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Cover
The Great White Fleet arrives in
Australia, August 20, 1908. In “The
Great White Fleet Sails Today? TwentyFirst-Century Logistics Lessons from
the 1907–1909 Voyage of the Great
White Fleet,” Christopher McMahon uses
the difficulties the battle fleet of the U.S.
Navy encountered on its around-theworld voyage of more than a century
ago to make the case that USN forces
attempting to operate in the western
Pacific area during a modern crisis likely
would suffer from many of the same
logistical vulnerabilities.
Credit: Australian National Maritime
Museum, via Wikimedia Commons
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FROM THE EDITORS
The reemergence of great-power competition in a multipolar world is seen, widely and rightly, as the most important feature of the current strategic environment.
All too often today, however, historical precedents for this new global order are
remembered only dimly, at best. The rise of China in the twenty-first century as
a great power—and especially and increasingly as a great maritime power—calls
for renewed attention to these precedents. In “Nationalism, Geopolitics, and Naval Expansionism: From the Nineteenth Century to the Rise of China,” Robert
S. Ross offers a systematic survey of three historical cases that provide a useful
framework for understanding the contemporary Chinese challenge: France in the
1850s under Louis-Napoléon, Germany in the two decades preceding the First
World War, and the United States during the presidency of Theodore Roosevelt.
In all three cases, naval expansionism was driven by a combination of committed
political leadership and nationalist sentiment rather than by any careful strategic
calculus. The geopolitical circumstances facing France and Germany caused
these efforts to be ineffective and indeed counterproductive, while in the American case our geographical isolation favored the fundamental transformation of
the United States into a major maritime power. Ross argues that, while China no
longer faces a serious continental threat (he offers an interesting analysis here of
the Russia-China relationship), its maritime ambitions are not about to go uncontested. Whether the strategic costs associated with those ambitions are worth
the candle is the large question he poses to the reader. Robert Ross is a professor
of political science at Boston College.
In “Escalation at Sea: Stability and Instability in Maritime East Asia,” Ian Bowers addresses one dimension of the potential strategic costs of confrontation in
the South China Sea. He argues that the nature of the maritime environment itself
is such that the risk of dangerous escalation of incidents at sea is less than often
supposed, with reference particularly to the history of U.S.-Soviet interactions
of this kind. Ian Bowers is an associate professor at the Norwegian Institute for
Defence Studies.
The increasingly contested nature of the maritime domain of the present has
an important implication for U.S. naval forces that too often is overlooked. As
Christopher McMahon argues in “The Great White Fleet Sails Today? TwentyFirst-Century Logistics Lessons from the 1907–1909 Voyage of the Great White
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2018
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Fleet,” the sealift capabilities currently available to the U.S. military are inadequate; dangerously dependent on foreign sources; and, in any serious international conflict, highly vulnerable to destruction. This is particularly so in the
western Pacific, as the Chinese continue a rapid expansion of their long-range
antiship missile forces. Christopher J. McMahon currently holds the Maritime
Administration Emory S. Land Chair of Merchant Marine Affairs at the Naval
War College.
Two historical studies of crisis decision-making round out the current issue. In
“The Cuban Missile Crisis and the Joint Chiefs: Military Operations to Meet Political Ends,” Dan Martins provides a carefully researched account of the oft-told
tale of President John F. Kennedy’s management of political-military decisionmaking during the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962. Finally, in “Coalition
Coordination during the Boxer Rebellion: How Twenty-Seven ‘Councils of
Senior Naval Commanders’ Contributed to the Conduct of Operations,” Umio
Otsuka tells the little-known story of the improvised organizational arrangement
devised by the on-scene allied naval commanders to manage the crisis created
by the Boxer Rebellion in China in 1900. Commander Dan Martins is a serving
U.S. naval officer. Vice Admiral Umio Otsuka is Director General, Defense Intelligence Headquarters, Ministry of Defense of Japan.
IF YOU VISIT US
Our editorial offices are located in Sims Hall, in the Naval War College Coasters
Harbor Island complex, on the third floor, west wing (rooms W334, 335, 309,
332). For building-security reasons, it would be necessary to meet you at the main
entrance and escort you to our suite—give us a call ahead of time (401-841-2236).
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Rear Admiral Jeff Harley is the fifty-sixth President
of the U.S. Naval War College. The College is responsible for educating future leaders, developing their
strategic perspective and critical thinking, and enhancing their capability to advise senior leaders and
policy makers.
Admiral Harley is a career surface warfare officer
whose sea-duty assignments have included command
of USS Milius (DDG 69), Destroyer Squadron 9, and
Amphibious Force Seventh Fleet / Expeditionary
Strike Group 7 / Task Force 76. During his command
of Milius, the ship participated in combat operations
supporting Operation IRAQI FREEDOM and his crew
won the Battle Efficiency Award and the Marjorie
Sterrett Battleship Fund Award for overall combat
readiness.
Admiral Harley attended the University of Minnesota, graduating with a bachelor of arts in political
science, and received master of arts degrees from the
Naval War College and the Fletcher School of Law
and Diplomacy, Tufts University. Additionally, he
served as a military fellow at the Council on Foreign
Relations in New York City.
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PRESIDENT’S FORUM

Your U.S. Naval War College: From Great to Greater

ON JUNE 15, 2018, your Naval War College brought to a close the

2017–18 academic year, with all the pomp and circumstance
the occasion deserved. We were honored to have Defense Secretary James Mattis
address the 544 resident and nonresident students in attendance, from the Navy,
Marine Corps, Air Force, Army, Coast Guard, federal civilian agencies, and the
College’s international programs. When we add in the students who graduated in
the November 2017 and March 2018 midyear ceremonies and the 991 students
who completed course work through our College of Distance Education programs, we arrive at a grand total of 1,647 students in the class of 2018. That this
class is one of the largest in the College’s 134-year history serves as one indication
of the positive influence this great institution continues to have on the Navy and
the nation. Also during this ceremony, we were able to award the first twenty
Naval War College international master’s degrees ever presented, to a select group
of our students from allied nations who worked side by side with their American
counterparts in meeting the requirements for this academic degree.
In his commencement remarks, Secretary Mattis stated: “We are witnessing a
world awash in change—a world beset by the reemergence of great-power competition, and we define the categories of challenges as urgency, power, and political will.”
He went on to say that he expects the school’s graduates “to be at the top of your
game mentally, physically, and spiritually, and to work to maintain that standard
throughout the rest of your career.” The graduates, he added, now have “the credentials to measure up in the crucible of combat, and your character must do the
rest.” He closed with an admonition to the students to “Keep your wits about you,
keep your grace under fire, your civility with subordinates; inspiring those you lead
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with humility and intellectual rigor, and reconciling war’s grim realities with your
political leaders’ aspirations.”
Just days prior to graduation we hosted the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief
of Naval Operations, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, and many other
distinguished visitors during this year’s Current Strategy Forum, which served
as the capstone event of our academic year. This was the sixty-ninth forum held
since the inception of the series, and the theme—“Technology, Innovation, and
Strategy”—was particularly relevant to the challenges we foresee for our graduates in the decades to come. The presence of leaders from the Department of
Defense and the Department of the Navy here in Newport is indicative of the
resurgence of interest in and support for the education and professional development of our officers and senior enlisted personnel. In a related subject, we are
intensely involved in the Department of the Navy’s Education for Seapower study
(referred to as E4S), which is being led by Under Secretary of the Navy Thomas
Modly. He has formed an independent team of subject matter experts to conduct
a comprehensive study of learning throughout the Department of the Navy. I will
share with you their recommendations when they are made to the Secretary of
the Navy early next year.
Looking downrange, this September we will host the twenty-third International Seapower Symposium, titled “Security, Order, Prosperity.” This truly
unique event, held biennially, often is referred to as the largest gathering of maritime leaders in the history of the world. For nearly a half-century, this symposium
has provided a forum for senior leaders from allied navies and coast guards from
around the globe to discuss common maritime challenges and consider opportunities to enhance international maritime security cooperation and improve fleet
operations. More than one hundred service chiefs and war college presidents
will spend three days discussing crucial issues and engaging with panels of distinguished speakers. I will share the results of this major event in future issues of
the Review.
From my vantage point, I see all the trend lines at the College moving in positive directions. We have taken significant steps to ensure that the College remains
the Navy’s flagship institution for top-quality graduate and professional military
education. The combination of motivated and engaged students, dedicated scholars and teachers, and relevant and constantly refined curricula will ensure that
the return on the Navy’s and the nation’s investment will be direct and sustained.
In the years ahead, a large and growing cadre of enlightened critical thinkers
will go forth from Newport to succeed in positions of leadership and senior
management throughout the national security community of the United States
and our friends and allies. The College is committed to ensuring that our alumni
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are recognized universally as better decision makers, more effective leaders, and
more compassionate and patriotic citizens.

JEFFREY A. HARLEY

Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
President, U.S. Naval War College
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Robert S. Ross is a professor of political science at Boston College and an associate at the John King Fairbank
Center for Chinese Studies, Harvard University. He
has been a visiting scholar at the Institute for Security
Studies, Peking University; a Fulbright professor at the
Chinese Foreign Affairs College; and a visiting senior
fellow at the Institute of International Strategic Studies, Tsinghua University. From 2007 to 2016, he was an
adjunct professor at the Institute for Defence Studies,
Norwegian Defence University College, and in 2009 he
was a visiting scholar at the Institute for Strategy, Royal Danish Defence College. His recent publications include coediting Strategic Adjustment and the Rise of
China: Power and Politics in East Asia (Cornell, 2017)
and authoring Chinese Security Policy: Structure,
Power, and Politics (Routledge, 2009). He has testified
before Senate and House committees and the Defense
Policy Board Advisory Committee. He is a member of
the Academic Advisory Group, U.S.-China Working
Group of the U.S. Congress, and is a consultant to U.S.
government agencies.
© 2018 by Robert S. Ross
Naval War College Review, Autumn 2018, Vol. 71, No. 4

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol71/iss4/1

Autumn2018Review.indb 10

16

8/6/18 8:49 AM

Naval War College: Autumn 2018 Full Issue

NATIONALISM, GEOPOLITICS, AND NAVAL
EXPANSIONISM
From the Nineteenth Century to the Rise of China
Robert S. Ross

T

here is perhaps no more momentous great-power strategic decision, short
of launching a war, than to develop a power-projection, war-winning maritime capability—thereby challenging, and risking heightened conflict with, an
established maritime power. The likely costs of such a decision should caution
the rising power against pursuing expansive naval ambitions. Such costs include
the long-term costs of building the requisite number of surface ships that possess
the advanced engineering and military capabilities necessary to enable maritime
security; of diverting resources from other pressing territorial-defense and domestic demands; of suffering the predictable societal, economic, and security
impacts of heightened and protracted great-power conflict; of preparing for the
possibility of great-power war; and ultimately, perhaps, of losing a great-power
war.
Despite these generalized risks entailed in pursuing destabilizing maritime
capabilities, and frequently despite particular risks inherent to their insecure
geopolitical circumstances and interior borders, many great powers have pursued extensive great-power maritime capabilities. In the past two hundred years,
France twice challenged British maritime hegemony. The United States initiated
its effort to develop global maritime capabilities in the early twentieth century.
Germany challenged British maritime security in the early twentieth century.
Russia frequently sought great-maritime-power capabilities, including in the
1850s, in the 1890s and the early twenty-first century, and in the late 1970s and
’80s. Japan simultaneously sought maritime hegemony in the western Pacific
Ocean and continental hegemony on the East Asian mainland in the 1930s. In
the twenty-first century, China has launched an extensive buildup of its navy to
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secure great-power maritime capabilities and to challenge U.S. maritime dominance in East Asia.
Great-power development of destabilizing maritime capabilities frequently
has reflected the nationalist aspirations for great-power status associated with
the possession of large capital ships and a reputation for maritime dominance.
Great-power nationalist aspirations may reflect the personal ambitions of autocratic leaders, the pressures on unstable autocratic regimes to use nationalism to
enhance domestic legitimacy, the popular aspirations of voters in a democratic
state for international prestige, or a combination thereof. But whatever its particular sources, naval nationalism can have the effect of encouraging expansionist
maritime policies, which can force acquisitions that are not informed by strategic
interests and that ultimately undermine security and contribute to unnecessary
and costly great-power conflict, including war.
This article examines three case studies of nationalist-driven great-power
maritime aspirations from the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. It addresses
the role of nationalism in driving French maritime ambitions in the 1850s and
1860s, under the leadership of Louis-Napoléon; German maritime ambitions in
the early 1900s, under the leadership of Kaiser Wilhelm II; and U.S. maritime
ambitions in the late 1890s and especially at the beginning of the following
decade, during the presidency of Theodore Roosevelt. In each case, the article
examines the high cost of the revisionist power’s naval expansionism, the relative
importance of its strategic and economic maritime interests to its naval buildup,
and the nonmaterial nationalist sources of its expanding maritime ambitions and
quest for great-power status. It places these countries’ naval nationalism within
the context of their distinct geopolitical circumstances and the challenges to their
continental security interests, explaining both the failures of French and German
naval expansionism and the success of American naval expansionism.
The article’s fourth case study examines China’s recent ambition to acquire
great-power maritime capabilities. Like the other case studies, this one considers
the material and nationalist sources of China’s naval ambitions. It also analyzes
China’s recent naval expansionism in the context of China’s post–Cold War geopolitical circumstances, considers the prospects for China’s success, and explores
the implications for great-power politics and U.S.-Chinese relations.
NATIONALISM, FRENCH NAVAL AMBITIONS IN THE 1850s AND
’60s, AND THE ANGLO-FRENCH NAVAL ARMS RACE
In 1858, following the attempted assassination of Louis-Napoléon by Italian
nationalists based in England and led by Felice Orsini, France began a major
expansion of its maritime defense budget and its naval shipbuilding program.1
The catalyst for the French buildup was British naval power and popular French
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol71/iss4/1
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hostility toward the apparent inadequacy of British opposition to anti-French
terrorists in the aftermath of the failed assassination attempt.
The era began with France’s completion in 1858 of the large, modern port
facilities at Cherbourg on the English Channel—directly across from English
shores.2 France also deployed more ships in the English Channel, and with
construction of the Suez Canal it expanded its presence in the Mediterranean
Sea, thus posing a growing challenge to British maritime security. France also
significantly increased its defense spending through the early 1860s to support
its naval buildup; in six years the French naval budget grew by over 30 percent.
Louis-Napoléon also increased French naval personnel, so that the number of
French sailors and marines was nearly twice the British total.3
Along with increased naval spending and naval expansion, France launched a
new stage of naval competition when it preceded Great Britain in the construction of the first ironclad capital ship. In 1858, it ordered construction of six ironclads; it began constructing the first that year and another in 1859; and it commissioned the first, Gloire, in 1860. France thus began a rapid ship-construction
program, and by the end of the decade it had constructed twenty-six ironclads,
representing a challenge to Great Britain in the form of potential maritime supremacy in British coastal waters.4
As French naval power grew, the regime explicitly challenged British security.
In 1860, the French ambassador in London warned that if Great Britain did not
accept French ambitions in Europe, France would destroy the foundations of
British naval power. Napoléon III publicly aspired to turn the Mediterranean Sea
into a “French lake.”5
Louis-Napoléon, Nationalism, and French Naval Ambition
France’s ambitious maritime policy was financially costly and strategically risky.
While the country increased its naval budget, its army budget stagnated and its
continental defense capability languished. At the outset of the naval buildup,
France’s naval ambitions also risked heightened conflict with Great Britain. The
combination of belligerent French diplomacy and the naval buildup created the
1859–60 French “invasion scare” in England. French naval ambitions alarmed
Queen Victoria and Prince Consort Albert. Queen Victoria argued that Great
Britain’s “very existence may be said to depend” on the country’s resolve to maintain its maritime supremacy. The prime minister, Henry J. Temple, Lord Palmerston, was especially alarmed by the French buildup and successfully argued for
funding the rapid fortification of British harbors and dockyards.6
France’s challenge to British maritime supremacy was intrinsically risky, yet
French naval ambitions were not fueled by either relative expanded financial
resources or increased security or economic concerns. Trends in relative British

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2018

Autumn2018Review.indb 13

19

8/6/18 8:49 AM

14

NAVA L WA R C O L L E G E R E V I E W

Naval War College Review, Vol. 71 [2018], No. 4, Art. 1

and French economic development in the 1850s did not suggest a financial opportunity for France to outspend Great Britain in a naval arms race. On the
contrary, during the 1850s trends in British and French economic growth significantly reduced French financial competitive ability vis-à-vis Great Britain, and by
1860 British gross domestic product (GDP) was approximately 40 percent greater
than French GDP, so Great Britain was in a much better position to fund an arms
race.7 Moreover, unlike France, because of its territorial security Great Britain
could prioritize funding for the navy within its overall defense budget.
France’s growing naval budget burden also did not represent a strategic response to increased British maritime capabilities. From the end of the Crimean
War through 1859, London maintained a moderate maritime budget and shipbuilding program and the
Louis-Napoléon’s preoccupation with greatstrength of its fleet declined,
power status to the detriment of security
even as France modernized
contributed to a devastating French military
and expanded the size of its
defeat, the demise of his nationalist regime,
fleet. London showed miniand his exile from France.
mal interest in developing
ironclad ships. Moreover, the
bulk of British ships remained in distant waters rather than in the vicinity of
French coastal waters.8 Thus, heightened threat perception did not drive France’s
revisionist maritime acquisitions.
Similarly, concern for economic security did not drive France’s heightened
maritime ambitions. Despite France’s colonial presence in northern Africa and
its recent acquisition of colonies in Indochina, France remained dependent on its
continental economic relationships. In 1858, approximately two-thirds of French
total trade was conducted with four of its immediate neighbors: Belgium, Germany, Italy, and Spain. During the decade prior to the onset of the American Civil
War in 1860, the United States was France’s leading single trade partner, but the
U.S. portion of total French trade declined over the course of the 1850s.9 Thus,
growing global economic interests and the increased importance of protecting
sea-lanes and overseas trade relationships did not drive France’s heightened interest in maritime power and its challenge to British security.
Thus, in general, material interests cannot explain France’s costly pursuit
of maritime ambitions and its challenge to British maritime security. Rather,
France’s naval ambitions reflected a combination of Louis-Napoléon’s personal
commitment to developing French naval power and his use of French naval
power to sustain his domestic political legitimacy, and thereby the stability of his
autocratic regime. The French fleet under Louis-Napoléon was a “prestige fleet.”
In its support for Louis-Napoléon, the French populace sought glory over all else,
and the navy was the “principal instrument of glory.”10
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Louis-Napoléon’s overwhelming election as president in 1848 and his continuing popularity reflected his populist legitimacy among the rural masses as the
French leader. They believed he represented the interests of the people rather
than the aristocracy and would restore the glory of the French empire. He was
the “Napoléon of the people.” His antiaristocratic coup d’état in 1851 and the
restoration of the empire were well received as promasses, populist measures.11
Nonetheless, potential opposition to his regime was a constant concern, and he
depended on the army to maintain domestic stability and suppress potential opposition movements. In this political context, an essential aspect of Napoléon’s
domestic legitimacy derived from his stature as a military leader. On his election
to the presidency in 1848, he put on a military uniform and posed as an imperial
leader, and frequently reviewed the troops with great fanfare. Moreover, popular
support in the 1850s for military adventurism contributed to France’s military
policies and its participation in the Crimean War, its war in Italy, and its Mexican
expedition.12 Napoléon’s “forward foreign policy,” including his support for war
against Russia, reflected his effort to retain his “precarious hold upon the French
people.”13
In the aftermath of Louis-Napoléon’s succession of military successes in the
1850s, French naval nationalism assumed heightened importance as a source of
the regime’s legitimacy. Moreover, following the Orsini bomb plot, French public
opinion turned against London. Orsini’s bomb had been made in England, and
the French public was dissatisfied with British efforts to curtail subsequent antiFrench activities in England.14 In this domestic and international context, despite
Louis-Napoléon’s commitment to Anglo-French cooperation, his domestic political interests encouraged him to pursue French international prestige through
the construction of world-class maritime capabilities.
In addition to his domestic political interest in developing expansive naval
power, Louis-Napoléon also possessed a strong personal nationalist interest in
military affairs, and particularly in maritime power and French shipbuilding.
He played an active role in developing day-to-day French naval policy, and he
personally decided that France should commence construction of the world’s
first ironclad ship. Following the French bombardment of Sevastopol during the
Crimean War in 1854 and the substantial damage that return fire inflicted on
French wooden ships, Louis-Napoléon proposed the development of ironclads.
He then actively promoted research into ironclad technologies and ordered and
oversaw the early experiments of the armor-plated ships, leading to the completion of Gloire. He also made detailed recommendations for the dimensions of
particular ships for particular missions. He was thus an active “lobbyist” on
behalf of the French navy and the “prime catalyst” of French maritime innovation. The ironclads were the “Emperor’s own creation,” and he had “inaugurated
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a great revolution in naval architecture.”15 His intrinsic fascination with naval
matters made possible the allocation of scarce financial resources away from
the French army for the construction and deployment of ironclads, which fed
France’s ambition to become a major maritime power and challenge British
maritime security.
Geopolitics and the Failure of French Nationalism
Not only did Louis-Napoléon’s leadership of French populist nationalism and his
personal naval ambitions fail to promote greater French maritime security and
French great-power status, but rather they contributed to a major weakening of
French security. In 1858, in response to France’s completion of its naval base at
Cherbourg and the continuance of its ambitious shipbuilding program, Great
Britain fortified its coastal regions and began deployment of a Channel Fleet—an
unusual policy in peacetime. Thousands of British volunteer riflemen went to the
shore to defend Great Britain’s coast from the French navy.16
Then, when French construction of the first ironclads threatened to make
British Royal Navy ships obsolete, Great Britain in 1859 began construction
of its own ironclads, launching HMS Warrior in December. Between October
1860 and August 1861, Great Britain increased its planned construction of ironclads from four to fifteen ships. In response to France’s numerical superiority
in ironclads, Britain abandoned its ongoing construction of wooden, screwpropulsion liners in favor of an all-ironclad fleet. Moreover, Great Britain’s ironclads were superior to France’s ironclads, in that they had iron hulls, in contrast
to the wooden hulls of the French ironclads. In addition, British ironclads were
over 50 percent larger than French ironclads. Trends in numerical superiority
also favored Great Britain.17
By the early 1860s, England’s superior financial resources and industrial
strength had dashed any French hope that France might take a permanent lead
over Great Britain in warship construction. By the mid-1860s, France had no
choice but to acquiesce to enduring British maritime superiority, and both sides
returned to their pre–arms race levels of defense spending, in keeping with a
status quo ante maritime balance of power.18
But the greatest impact of Louis-Napoléon’s personal preoccupation with
maritime affairs and France’s popular nationalist naval aspirations was the effect on French continental security. Despite Louis-Napoléon’s dependence on
the army for his political base, domestic prestige, and maintenance of domestic
stability, the army was the weakest of the French armed services. The service was
poorly administered and Napoléon neglected to use his authority to modernize
the ground forces and impose needed reforms on recruitment and training.19
Thus, in the 1870–71 Franco-Prussian War, the French army performed poorly,
failing to provide even modest resistance to the Prussian invasion.
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Meanwhile, during the war the navy was mostly irrelevant, as the decisive battles were fought on land, not at sea. But equally revealing was the French navy’s
poor wartime performance, despite its numerical superiority over the Prussian
navy. By the time the navy mobilized for war, the decisive land battles were over
and the outcome of the war had been decided. Napoléon’s focus on the development of a large maritime fleet to enhance French great-power prestige did not
include development of the intelligence and training required to deploy the fleet
quickly and effectively.20
French resources and Louis-Napoléon’s military interests would have served
France better if they had focused on continental security rather than French
maritime grandeur, and if France had maintained a low-cost yet effective guerre
de course capability that could protect French trading interests. France pursued
this strategy in the aftermath of the Franco-Prussian War when it developed
its “asymmetric” Jeune École maritime policy.21 Ultimately, however, LouisNapoléon’s preoccupation with great-power status to the detriment of security
contributed to a devastating French military defeat, the demise of his nationalist
regime, and his exile from France.
NATIONALISM, GERMAN NAVAL AMBITIONS, AND THE
PRE–WORLD WAR I ANGLO-GERMAN NAVAL ARMS RACE
Beginning in 1898, Germany launched a major naval shipbuilding effort that
imposed a significant financial burden on the country’s finances and provoked
a dangerous arms race with Great Britain. In 1898, Germany’s First Naval Law
funded the construction over six years of nineteen battleships and an additional
fifty ships. Two years later, the Second Naval Law nearly doubled the scope of
this plan, providing unlimited funding for construction of thirty-eight battleships and a total of ninety-six ships. Between 1900 and 1905, Germany laid down
twelve battleships.
When Great Britain responded to Germany’s naval buildup with the construction of the first Dreadnought-class battleship in 1905, thus neutralizing Germany’s superior matériel, Germany countered with its own dreadnought program,
determined to outrace Britain and challenge its maritime dominance. The 1906
German Novelle (supplemental bill) allocated funding for two dreadnoughts and
increased naval spending by 35 percent.
But British efforts to sustain the naval arms race led to ever-further expansion of Germany’s shipbuilding plans and to greater German naval expenditures.
Between 1905 and 1914, the German naval budget increased by 102 percent and
absorbed an ever-larger share of the total defense budget. Between 1901 and
1909, the German naval budget nearly equaled the entire German budget deficit,
and it continued to grow.22
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Kaiser Wilhelm, Nationalism, and German Naval Ambition
Germany’s naval ambitions were strategically risky. They provoked a naval arms
race with Britain and risked a British preventive attack on the nascent German
fleet, a “Copenhagen.” British leaders, including Admiral of the Fleet Sir John A.
Fisher and Civil Lord of the Admiralty Arthur Lee, advocated such an attack, and
German leaders, including State Secretary of the Imperial Naval Office Admiral
Alfred von Tirpitz, were acutely aware of the risk of a British preventive attack
before Germany could achieve a deterrent capability, during the “danger zone”
of its naval buildup.23 Equally important, Germany’s naval ambitions threatened
the German ground force’s capability and German continental security. As tension mounted on the continent and the likelihood of war increased, budget
competition from the navy increasingly constrained the German army’s access
to resources. From 1904 to 1912, while the naval budget climbed 137 percent, the
army budget grew 47 percent. Despite Germany’s precarious two-front territorial
defense dilemma, from 1889 to 1911 the relative size of the naval budget grew
from 20 percent to nearly 55 percent of the army budget, so Germany essentially
was allocating equal financing to the navy and each of the land fronts.24
Neither expanded relative financial resources nor increased security or economic interests can explain Germany’s ambitious and risky naval ambitions. Unlike France in the 1850s and ’60s, Germany experienced considerable industrial
development in the 1880s and ’90s. From 1880 to 1900, the German GDP grew a
remarkable 44 percent; during this same period, the British GDP grew less than
30 percent. But because of Great Britain’s prior significant economic lead over
Germany, Germany’s more rapid economic development did not enable it to
diminish significantly Britain’s financial advantage; in 1900, the British economy
remained nearly one-third larger than the German economy. Overall, British
global industrial domination diminished in the last decades of the nineteenth
century, but Germany’s industrial development had not yet yielded it the financial parity with Great Britain that could foster the confidence necessary to challenge British maritime dominance. On the contrary, rather than benefiting from
German economic growth, Germany’s increased naval budget was a major source
of Germany’s budget deficit.25 Moreover, Germany should have been cautioned
further by the British ability to prioritize its naval budget over its army budget,
unlike Germany.
Germany’s ready dismissal of its economic constraints did not reflect a heightened British maritime threat to German security. During the 1880s and early ’90s,
the British navy became increasingly overextended as its colonial commitments
came under challenge, not only in distant waters of the Western Hemisphere and
East Asia, but also in European waters, with the rise of the French and Russian
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navies and the prospect of Franco-Russian cooperation. The latter development
challenged British maritime security in the Mediterranean Sea and compelled
Great Britain to budget so as to maintain its two-power standard. Moreover,
worldwide interest in maritime power had stimulated ship production among all
the great powers. Whereas in 1893 British battleships nearly equaled in number
the combined total of all the other great powers’ battleships, in 1897 its advantage
had disappeared; it now possessed approximately two-thirds of the total of the
other great powers’ battleships. In this transformed strategic environment, Great
Britain reduced its strategic
Kaiser Wilhelm’s pursuit of his personal naval commitments in the Caribbean Sea and in Northeast
ambitions and his political manipulation of
Asia and redeployed much
popular German naval nationalism not only
of its fleet to the Mediterfailed to promote German maritime security
ranean.26 Thus, in the 1890s,
. . . but contributed to a major weakening of
British maritime capabilities
German continental security.
and deployments did not pose
a growing threat to German maritime security that might explain Germany’s
insistence on incurring the financial and strategic burdens of unrestrained naval
expansion and an Anglo-German arms race.
Germany’s global colonial and economic interests expanded in the 1890s and
the early twentieth century, but they were not a compelling driver of naval expansion either. Granted, Chancellor Otto von Bismarck’s interest in colonial expansion and Germany’s acquisitions in Africa and the Pacific Ocean in the 1880s and
’90s created a German motivation to protect its colonial possessions and its trade
with its new colonies; moreover, from 1899 to 1910, as Germany required evergreater exports to support its growing industrial sector, total German foreign
trade increased by nearly 80 percent, creating in parallel a greater German interest in maritime security.27 Nonetheless, German colonies made only a secondary
contribution to German economic prosperity. As late as 1895, over 60 percent
of Germany’s trade was with its European neighbors. The overwhelming share
of Germany’s remaining trade, and its most important overseas trade, was conducted with the United States. German trade with its colonies was insignificant.28
Thus, for Germany, economic security priorities lay in continental security.
Thus, in the mid-1890s Chancellor Leo von Caprivi argued that Germany
should not seek maritime security through development of a major oceangoing
fleet. In particular, he argued that Germany lacked the maritime potential to
guarantee its transatlantic trade with the United States. Because Germany’s continental neighbors were its most important trading partners and its colonies were
inconsequential to German economic security, Caprivi believed that Germany
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should concentrate its defense resources on its ground forces to enable it to dominate the continent, and that it should develop only a limited counterblockade
capability to ensure continued access to overseas trade.29 But Caprivi’s prudent
foreign policy preferences failed to gain the kaiser’s support, and advocates of
naval expansion soon dominated the development of German maritime policy.
As in the discussion of the sources of French maritime policy from 1858
through the 1860s under Louis-Napoléon, German material interests cannot explain Germany’s costly maritime ambitions in the 1890s and early twentieth century and its challenge to British maritime security. Rather, similarly to France’s
ambitions under Louis-Napoléon, Germany’s revisionist naval ambitions and
its maritime policies reflected the destructive combination of Kaiser Wilhelm’s
personal nationalist commitment to developing a global naval capability that
would challenge British maritime dominance and the growing dependence of the
regime on nationalism for domestic legitimacy.
Kaiser Wilhelm’s commitment to building a world-class German navy, regardless of the strategic and financial impediments, reflected his personal obsession
with naval power and his association of naval power with great-power status and
Germany’s destiny. He considered the head of state to be the “officer of the watch
of the ship of state” and identified his historic mission as the development of a
German navy with stature and capabilities similar to those of the German army.
He personally telegraphed shipbuilding orders to the naval yards. He bestowed on
himself the title of grand admiral of the Imperial German Navy, and he enjoyed
his status as admiral of the Russian navy; admiral of the royal navies of Great Britain, Sweden, Norway, and Denmark; and honorary admiral of the Greek navy. He
possessed a personal flotilla of naval ships that he used for his summer voyages.
From the earliest days of his regime he wore his naval uniform and saw to it that
he was the only member of the German aristocracy to wear an executive naval
officer’s uniform. He also dressed his sons in naval uniforms. As Admiral Tirpitz
later reported, Wilhelm regarded the German navy as his “mechanical toy.”30
Wilhelm associated his personal attachment to naval power with the necessary emergence of Germany as the preeminent world power. When he spoke of
Germany achieving its “place in the sun” he meant that Germany must possess
the world’s most powerful navy. In August 1911, when Germany’s arms race with
Great Britain was at its height, he declared that Germany must strengthen its
navy “so that we can be sure that nobody will dispute with us our place in the sun
which belongs to us!” He insisted that in distant oceans of the globe “no important decision should be taken without Germany and the German Kaiser.” He believed that “without being a world power one was nothing but a poor appearance.”
When he encountered among his advisers opposition to his plans to increase the
naval budget, he exclaimed, “I will not allow England to tell me what to do.”31
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But Germany’s revisionist naval ambitions, its challenge to British maritime
security, and its initiation of the arms race reflected more than Kaiser Wilhelm’s
personal preoccupation with maritime power and his commitment to German
great-power status and nationalist aspirations. Germany under Wilhelm was
experiencing intensifying societal pressures for political reform of its autocratic
monarchy. In these circumstances, rather than yield to popular demands for
liberalization, Wilhelm and his conservative advisers developed domestic and
foreign policies that would unify the German people behind Wilhelm and his
autocratic leadership and consolidate his monarchy.32 For the German autocracy,
the navy was the most powerful source of German nationalist unity, so appeals
to German naval power served the interests of the German regime as well as
Wilhelm’s personal ambitions, just as naval expansionism had served LouisNapoléon’s interest in bolstering regime legitimacy.
In the aftermath of German unification, many of Germany’s institutions,
including the army, railways, and postal service, were not national institutions
but institutions of the German component states. Because a German navy did
not exist prior to unification in 1871, it was created by the new German imperial
government under the direct authority of the kaiser. It was the foremost German
“national institution.” In addition, the navy embodied German middle-class concepts of German culture and international economic superiority. And unlike the
German army, the German navy was not the exclusive realm of the aristocracy;
members of the German bourgeoisie could enlist in the navy and rise through
the ranks to become senior officers. This created widespread popular support for
the German navy.33
Within German society, the Navy League occupied a prominent place. It was
the most popular of all Germany’s various nationalist groups, including the PanGerman League and the Colonial Society, and it established branches throughout
the country. Despite its later start, in 1898, within its first eighteen months, the
Navy League surpassed in total membership all the other nationalist groups combined. The 1900 Second Naval Law stimulated a major increase in Navy League
membership, and by 1907 it had over a million members and associates, making
its membership over eight times larger than that of the Colonial Society.34
Thus, on the one hand, for German naval leaders seeking support for naval
spending, appeals to popular nationalism were effective. Wilhelm understood
this and planned budget politics accordingly, to realize his personal nationalist
ambitions.35 On the other hand, for the German elite seeking to promote its nationalist credentials and foster national unity under the monarchy, the navy was
the perfect nationalist instrument. Thus, as in France under Louis-Napoléon, a
mutually reinforcing relationship existed between Kaiser Wilhelm’s use of popular naval nationalism to serve his personal ambition for Germany’s naval buildup
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and its great-power status and the monarchy’s use of naval expansionism to enhance popular support for the regime. Admiral Tirpitz well understood this dual
value of naval nationalism.36
Geopolitics and the Failure of German Nationalism
Kaiser Wilhelm’s pursuit of his personal naval ambitions and his political manipulation of popular German naval nationalism not only failed to promote German maritime security and Germany’s “place in the sun” as a maritime power but
contributed to a major weakening of German continental security.37 Despite Germany’s extensive effort to compete with British naval power, throughout World
War I the German fleet of dreadnoughts was unable to challenge British maritime
supremacy. In the decade prior to World War I, whereas Berlin allocated between
19 and 26 percent of its defense budget to the navy, London allocated 60 percent
of its defense budget to the navy. Ultimately, Wilhelm and Tirpitz had to give up
the naval race to focus Germany’s limited resources on its army and continental
security.38
Great Britain’s victory in the naval race enabled it to impose a close-in blockade
of German maritime trade for the duration of the war. The German fleet ventured
into the North Sea to engage the British fleet just once during the war. Although
Germany fared better than Britain in the 1916 battle of Jutland and could claim
a tactical victory, its greater losses relative to the sizes of the respective fleets deterred Germany from seeking a second engagement. Its fleet remained in harbor
for the remainder of the war, essentially irrelevant to its outcome.39
But the greatest impact of Germany’s nationalist naval ambition was its diversion of scarce economic resources from more strategically important priorities,
and thus its contribution to German military defeat in World War I. In the maritime theater, Wilhelm’s preoccupation with battleships led him to neglect German development of a cost-effective counterblockade submarine fleet that could
have posed a more secure and effective threat against the British fleet.40
In contrast, Adolf Hitler later would understand the value of a less expensive
submarine capability to a continental power’s blockade and counterblockade
capabilities. In September 1939, after the early successes of his U-boats against
British shipping, Hitler switched to construction of a massive U-boat fleet. His
guerre de course strategy drastically reduced British imports, while posing a minimal constraint on Germany’s continental capabilities.41
In the continental theater of World War I, the effect of Wilhelm’s failure to
place sufficient priority on German ground forces was all too clear on the western
front. Diversion of funds equivalent to the cost of even one dreadnought to create
an additional German division might well have enabled an early German victory
against France and altered the campaign on the eastern front against Russia.
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Ultimately, Kaiser Wilhelm’s intense military interests would have served
Germany better if he had focused on developing a more robust continental security force so as to dominate continental Europe, while procuring only a limited
maritime capability, rather than on securing Germany’s “place in the sun” as a
global maritime great power. Wilhelm’s nationalist preoccupation with German
naval preeminence on the high seas contributed to a devastating German military
defeat in World War I and the demise of his monarchy.
NATIONALISM, AMERICAN NAVAL AMBITIONS, AND AMERICA’S
RISE TO WORLD POWER
As was true of the sources of France’s and Germany’s expansive naval ambitions,
the development of expansive U.S. naval ambitions during Theodore Roosevelt’s
presidency in the first decade of the twentieth century did not reflect pressing
security or international economic concerns. Rather, similarly to the French and
German experiences, the U.S. maritime buildup reflected a combination of a
personal nationalist leadership commitment to developing great-power maritime
capabilities and the domestic politics of mass nationalism.
From the end of the Civil War until the passage in 1890 of the so-called Battleship Act, the United States neglected its navy; minimal funding and poor conditions allowed the deterioration of the country’s naval capabilities. The 1890 act
funded construction of three second-class battleships to provide a coastal, guerre
de course naval capability. Then in 1895 Congress authorized funding for the construction of the first two first-class American battleships and the development of
an oceangoing power-projection capability. In the ten years between 1900 and
1910, the U.S. Navy commissioned twenty-five first-class battleships, including
world-class dreadnought-type battleships, as well as many smaller ships. During
the Roosevelt presidency, the Navy commissioned twenty-one battleships. After
fifteen years of funding, in 1910 the U.S. Navy possessed the second-largest number of capital ships in the world.42
This naval buildup was the result of a fundamental reorientation of U.S.
military priorities. The 1890 naval act doubled in one year U.S. spending on the
Navy. During the Roosevelt presidency, the naval budget increased from fifty-five
million dollars to $140 million, a peacetime record for U.S. naval appropriations,
and the tonnage of U.S. capital ships doubled. The Roosevelt administration also
tripled the number of active-duty naval personnel. During this same period,
the U.S. Army budget stagnated and the number of army personnel decreased
by 20 percent. Whereas in 1900 the number of naval personnel was less than 20
percent that of army personnel, in 1910 that proportion was nearly 60 percent.
Increased naval spending during the Roosevelt presidency also changed federal

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2018

7210_Ross_LEAD.indd 23

29

8/8/18 11:13 AM

24

NAVA L WA R C O L L E G E R E V I E W

Naval War College Review, Vol. 71 [2018], No. 4, Art. 1

budget priorities. Between 1900 and 1910, the defense budget share of the overall
federal budget increased from 36.6 percent to 45.1 percent.43 Under Roosevelt’s
leadership, the United States began its transition from being a land power to a
naval power.
Theodore Roosevelt, Nationalism, and American Naval Ambition
Neither increased U.S. security concerns nor greater U.S. international economic
interests can explain the costly transformation in U.S. defense policy. In international security affairs, the rapid buildup of U.S. naval forces coincided with
the most secure era in U.S. history. Whereas since 1776 the United States had
been plagued with concerns about European military presence in the Western
Hemisphere and the implications for U.S. territorial security, by the time of the
Roosevelt administration all the European powers had retreated from the Western Hemisphere, withdrawing their naval presences to home waters to deal with
pressing European security concerns. The turning point in U.S. domination of
the western Atlantic was the outcome of the 1895 Anglo-Venezuelan boundary
dispute. Amid a context of German involvement in the Boer conflict in South
Africa, Russian challenges to the British presence in South Asia, and the rise of
the French and Russian navies, the growing threat of war with the United States
compelled Great Britain to concede the merits of the Monroe Doctrine and to
acknowledge the U.S. right to intervene in disputes between Latin American and
European countries. By 1902, Great Britain began a strategic withdrawal from the
Western Hemisphere, conceding U.S. maritime superiority, and it soon welcomed
American expansion, both in its colonial presence in the western Pacific and in
the form of the construction of the Panama Canal.44
Germany posed an equally remote threat to U.S. security. It had no naval
bases in the Western Hemisphere and faced multiple strategic challenges in
continental Europe and a costly maritime competition with Great Britain. By
the beginning of the Roosevelt administration, the combination of military and
political conditions had eliminated a German challenge to U.S. preeminence in
the Western Hemisphere. Both Kaiser Wilhelm and Chancellor Bernhard von
Bülow understood the importance of not antagonizing the United States.45 Thus,
during the 1901 German-Venezuelan dispute, Germany imposed a blockade on
Venezuela but shortly thereafter accepted U.S. mediation of the dispute, thus
concurring with Britain’s earlier acknowledgment of a U.S. right to intervene in
Latin America. The end of the German blockade signaled the demise of German
ambitions in Latin America.46
Nor could Japan threaten the United States. In 1890, the Japanese navy was
weaker than the U.S. Navy, and the Pacific Ocean was a formidable barrier to
Japanese power projection into the Western Hemisphere.47
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Thus, in 1890 the Naval Board recognized that the United States did not face a
threat from any advanced power, including Great Britain. By the early twentieth
century, the United States enjoyed “remarkable security,” and Theodore Roosevelt
understood this. He believed that Great Britain dared not provoke war with the
United States and that it had conceded leadership to the United States in the
Western Hemisphere.48 Any alleged threat from Germany was premised on that
country’s reputed long-term intentions, rather than on its immediate capabilities,
and Roosevelt understood the limits to the German challenge. Given current
trends in European great-power politics, a potential German naval threat did
not require a rapid and expensive buildup of the U.S. Navy. After the U.S. naval
buildup was well under way in 1906, Roosevelt raised the Japanese navy as a potential threat to U.S. security, but he also understood that if this threat developed
it would do so in the distant future. Throughout the Roosevelt presidency, the
absence of a threat to U.S. security frustrated the Navy’s effort to articulate a naval
policy and to justify a naval buildup.49
The United States also did not require a strong oceangoing navy to protect
its interests in foreign trade and international investments. In 1900, less than
10 percent of U.S. GDP came from foreign trade; exports constituted less than 5
percent of GDP.50 During the rise of U.S. naval power, the United States was not
a trading nation. Moreover, during this period the United States possessed only a
small commercial fleet; most U.S. trade was carried on foreign-flagged ships. The
United States gained colonial interests in the western Pacific Ocean following the
war of 1898, but the economic significance of the Philippines, of other U.S. Pacific
possessions, and of overall U.S. trade with East Asia did not require development
of a large navy to protect U.S. economic interests in the western Pacific. President
Roosevelt understood this and did not attempt to justify U.S. maritime expansion
on the basis of American economic interests.51
Similarly to the sources of French maritime policy from 1858 through the
1860s under Louis-Napoléon and of German maritime policy prior to World
War I, national material interests cannot explain expansive U.S. maritime ambitions in the early twentieth century. Rather, American revisionist naval ambitions
reflected dynamics similar to those that gave rise to French and German naval
ambitions. U.S. naval policies reflected President Roosevelt’s personal interest in
naval ships and his nationalist commitment to maritime power, combined with
the impact of American popular nationalism on the development of U.S. defense
policy.
According to Howard K. Beale, Theodore Roosevelt shared with Kaiser
Wilhelm a “boyish” fascination with naval ships. As a young boy, Roosevelt
greatly admired his two uncles who had served in the Confederate navy and he
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maintained a long-term relationship with them. In his senior year at Harvard he
began writing a scholarly volume on the naval history of the War of 1812. In his
introduction to the volume, Roosevelt expressed his personal outrage at the poor
condition of the U.S. Navy during the war and the importance of naval power
for national dignity. He wrote that it was “folly” for “the great English-speaking
Republic to possess such an old and inadequate fleet”; America deserved better.
Equally important for explaining his lifelong commitment to U.S. naval power
was the intrinsic excitement Roosevelt associated, from boyhood forward, with
naval warfare, along with the youthful pleasure, natural fun, and lifelong exhilaration he derived from having
America pursued its naval ambitions wearing and directing a large navy.52
Roosevelt’s early interest
the same strategic blinders as had France and
Germany. The United States succeeded where in and enthusiasm for naval
matters contributed to his
other great powers had failed because of the
strong personal attention
fortuitous combination of domestic circumto naval policy during his
stances with a strategic opportunity in greatpresidency. Throughout his
power politics.
presidency he possessed a
nearly “fanatical desire” and persistent determination to develop a large navy.
In contrast to his predecessors, he personally participated with Congress in developing naval appropriations legislation, and he used his considerable political
popularity and political drive to compel congressional support for his policies.
In his first message to Congress, in December 1901—within three months of his
inauguration—Roosevelt made a rousing appeal for a large navy, and soon thereafter he presented specific funding legislation. Throughout his presidency he was
personally involved in such detailed issues as the height of smokestacks and the
proper deployment of ships in battle groups.53
Roosevelt combined his personal interest in ships and navies with a nationalist
impulse to promote American great-power status in world affairs. In this respect,
the rise of the United States as a global naval power depended on the leader’s nationalist impulse, similarly to the dependence on the leaders’ nationalist impulses
of the development of the French navy under Louis-Napoléon and the German
navy under Kaiser Wilhelm.
Roosevelt and his associates, including Alfred Thayer Mahan and Henry
Cabot Lodge, were strong nationalists who were impelled by an overwhelming
pride in the United States. Roosevelt believed that American honor should be
placed above the honor of all other nations. Thus, he considered it “impertinence” for any country to be angry at U.S. actions, was intent on defending U.S.
honor and establishing U.S. resolve, and was determined to resist challenges to
U.S. achievement and maintenance of world-power status. Thus he argued that
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the United States required warships in numbers commensurate with “the greatness of our people” and that a large navy would serve U.S. prestige. When Britain
launched its first dreadnought, Roosevelt was determined that the United States
should possess the world’s largest battleships. He pushed through Congress funding for construction of U.S. dreadnoughts that were larger than those of both
Britain and Germany.54
Roosevelt’s nationalism, including his sense of American greatness, superiority, and infallibility and his inability to conceive of any reason for another nation
to oppose U.S. diplomacy and military policies, was rooted in his conviction of
the superiority of the Anglo-American race and its destiny to lead the world. The
United States stood for peace and civilization, and U.S. expansionism and imperialism, including the development of U.S. maritime power, reflected a national
obligation to crusade for international moral improvement and the spread of
civilization to “backward” peoples. In 1893, Roosevelt wrote that it would be “a
crime against white civilization” for the United States not to annex Hawaii. The
U.S. victory in the war against Spain and its territorial acquisitions in the Far East
should make Americans proud that the United States now could take its place
among the world’s great powers.55
Roosevelt’s nationalist aspirations for U.S. honor and international prestige
were important for the rise of the U.S. Navy. But equally important was the popular American nationalism that reinforced Roosevelt’s personal aspirations and
established the national democratic political conditions for U.S. naval expansionism. In the context of a significant economic recession in the 1890s and the final
fulfillment of Manifest Destiny from coast to coast and the end of the American
“frontier,” Americans were susceptible to emotional sources of renewed national
pride, including the superiority of American values and the legitimacy of U.S.
global power. American churches joined in the expansionist movement, promoting the “imperialism of righteousness” that would spread to the world American
religious values, thus complementing Roosevelt’s personal “crusade” to spread
Anglo-American civilization.56
These popular societal trends established the underlying foundation for jingoism, America’s particular style of nationalism, and for its effect on both U.S. domestic politics and foreign policy. In this context, forceful U.S. resistance in 1895
to British policy toward Venezuela and Great Britain’s subsequent acceptance of
U.S. intervention in Latin America reflected widespread American nationalism
and support for an expansionist foreign policy and the corresponding political
pressures on U.S. foreign policy making. The outcome of the 1895 Venezuela
crisis also encouraged Americans to press for further military-backed nationalist
successes. These trends continued through the end of the decade, when popular
nationalism was a powerful force leading in 1898 to the annexation of Hawaii
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and the U.S. war against Spain. President William McKinley’s effort to negotiate
with Spain a resolution to the conflict in Cuba increasingly isolated him from
Congress and the American people. Quite apart from peripheral U.S. material
interests in opposing Spain’s Cuba policy, Congress and the voters clamored for
war, and ultimately they pushed the president into a war he did not support.57
The rapid American naval victory over Spain elicited widespread and enthusiastic nationalist pride in the U.S. Navy, and within a year of the war Congress
passed widely popular legislation that funded construction of five battleships
and multiple other ships. The Roosevelt administration’s naval legislative agenda
benefited from the larger American naval nationalism. The Navy League of the
United States was founded in 1902, its membership grew quickly among retired
naval officers and American corporate leaders, and it played a valuable role in
mobilizing support to bring about Roosevelt’s legislative successes.58 Roosevelt
himself frequently campaigned for his naval legislation with populist speeches
laden with nationalist appeals harking to the importance of naval expansion
for America’s world stature. In his first State of the Union address, in December
1901, he declared that for the “honor” of the United States, the “work of upbuilding the navy must be steadily continued” and that Americans “must either build
and maintain an adequate navy or else make up their minds definitely to accept a
secondary position in international affairs.”59 During the 1904 presidential campaign, Roosevelt appealed to popular economic nationalism and benefits for the
American worker to justify his naval policies and U.S. imperialism in East Asia.
As he later acknowledged, his decision in 1907 to send the U.S. Atlantic fleet on
an around-the-world cruise reflected more his ultimately successful effort to
arouse popular nationalist support against congressional opposition to his battleship legislation than his effort to establish global—especially Japanese—respect
for U.S. power.60
Geopolitics and the Rise of the American Navy
It is tempting to explain America’s unique success by the superiority of U.S.
political institutions, or the leadership thereof, or both. Neither factor, however,
can explain American success. American democracy and foreign policy in the
late nineteenth century and early twentieth century experienced popular jingoistic and expansionist impulses that reflected minimal awareness of the relative
resources or national interests of the United States. Similarly, there is minimal
documentation that suggests that Theodore Roosevelt calculated that European
great-power politics or advantageous U.S. economic resources had created a strategic opportunity for the United States to challenge the regional and global strategic orders and develop great-power maritime capabilities. America pursued its
naval ambitions wearing the same strategic blinders as had France and Germany.
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The United States succeeded where other great powers had failed because
of the fortuitous combination of domestic circumstances with a strategic opportunity in great-power politics. American popular naval nationalism and
the expansionist impulse emerged after the United States had defeated Mexico,
completed its conquest of the American Indian, and settled the Pacific frontier.
These developments and the intrinsic stability of the U.S.-Canadian border established the enduring territorial security that enabled the United States to fund
safely its strategic transition from being a continental power dependent on its
ground forces for security to being a maritime power seeking global influence.
In contrast, similar efforts by France and Germany jeopardized their territorial
security and contributed to devastating military defeats.
Moreover, Britain’s preoccupation first with the emerging French and Russian
navies and then with German naval ambitions compelled it to acquiesce to U.S.
global naval ambitions and to acknowledge the Caribbean Sea as a U.S. sphere of
influence.61 These developments in British security enabled the United States to
avoid engagement in a costly arms race and the prospect of a “Copenhagen”—the
strategic challenges that plagued the security and naval aspirations of both France
and Germany.
CHINA GOES TO SEA
A combination of nationalist leadership and popular nationalism drove French
naval ambitions under Louis-Napoléon in the 1850s and 1860s, German naval
ambitions under Kaiser Wilhelm in the early twentieth century, and U.S. naval
ambitions during the Theodore Roosevelt presidency in the early twentieth century. In each case, a personal leadership commitment to building naval power
coalesced with popular nationalism to fuel national ambitions for great-power
status, reflected in large capital ships and substantial maritime power. Such nationalism contributed to strategic disaster for France and Germany. For the
United States, however, these same conditions propelled the country to construct,
by 1908, the world’s second-largest navy while strengthening national security,
and to establish the foundations for America’s eventual emergence as the world’s
preeminent maritime power.
In the twenty-first century, China has become the latest land power to go to
sea. After thirty-five years of double-digit annual growth in its GDP and defense
spending and significant technological modernization, China is building a
large and modern naval fleet whose capabilities soon may rival those of the U.S.
Navy in East Asia. The recent pace of China’s shipbuilding program has been
impressive. Since 2000, China has replaced most of its prereform platforms with
“modern” platforms. Whereas only 3 percent of Chinese attack submarines were
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“modern” in 1996, currently 70 percent are. China also has been developing large
numbers of modern surface ships. Serial production of the Houbei and Jingdao
classes has contributed to establishing and maintaining the Chinese maritime
presence throughout the East and South China Seas. China’s development of a
next-generation frigate, the Jiangkai class, will enhance the war-fighting capability of the Chinese navy. Even at reduced rates of GDP growth, China’s shipbuilding program will add significant numbers of modern naval platforms, including
attack submarines, frigates, destroyers, and smaller fast-attack ships armed with
antiship cruise missiles. According to one estimate, assuming that China’s naval
budget over the next fifteen years grows commensurately with its GDP growth,
by then the Chinese navy will possess well over four hundred surface combat
ships and nearly one hundred submarines. All these modern ships will make significant contributions to Chinese naval capabilities in the East and South China
Seas and will contribute to improved Chinese capabilities in the western Pacific
Ocean.62 China’s navy is not as technologically advanced as the U.S. Navy, but
even merely in quantity China’s naval ships constitute an effective war-fighting
force and attest to China’s long-term naval ambitions. The U.S. Navy’s increased
attention to “dispersed lethality” reflects its concern with the modernization,
growing number, and improved quality of China’s naval ships.63
China also is developing airpower to support its oceangoing navy. It is producing military aircraft with greater capabilities and ranges that will provide greater
air support for Chinese surface ships. Its intermediate-range surface-to-surface
ballistic missiles can degrade U.S. access to the naval facilities throughout East
Asia that enable the U.S. Navy to project naval and air power. China also is modernizing its command and control capabilities with improved satellite communications and air-based and underwater reconnaissance and targeting.64
Xi Jinping, Nationalism, and Chinese Naval Ambition
As was the case with French, German, and American naval expansionism,
nationalism is a driver of China’s naval ambitions. Xi Jinping’s “China dream”
platform is a nationalist promise to bring modernization and advancement not
only to the Chinese people but also to the Chinese nation in world affairs.65
Members of the Chinese military, including Chinese naval officers, have argued
that a “strong army dream” and a strong navy are central to achieving the “China
dream.”66 Similarly, Xi’s call for da fuxing Zhongguo (the great rejuvenation of
China) is a direct call for China to restore its status as a great power. In 2017, Xi
assured the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) that “[t]oday, we are closer to the
goal of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation than any other time in history, and we need to build a strong people’s military now more than any other
time in history.” He promised the PLA that “[w]e will never allow any people,
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organization, or political party to split any part of Chinese territory from the
country at any time, in any form.”67
Reinforcing Xi Jinping’s ambitions has been the growth of Chinese mass nationalism. The combination of the spread of the Chinese people’s access to the
World Wide Web in China’s major cities and widespread dissatisfaction with the
alleged weakness of Chinese foreign policy, encouraged by the global financial
crisis and the onset of the U.S. recession, has heightened mass nationalist demands for a more belligerent Chinese foreign policy. Despite China’s authoritarian single-party political system, nationalism can influence Chinese foreign
policy. Leaders who are not sufficiently nationalist/hard-line and responsive to
mass nationalism can be vulnerable to political challenges from their political
adversaries—and in China the cost of political defeat is, at best, lifetime isolation
under house arrest. Equally important, the Chinese Communist Party leadership
is acutely sensitive to the challenge that social instability, including urban nationalist demonstrations, can pose to regime stability and survival.68
In 2009, the number of Internet users in China increased by nearly 60 percent.69 Use of the Internet spread most significantly among the urban population.
Between 2007 and 2010, Internet usage in Beijing increased by 60 percent, penetrating nearly 70 percent of the population; the comparable figures for Shanghai
were 67 percent and 65 percent.70 The expansion of Internet usage has led to strident online nationalist criticism of Chinese foreign policy and has contributed
to widespread nationalist demonstrations against Japan for its arrest of a Chinese
fisherman in 2010 and its government’s “nationalization” of the Diaoyu/Senkaku
Islands in 2012. Belligerent online mass nationalism also contributed to Chinese
government opposition to U.S. naval exercises in the Yellow Sea following North
Korea’s 2010 sinking of a South Korean corvette.71
As Xi Jinping has promoted a nationalist vision of China’s future and as mass
nationalism has spread through Chinese cities, he has led China’s naval activism.
The impact of nationalism and the China dream is especially clear in China’s
costly commitment to developing aircraft carriers, just as nationalism drove
French, German, and U.S. acquisition of large capital ships. Given the proximity
of China’s air and naval bases to its neighbor’s defense facilities in the surrounding seas, including those in Japan, Taiwan, and the South China Sea countries,
China does not require aircraft carriers to project power to contend with regional
competitors, including the United States, to defend its maritime security.
China’s economic growth increasingly relies on its domestic market. Since
2006, as Chinese domestic manufacturing has increased, there has been a steady
and significant decline in Chinese trade dependence, including export dependence.72 China also is only minimally dependent on imports of energy resources
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for its energy security; approximately 90 percent of Chinese energy resources
are sourced domestically or via pipelines transiting countries on China’s interior
periphery. So the country does not require a power-projection navy to defend its
economic interests.73
But aircraft carriers are a symbol of great-power status, so realization of the
China dream required China to develop a fleet of them.74 As Chinese leaders
considered launching China’s first carrier late in the first decade of the twentyfirst century, popular demand for a carrier increased. At public presentations,
Chinese military officers were pressed to explain when China would build a
carrier. Many Chinese citizens offered their own funds to support construction
of an aircraft carrier.75 China’s
[T]he United States did not face a serious
first Soviet-era aircraft carrier,
great-power challenge to its maritime rise
the former Minsk, was a popuin the Western Hemisphere. China’s rise as
lar tourist attraction—33,000
a maritime power faces very different greatvisitors toured the ship in just
power politics.
seven days during the 2006
Chinese New Year holiday.76
Talk shows on China Central Television (CCTV) focused on the merits of an
aircraft carrier; the popularity of the subject led CCTV to air additional programs
on the subject. Among the most popular CCTV television programs at that time
was The Rise of the Great Powers. It stimulated widespread public discussion over
the lessons of history for China’s emergence as a great power. According to the
documentary, all successful great powers have possessed a large blue-water navy,
with large capital ships.77 In 2009, a Chinese foreign affairs weekly reported on
the widespread national conversation focused on “the long-held dream of so
many people” that China would “build its own aircraft carrier.”78 Since then, Xi
has expanded the pace of Chinese carrier production.
China’s recent maritime impatience and boldness reflect Xi’s personal ambition and impatience to resist any challenge to Chinese interests and to restore
China’s great-power status. In the brief span of the fifteen months from late 2012
to early 2013, shortly after he assumed authority over Chinese security policy,
Xi led China to establish routine maritime presence within twelve miles of the
Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, thus actively challenging Japanese sovereignty; announce an air-defense identification zone in the East China Sea; occupy the
Philippine-claimed Scarborough Shoal in the South China Sea; explore for oil in
disputed waters in the South China Sea for the first time since 1994; challenge
Vietnamese maritime activities in the South China Sea, contributing to heightened tension and a crisis atmosphere in Sino-Vietnamese relations; challenge,
more frequently and more assertively, U.S. air and naval surveillance activities
in the South China Sea; and carry out extensive land-reclamation activities in
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disputed areas of the South China Sea, and subsequently construct air and naval
facilities on its artificial islands.
Accompanying these developments in East Asia is the determined expansion
of the global presence of the PLA Navy (PLAN). Under Xi’s leadership, in 2017
the PLAN carried out its first live-fire exercises in the Mediterranean Sea and its
first joint exercise with the Russian navy, in the Baltic Sea. In 2017, China also
reached agreement with Djibouti for the PLAN to establish its first overseas naval
facility: a logistical support base in East Africa for its operations in the western
Indian Ocean.79
Geopolitics and the Rise of the Chinese Navy
China’s rapidly expanding naval capabilities and its maritime activism attest to its
resolve to challenge U.S. maritime supremacy in East Asia and become a worldclass naval power. As China goes to sea, will its fate resemble the failed nationalist ambitions of France under Louis-Napoléon and of Wilhelmine Germany, or
the successes of the United States when it emerged as a naval power? The fate
of China’s naval ambitions, as was the case with the United States, France, and
Germany, ultimately will depend on the country’s geopolitical circumstances.
In important respects, China’s contemporary geopolitical circumstances
resemble U.S. geopolitical circumstances in the 1890s and the early twentieth
century. In the decades since the end of the Cold War China has established
overwhelming military superiority vis-à-vis its neighbors along its entire periphery. China is bordered by fourteen countries, but none can challenge Chinese
territorial security. After decades of Chinese modernization of its ground-force
capabilities, China’s smaller neighbors, including Vietnam, cannot pose even a
minor challenge to Chinese security. India is a great power in South Asia, but
over the past thirty years the gap between India and rising China has increased
significantly. In contrast to China, India in military affairs remains dependent on
imported platforms for both its navy and its air force. Moreover, the Himalayas
pose a formidable check on India’s ability to threaten Chinese territory, and thus
on the outbreak of a major war on the Sino-Indian border. In economics, recently
India’s annual GDP growth rate has surpassed China’s GDP growth rate. But
because China’s GDP is five times the size of India’s, even should China’s annual
growth in GDP maintain the relatively “slow” rate of 7 percent and India’s maintain 8 percent growth through 2020, China still will add another “three Indias”
to its GDP in that time.80
China’s only neighbor that conceivably might pose a threat to Chinese security is Russia. But since the end of the Cold War, in Northeast Asia Russian
military and economic capabilities have declined dramatically vis-à-vis China’s.
In 1991, there were fourteen million Russians living in the Far East, but in 2010
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the Russian census found that fewer than 6.3 million Russians lived there.81 Infrastructure in the Far East also has suffered since the end of the Cold War. Lack
of Russian investment has contributed to a deterioration of electrical-power
facilities and transportation networks. Russian ports in Northeast Asia have
fallen behind global standards. Overall, the Far East economy is far poorer than
the Russian economy west of the Urals, and at best has stagnated over the past
twenty-five years. Russia has called for China to help with the development of the
Far East economy, contributing to Russian dependence on China.82
Russian military power also has declined. Despite successful Russian groundforce actions in Georgia and Ukraine, much of the Russian military remains
backward and poorly trained. For much of the post–Cold War period the Russian
navy was in decline. Although in recent years it has received increased funding,
its shipbuilding has focused on frigates and cruisers that lack adequate defenses
and primarily are limited to coastal-defense operations.83 But even this limited
recent expansion of the Russian fleet has been hampered by the poor state of the
Russian shipbuilding industry. Russian observers acknowledge that the navy’s
shipyards are in difficult shape and require significant funding, contributing to
extended delays in delivering new ships. In 2017, of the Russian navy’s twentyfour major surface ships, only three had been constructed since the end of the
Cold War. Overall, the decline in Russia’s defense industry is significant. Only 20
percent of its defense companies can be modernized in an economical way.84 Yet
the Russian defense budget has declined in recent years, reflecting the absence
of reform of the Russian economy, the extended decline in GDP growth, and
Western sanctions following Russia’s annexation of Crimea and its intervention
in Ukraine. Budget problems have compelled Russia to delay development of a
next-generation destroyer and aircraft carrier. In 2018, the Russian military budget declined by 20 percent compared with 2017’s.85 According to Russian sources,
in 2017 China’s defense budget was three times that of Russia’s.86
Russia’s military decline has become especially apparent in the Far East. Its
intervention in Ukraine and NATO’s subsequent renewal of ground-force and
naval exercises on Russia’s periphery have compelled Russia to concentrate much
of its limited force capabilities on the growing U.S./NATO challenge to Russian
security, thus weakening further the Russian strategic presence in the Far East.87
China, on the other hand, has developed advanced ground-force and naval
technologies and platforms that contribute to the growth of its full-spectrum
conventional superiority over the Russian military in Northeast Asia. Moreover,
just south of the Sino-Russian border China enjoys the benefits of plentiful arable
land and rapid industrial growth. In its northeast, China has developed a modern economy, an increasingly well-educated and capable population, advanced
and well-trained ground-force capabilities, and a sophisticated high-technology
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infrastructure. Moscow cannot patrol its borders, so the Sino-Russian border can
be as porous to Chinese migration and trade as it was for most of the nineteenth
century and the early twentieth century, when 80 percent of the civilians in Vladivostok were Chinese or Korean.88 In the twenty-first century, China’s stronger
commercial presence in the Far East challenges the economic integration of the
Far East with the rest of Russia.89 China’s domination of the Sino-Russian border
has increased since the end of the Cold War.
Overall, the gap between Chinese and Russian underlying economic greatpower capabilities has widened in the twenty-first century. The significant difference between Chinese and Russian GDP growth rates over the past twentyfive years has contributed to the widening of the Sino-Russian economic and
technological gaps. Moreover, Russia has yet to reform its economy; it has been
content to rely on oil revenues to sustain economic growth. The prospects for
relative improvement in Russia’s economic situation have not improved. More
recently, the new international sources of gas and oil and the resulting drop in
world energy prices, combined with NATO’s economic retaliation against Russia
for its intervention in Ukraine, contributed to the onset of a Russian recession.
This recession, or stagnation, is likely to endure for many years, thus postponing
further Russia’s ability to develop sustained economic growth and to field a strong
military in the Russian Far East.90 Russian defense spending as a share of GDP is
already more than double Chinese defense spending as a share of GDP.91 Russia
cannot contend with China in an arms competition.
The decline of Russian capabilities in Northeast Asia diminishes the necessity
for Beijing to allocate significant resources to defend its northern border. Chinese analysts have minimal concern that Russia will reemerge as an East Asian
great power that can challenge Chinese security.92 Thus, in terms of the domestic
security of the great power, the Sino-Russian border increasingly resembles the
U.S.-Canadian border.
Therefore, along its entire mainland periphery China’s strategic circumstances
resemble U.S. strategic circumstances in the late nineteenth century and early
twentieth century, when American nationalism promoted the development of the
United States as a global naval power, rather than the geopolitical circumstances
that contributed to the demise of French and German nationalist naval ambitions. Consolidated Chinese border security has allowed China to allocate an increasing share of its growing defense budget to developing a large, modern naval
force, thus enabling the development of great-power capabilities that can challenge U.S. maritime hegemony.93 The PLA’s 2015 defense white paper on China’s
military strategy reported that China’s “traditional mentality that land outweighs
sea must be abandoned, and great importance has to be attached to managing the
seas and oceans and protecting maritime rights and interests.” Thus, China’s navy
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“will gradually shift its focus from ‘offshore waters defense’ to the combination of
‘offshore-waters defense’ with ‘open-seas protection.’”94 Insofar as China’s defense
budget consumes a mere 2 percent of its GDP, China can expand its naval budget
significantly with minimal repercussions for the Chinese economy.95
The Rise of the Chinese Navy and U.S.-Chinese Competition
Thus, in many respects, China’s geopolitical circumstances resemble the American geopolitical circumstances that facilitated the U.S. effort to dominate the
Caribbean Sea and ultimately the Western Hemisphere. China possesses the continental security and the growing economy that will enable it to fund a large and
modern naval force without undermining Chinese continental border security.
But in one important respect China’s geopolitical circumstances are different
from those of the United States at the turn of the twentieth century. The United
States peacefully rose to be a great naval power and to exert hemispheric hegemony because the established global powers faced more-pressing issues in their
home theater. Between 1895 and 1905, both Britain and Germany ceded the Caribbean Sea to U.S. naval hegemony because they faced threats to their territorial
integrity from other European powers, so they could not afford conflict in distant
regions. Britain, the established global power, withdrew its fleet to European
waters, and Germany, the rising global power, never thought to challenge the
United States in the Caribbean Sea. Thus, in effect, the United States did not face
a serious great-power challenge to its maritime rise in the Western Hemisphere.
China’s rise as a maritime power faces very different great-power politics. The
United States, the established maritime power in East Asia, does not face a challenge in the Western Hemisphere to either its continental or maritime security.
Similarly, European countries are not dependent on a major U.S. presence in
Europe to contend with Russian military power. U.S. security interests outside
East Asia thus do not require the United States to concede Chinese maritime hegemony in East Asia. On the contrary, China’s maritime rise in East Asia already
has encountered significant U.S. resistance. The U.S. “pivot to Asia” during the
Barack Obama presidency, including the strengthening of the U.S. naval presence in East Asia, reflected U.S. concern about rising Chinese naval power and
the American intention to balance the rise of China and strengthen U.S.–East
Asian alliances. Similarly, during the Donald Trump administration, U.S. defense
policy has focused on expanding the size of the U.S. Navy to contend with China’s
expanding fleet. U.S. development of advanced-technology weapons reflects
the country’s growing concern for the maritime balance of power in East Asia.
U.S. researches on laser weapons, the rail gun, carrier-based attack and reconnaissance unmanned aerial vehicles, underwater antisubmarine and antimine
drones, long-range antiship cruise missiles, range extensions for U.S. carrierbased aircraft, and ship-based antiship cruise missiles all reflect the U.S. effort to
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contend with the rise of China’s navy. Similarly, heightened U.S. resistance since
2013 to China’s legal claims and its land-reclamation activities in the South China
Sea reflects U.S. efforts to bolster its regional strategic partnerships as China has
developed greater naval power.
Thus, despite similar continental geopolitical circumstances, the greatpower consequences of the rise of China in East Asia may be very different from
the great-power consequences of the rise of the United States in the Western
Hemisphere. America’s peaceful rise reflected the strategic priorities that the
established great powers, especially Great Britain, faced in distant regions. As
China rises, it will not enjoy such fortunate geopolitical circumstances. Rather,
America’s strategic priority will be balancing the rise of China in East Asia. This
suggests that the rise of China in the twenty-first century may elicit far greater
instability and great-power competition and tension, including crises and arms
races, than the instability and tension elicited by the rise of the United States at
the turn of the twentieth century.
This historical comparative analysis of case studies of great-power maritime expansionism suggests that naval nationalism, not realist strategic considerations or
an unrelenting drive for security or immediate national security interests, drives
costly revisionist impulses and strategically counterproductive naval acquisitions
that distract from realist policy making and frequently contribute to significant
strategic setbacks. Such nationalist dynamics explain not only the costly failures
of the French and German maritime ambitions discussed in this article but also
the failed ambitions of France in the early nineteenth century during the Napoleonic Wars, Russian maritime ambitions in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, Japan’s maritime ambitions in the 1930s, and the Soviet Union’s maritime ambitions in the 1970s and 1980s.96
In the twentieth century, the United States was the exception to this historical pattern. Nationalism drove its naval expansionism, but its successful rise as a
global maritime power reflected the benefits neither of nationalism nor of realist, threat-based strategic planning. Instead, U.S. success as a rising naval power
occurred despite the potentially detrimental effects of American nationalism.
Given America’s single-minded expansionist ambitions and its ambitious naval
acquisition program during the Roosevelt administration, fortuitous strategic
circumstances best explain America’s early maritime successes.
In the twenty-first century, China is the rising power that is challenging the
great-power status quo. To a significant degree, its naval ambitions and its revisionist strategic impatience are driven by the convergence of growing mass
nationalism and nationalist leadership. Nonetheless, unlike France and Germany,
China possesses the necessary geopolitical circumstances that allowed the United
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States to become a maritime great power. It does not face a significant continental
threat to its security. But unlike the United States, China likely will face resistance
to a revised regional security order from the established maritime power, the
United States. Thus, China’s fortuitous geopolitical circumstances and the likelihood of continued economic growth, even at lower annual rates, probably will
enable it to challenge U.S. maritime hegemony, but in doing so it will contribute
to heightened great-power conflict, with implications for the global security order and the prospects of great-power war instead of peace.
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ESC AL ATION AT SEA
Stability and Instability in Maritime East Asia
Ian Bowers

I

n recent years, the seas of East Asia have witnessed frequent clashes among naval, coast guard, and paramilitary vessels and civilian actors. This has created
academic and policy concerns regarding the potential for significant escalation
in the region. This article argues that low-level instability is to be expected with
maritime boundary disputes or when power competition occurs at sea; however, sustained escalatory cycles are unlikely, because of the characteristics of the
maritime strategic environment. The maritime theater possesses unique strategic
characteristics. These include the nature of potential strategic threats, the speed
of response, and quick attribution of responsibility. These characteristics reduce
the potential for escalation and allow de-escalatory strategies to achieve greater
success. These findings demonstrate that the maritime sphere in East Asia is
more stable than is commonly thought.
In East Asian waters, disputes over the sovereign control of islands, the extent
and delimitation of maritime jurisdictional boundaries, and the operational
rights and obligations of military vessels in jurisdictional waters coexist with
conflicting nationalist narratives and fears of great-power competition.1 China’s
growing presence and actions in this strategic maritime arena are upending
the post–World War II status quo and shifting the power dynamics that have
maintained stability in the region. This, in comIan Bowers is an associate professor at the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies. He holds a PhD bination with political and strategic uncertainty
in war studies from King’s College London. His rearising from the election of Donald Trump to the
search focuses on naval warfare, Asian security, deAmerican presidency, has led to increasing fears
terrence, and military change. He has published on
deterrence at sea, naval operations other than war,
about conflict escalation at sea.2 Such instability is
and South Korean perceptions of sea power.
manifested in fractious interactions among growNaval War College Review, Autumn 2018, Vol. 71, No. 4
ing naval (indigenous and external), civil maritime
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law-enforcement, and civilian actors who aim to assert or contest perceived economic and navigation rights at sea. Reflecting this reality, in 2016 the commander
of U.S. Pacific Command, Admiral Harry B. Harris, stated that the region was
“ripe for miscalculation that could escalate to conflicts that no one wants, in an
area vital to global prosperity.”3
On the surface, given the publicity that clashes at sea garner, such a fear may
seem well-founded.4 Numerous studies have revealed the propensity for conflict escalation over the issue of sovereign control of land, including disputed
islands.5 However, the potential for escalation arising from incidents at sea and
the strategic effect of such incidents remain largely understudied phenomena.6
By focusing solely on incidents at sea, this article argues that in areas of contested
maritime jurisdictional claims or maritime zones in which strategic competitors
meet, peaceful interactions among military, law-enforcement, and civilian actors
should not be expected. However, accidental, inadvertent, or even intentional
acts that result in clashes between rival forces should not trigger sustained escalatory cycles or be construed as a prelude to major conflict at sea or on land.
Rather, such events should be viewed as an expected consequence of operations
in contested maritime environments. In short, at sea, the threshold for stability
in contested areas is low, and therefore escalatory incidents are likely; however,
escalatory cycles or sustained conflict, including war at sea, are unlikely to follow
such incidents.
To justify this contention, this article argues that a maritime strategic environment imposes specific conditions on escalatory and triggering dynamics.
Disputed maritime borders, unlike those on land, cannot be held, and thus must
be contested. Despite this requirement of contestation and the impossibility of
exercising total control, conflicts at sea typically do not present an existential
strategic threat to the involved parties. Escalation arising from inadvertence or
miscalculation is easier to control, owing to the realities of operating in a maritime environment.7 At an operational level, it is easier to achieve controlled deescalation at sea than on land. The options to use new weapons systems or attack
new types of targets (vertical escalation) are limited, and geographic expansion
of the area of conflict (horizontal escalation) is unlikely.8
The article develops this argument by discussing how the nature of the maritime strategic environment simultaneously can sustain low-level instability yet
dampen escalatory pressures. It supports these ideas by examining U.S.-USSR
maritime interactions during the Cold War and by analyzing incidents at sea that
have arisen from disputed maritime boundaries across the globe since the Cold
War. The article finishes by using these findings to consider the implications for
our understanding of how stability and instability in maritime East Asia manifest
themselves.
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CONTESTED SEAS, STABLE INSTABILITY, AND WAR
Maritime geography enhances the potential for instability at sea, since it allows
actors in competition or in conflict to interact to a greater extent than is possible
on land.9 This section argues that this instability should be expected unless maritime boundaries are agreed to or strategic competition is rendered inert. Further,
it shows that, despite this instability, sustained vertical or horizontal escalation
past any initial incident is unlikely.
Disputed Maritime Rights
In the case of contested territory or strategic competition on land, the role of a
state’s armed forces is to defend demarcated borders or to seize and hold enemy
territory.10 Control of territory brings about the capacity to govern both the land
and the people and to use both for economic advantage. It is only during times of
war that borders dissolve, the armed forces of competing states interact, and the
control of territory becomes uncertain.
At sea, the type of control that allows for the maintenance of land borders is
not possible. Except for areas close to shore, the sea is controlled permanently by
no one. Sovereign boundaries—such as those delineating territorial waters, contiguous zones, and exclusive economic zones (EEZs), as defined under the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)—are not demarcated by
the permanent presence of navies or civilian agencies; rather, they are maintained
by political agreements on land.
If a party chooses to ignore UNCLOS or parties have differing interpretations
of its parameters and the obligations it imposes, the possibility for clashes is
heightened, since in contested areas at sea any exercise of administrative control
is fluid and limited.11 If one power vacates an area of the sea, control does not
transfer automatically to another party; rather, it is left vacant.12 Parties who possess the requisite naval or maritime capacity easily can enter disputed waters to
contest control or undertake resource-exploitation activities.
To maintain legitimacy in contested waters, states are required to undertake
operations to assert and defend their perceived rights. This can take the form
of sailing through disputed waters, exploiting maritime zones for economic
purposes, or performing law-enforcement and naval operations consistent with
sovereign control. Absent an intervening authority such as the United Nations,
political agreement on land, or compatible interpretations of the UNCLOS
regime, this can create substantial friction, leading to clashes among military
vessels, other state-controlled vessels, and civilian vessels such as fishing boats.
This friction has been illustrated in a number of clashes between democratic
countries over maritime economic exploitation rights. The “Lobster War” between Brazil and France in early 1963, the “Cod Wars” between Iceland and the
United Kingdom in the mid-1970s, and the Canadian-Spanish “Turbot War” in
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2018
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1995–96 all saw democratic countries deploying military force to assert their
perceived maritime economic rights against other democracies. Similarly, a
2006 incident between South Korea and Japan over exploration in a potentially
lucrative fishing zone surrounding the disputed Dokdo/Takeshima Islands saw
military and maritime law-enforcement assets being deployed to assert both
countries’ claims.13
This type of deployment of military and civilian maritime law-enforcement
actors to contested maritime zones has not yet resulted in substantial levels of
escalation. The three earliest cases described above each ended with a political
solution, while the fourth, between South Korea and Japan, has resulted in sustained but low-level instability characterized by the periodic dispatch of military
and civilian law-enforcement assets to indicate the respective country’s claims.
As represented in table 1, data extracted from the Dispute Narratives of the
Military Interstate Dispute dataset provide further evidence of sustained lowlevel instability at sea. However, in no case did this instability evolve into war;
indeed, no substantial escalation occurred past the initial clash.14 These data
indicate that instability and clashes are to be expected in contested maritime
environments, but substantial escalation, including to the point of interstate war
breaking out, is unlikely.
TABLE 1
DISPUTE NARRATIVES, 1993–2010: GLOBAL MILITARIZED INTERSTATE
DISPUTES AT SEA
Cases at Sea
116

Total Number of Cases
561

Level of Force Used

Frequency
No. (%)

Use of Force

Display of Force

Threat to Use Force

Activities in
disputed waters

50 (43.1)

30

18

2

Illegal fishing
operations

20 (17.2)

19

1

0

Operations around
disputed islands

13 (11.2)

2

11

0

Strategic and
security operations

18 (15.6)

3

13

2

Other

15 (12.9)

10

5

0

Source of Dispute

Total number of
disputes

116

64 (55.2%)

48 (41.4%)

4 (3.4%)

Sources: Data from “Dispute Narratives, 1993–2001, Correlates of War Project MIDv.4.0, 13 December 2013” and “Dispute Narratives 2002–2010,
Correlates of War Project MIDv4.0, 13 December 2013,” both in Glenn Palmer et al., “The MID4 Dataset, 2002–2010: Procedures, Coding Rules and
Description,” Conflict Management and Peace Science 32, no. 2 (2015). (The table does not include data for the Korean Peninsula; see below.)
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Notably, operations in waters with disputed maritime boundaries accounted
for over 40 percent of the interstate disputes at sea. These were caused primarily by resource-exploitation operations, including fishing and oil exploration.
In several cases—notably in the Gulf of Fonseca, on the Pacific coast of Central
America—multiple interactions took place within short periods, but there is no
evidence that any escalation in the level or mode of violence occurred. In a number of theaters, including the South and East China Seas, economic and strategic
operations in disputed waters resulted in the consistent display and use of force
to enforce perceived maritime rights, yet again no further escalation occurred.
Power Competition at Sea
Disputed maritime borders are not the only source of conflict at sea. Power competition there is manifested in a different manner than on land. The sea is a global
commons with free access for all.15 Consequently, geographically distant but still
adversarial powers can operate in closer proximity and with greater freedom
than they would on land in areas of mutual strategic interest, thereby heightening
the risk of interstate clashes. This risk can be exacerbated further in that under
UNCLOS littoral states cannot restrict innocent passage through territorial
waters.16 Naval forces therefore legally can pass through the maritime territory
of a competing state. Further, differing legal interpretations of the necessity for
notification of innocent passage and the operating rights of military vessels in
the EEZ can lead to conflict, because littoral states may seek to limit the ability of
others to enjoy the navigation and operating freedoms commonly understood to
be granted under UNCLOS.17
During the Cold War, the sea was a marginal strategic arena when compared
with the NATO-USSR divide that dominated continental Europe. While the
opposing land forces did not engage each other directly during this period,
their navies often operated in proximity, both in important geostrategic areas
such as the waters of northern Europe and the Mediterranean and in their
respective littoral zones. This resulted in numerous distinct acts of extremely
dangerous behavior. As table 2 shows, over the thirty-five-year period between
1950 and 1984, there were 422 acts between U.S. and Soviet naval and statecontrolled vessels and aircraft that at least one side described as exceeding peaceful operations.18
Such incidents included the harassment of vessels during normal operations,
dangerous maneuvers such as crossing and shouldering, and the pointing of
weapons and use of fire-control radars to track opposing ships and aircraft.
Pointing was considered particularly hazardous, as it blurred the line between
peacetime harassment and preparation for attack.19
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TABLE 2
REPORTED INCIDENTS AT SEA BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND USSR: 1950–84
Total Number

422
Type of Incident

Dangerous
Maneuvers

Harassment

Pointing/Tracking

Collision/Shouldering

Loss of Life

Other

135

130

109

17

1

30

Source: Data taken from Winkler, Cold War at Sea, pp. 177–210.

Despite these multiple acts, war did not break out; rather, low-level instability persisted without resulting in a sustained escalatory cycle or the substantial
heightening of political tensions between the parties.
Instability at Sea and the Transition to War
It is important to emphasize that in cases of both disputes over maritime boundaries and power competition at sea, despite clashes involving varying levels of
force and lethality, there is no evidence that significant escalation followed any
incident. Indeed, there is little historical evidence that clashes at sea are a primary
reason for the occurrence of interstate conflict, either at sea or on land. In other
words, war is unlikely to break out as the sole result of clashes on the water. In
modern history, the British-Spanish War of Jenkins’s Ear between 1739 and 1748
is a notable exception. Conflicts such as the War of 1812, the First Sino-Japanese
War (1894–95), and the Pacific theater in World War II had substantial maritime
components, yet the wars at sea were secondary to the broader strategic, political,
and economic issues at stake on land.20
To understand why, we must return to the relationship between the sea and
the land. As the highly regarded British naval theorist Sir Julian Corbett noted
when discussing naval warfare, “Since men live upon the land and not upon the
sea, great issues between nations at war have always been decided—except in the
rarest cases—either by what your army can do against your enemy’s territory and
national life or else by the fear of what the fleet makes it possible for your army
to do.”21 In other words, what happens on the sea can be understood only in the
context of its relationship with the land and the material effect such events have
on populations.
Acts at sea rarely have an immediate influence on a state’s survival or the living
conditions of the populace. They often occur far from the public eye and evoke
less emotional responses.22 Therefore the escalatory pressure on decision makers
is reduced, so low–level or tactical interactions at sea generally do not have an
impact on the broader strategic picture. Consequently, the Cold War’s numerous and severe incidents at sea between the two superpowers did not result in
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol71/iss4/1
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escalation. Such events did not impact strategic stability and were not important
enough to warrant a response that could trigger conflict in the core theater of
continental Europe or risk the possibility of nuclear war. The high strategic stakes
of the Cold War ensured that even serious clashes at sea, much like higher-profile
incidents such as the Cuban missile crisis, were contained, since the leadership of
neither side desired a mutually catastrophic conflict.23
The Korean Peninsula provides ample further evidence of these dynamics. Between 1954 and 2010 there were 510 cases of what the South Korean Ministry of
National Defense classifies as local provocations at sea.24 These include 490 cases
of North Korean–flagged naval and civilian vessels crossing into South Korean
waters and twenty cases of naval engagements.25 Since 1999, there have been several high-profile incidents near the contested Northern Limit Line (NLL) on the
west coast of the peninsula. These include three battles at sea: the first and second
battles of Yeonpyeong (1999 and 2002) and the battle of Daecheong (2009). The
sinking of ROKS Cheonan in 2010 cost the lives of forty-six South Korean naval
personnel but did not result in escalatory actions either at sea or on the Korean
Peninsula itself. These incidents, while costly in terms of lives and equipment, did
not warrant the risk of starting an escalatory cycle that could impact the broader
strategic balance on the peninsula, and by extension the physical and economic
well-being of South Korea.26
Similarly, the capture of the intelligence-gathering ship USS Pueblo in 1968
by North Korean forces resulted in substantial pressure on the Johnson administration to escalate in response to Pyongyang’s actions. While the United States
did deploy extra naval assets to the region as a show of force, there was a clear
preference on the part of the U.S. government to find a negotiated solution. As
Clark Clifford, a U.S. presidential adviser, stated, a spy ship was not worth going
to war over.27
FACTORS THAT FURTHER INHIBIT ESCALATION
Beyond the often asymmetrical strategic importance of incidents at sea compared
with those on land, other factors further explain why significant escalation is
unlikely at sea. The nature of naval combat and operations at sea reduces the
likelihood of a sustained escalatory cycle. This, combined with the factors of time
and distance and, frequently, the opacity of incidents at sea, has a calming influence on the wider political and strategic picture, thereby contributing to making
de-escalation easier.
Attribution
Escalation is rendered less likely by the often-opaque nature of incidents at sea.
The difficulty of attribution following incidents at sea, something that is magnified in the case of submarine operations, reduces the escalatory potential of an
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incident, even one as serious as the sinking of a vessel.28 Richard Smoke argues in
his analysis of the Italian submarine campaign of 1937 that because of the anonymous character of submarine warfare, “[t]he immediate and direct connection to
the responsible nation in this sense was broken, and the probability of a response
directly against Italy reduced.”29
This argument seemingly was confirmed following the sinking of Cheonan.
The South Korean corvette sank on March 26, 2010, yet while North Korea immediately was suspected of being behind the incident, the lack of eyewitnesses
and the difficulty of collecting evidence made the immediate authoritative attribution of the attack to North Korea particularly challenging. This reduced South
Korea’s ability to justify an immediate military response.30 It also provided time
for Washington and, as Robert Gates suggests, Beijing to work to de-escalate
postsinking tensions.31 Ultimately, it took almost two months for an international
investigatory team to attribute the attack officially to a North Korean torpedo.32
The time needed to investigate incidents at sea has provided the necessary
breathing room to de-escalate tensions in other cases as well. The 1904 Dogger
Bank incident, in which a Russian fleet transiting from Europe to Asia accidentally sank a number of British fishing vessels, demonstrates that the time needed
to establish the facts fully allowed both governments and outside powers to ameliorate substantial public ire, control the military response, and reduce internal
pressures to go to war. The incident ultimately was resolved with an apology and
the establishment of an international investigatory commission.33
Distance and Escalation Dominance
The operational space that characterizes the sea also reduces the possibility of
escalation. Naval and other maritime forces have the capacity to transit greater
distances and to do so much more quickly than land forces.34 Yet the areas in
which individual vessels and units operate often are much larger than those on
land.35 Unless there is a specific and demarcated area of contention, such as the
aforementioned NLL, forces at sea tend to be dispersed. Therefore, following an
accidental or isolated clash at sea, time is required for additional forces to enter
the area of operations. Conversely, the lack of geographical barriers allows for
clashing vessels to separate quickly without losing control of territory, as would
occur on land. The speed of modern naval warfare supports the case that distance
and dispersal reduce the likelihood of escalation.
While there is little contemporary evidence of what the precise nature of naval
warfare in a modern combat environment will be, it likely will be a rapid affair
in which combat between vessels would be over quickly.36 This lessens the likelihood that the use of force will evolve organically, as any clash would be finished
before reinforcements could arrive.
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Once again, the sea battles on the NLL provide the best evidence to support
this argument, as they are among the few examples of contemporary modern
naval combat, albeit without the use of missiles. In the first battle of Yeonpyeong,
once the North Korean vessels opened fire the engagement lasted fourteen minutes. The second battle of Yeonpyeong, including the arrival of proximate South
Korean reinforcements, lasted approximately thirty minutes. The battle of Daecheong lasted eight minutes.37 In each of these cases, South Korean naval forces
quickly achieved dominance in the engagement, either sinking their North Korean opponents or forcing them into retreat before North Korean reinforcements
could arrive. After the initial clash, the combination of South Korean superiority,
the North Korean navy’s inability to concentrate force, and the North Koreans’
ability to escape resulted in clashes that ended without further escalation.
The importance of escalation dominance also was demonstrated during the
Lobster War of 1963, when President Charles de Gaulle deployed a French naval
destroyer to protect French fishing interests off the coast of Brazil. The Brazilian navy deployed its aircraft carrier, Minas Gerais, and the French force quickly
backed down.38 The situation de-escalated because the Brazilian forces achieved
escalation dominance and distance prevented the French from providing reinforcements quickly. This speaks to the importance of the local balance of forces
in the area of engagement, as opposed to the total capability of opposing navies.
Even weaker powers can achieve escalation dominance if their deployed forces
are superior. Reflecting these findings, several studies on deterrence have found
that it is not the ratio of total capabilities but the “immediate or short-term balance of forces” in proximity to the target that has the greatest impact on deterrence calculations.39
The Naval and Maritime Profession
The nature of shipboard life and the technical expertise needed to operate at sea
require a relatively high level of professionalism and minimize the number of
individuals capable of undertaking escalatory action, in comparison with land
forces. Command chains in most navies are more structured than they are in the
other military services, with obedience to the commanding officer an absolute
requirement in the rigid world of ships often operating away from port.40 The
technical nature of naval operations also places a premium on following procedures.41 In combination, these realities ensure that inadvertent escalatory action
on the part of a crewmember is less likely (although not impossible).
This reality also places a lot of responsibility on the senior officers of vessels.
During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union signed the 1972
Incidents at Sea Agreement (INCSEA). A primary driver behind the Soviets’
agreeing to such a measure was the rapid expansion of their navy, which had
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resulted in inexperienced officers being promoted. This created fears within the
Soviet command that such inexperience could “inadvertently lead to an incident
with grave consequences for both countries.”42
The importance of the commanding officers for avoiding or initiating escalation at sea can be seen during the so-called lock-on incident between Japanese
and Chinese vessels in 2013. Media reports suggest that it was the Chinese vessel’s
commander himself who made the decision to lock a fire-control radar onto a Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force ship.43 Equally, the decision whether to respond
was in the hands of the Japanese commander himself.44 In this case, restraint following the initial escalatory act led to de-escalation of the situation.
Expense and Pride
As states develop their navies and invest more money in them, they are less likely
to be willing to sacrifice expensive and prestigious assets by escalating clashes in
a nonexistential context. While warships are purchased and designed to fight,
they represent large capital investments and are linked closely to national pride
and achievement.45 Clashes in nonexistential environments rarely justify the loss
of such assets.
This argument only is strengthened when navies grow in power. The costs
of miscommunications and clashes at sea increase as more-powerful platforms
become involved, since losing such a ship has both a high financial and a high
political impact. As Abram N. Shulsky points out, as the Soviet navy expanded,
its platforms increased, not only in number and power, but in monetary and ideational value.46 While this provided the Soviet leadership with greater signaling
options at sea, it also ensured that the accuracy of such signaling increased in
importance, as both the USSR and the United States stood to lose more if operations at sea escalated.
For many smaller states, modern warships are among the most expensive military assets they possess and are not easy to replace. Modern, hightechnology warships are more powerful and their increasing multifunctionality
means they are capable of fulfilling a wider number of roles, but their rising costs
have reduced fleet numbers.47 This places a premium on the survival of expensive
platforms and ensures that these vessels will be risked only if national interests
demand it.
Agreements and Managing Escalation
Escalation through an inadvertent miscalculation or following an isolated incident can be prevented or mitigated by the establishment of agreements that both
set the rules of interaction between maritime forces and provide mechanisms for
the alleviation of tension.
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Internaval or intergovernmental agreements that aim to mitigate potential
clashes at sea have proved successful. This was especially true during the Cold
War. INCSEA provided rules for both navies on how to operate and provided
relief mechanisms when incidents occurred. The agreement was negotiated at
a time when incidents at sea between the two sides were becoming increasingly
robust, including a number of collisions and near collisions. The concern was
that, aside from the actual danger to lives and equipment that an incident at sea
represented, there was substantial risk that an incident could cause a crisis, or
even direct combat, to erupt.48
Importantly, both sides acknowledged that incidents at sea were an inevitable
consequence of great-power interaction at sea, but that such incidents needed
to be managed. As Sean Lynn-Jones points out, INCSEA accepted “the reality of
U.S.-Soviet competition and competitive interaction. . . . [I]t implicitly assumes
that U.S. and Soviet warships and aircraft will continue their rivalry at sea and
engage in ‘gunboat diplomacy’ to influence political outcomes.”49
The agreement provided for an annual meeting at which violations were reviewed, and when required naval attachés assigned to their respective embassies
served as liaisons. While the agreement was not perfect and clashes continued at
sea, it was an effective release valve that reduced tensions and mitigated the risk
of miscalculation.
The effectiveness of this agreement was predicated on the reality that neither
side wanted to escalate tensions inadvertently and damage valuable government
assets. This resulted in both the United States and the Soviet Union actively seeking to improve INCSEA and engaging with each other via its processes.50 This
suggests that for an agreement to have utility, both sides must view it as beneficial. Professional understanding between naval officers of the two sides also was
a key component in ensuring the success of INCSEA.51 Professional empathy
created by consistent working-level interactions between officers of conflicting
sides cannot eliminate the possibility of inadvertent escalation but can reduce it.
Another successful component was the agreement’s relative obscurity; keeping
it out of the public eye allowed both navies to administer the agreement with
minimal political interference.52
Beyond formal agreements such as INCSEA, open channels of communication also are viable methods of reducing tension. Establishing hotlines between
governments, ministries of defense, and military services can reduce the risk of
misunderstandings and aid in coordinating de-escalatory measures. However, as
with operational agreements, hotlines are not a panacea, nor do they guarantee
peace. Rather, their primary utility, as was demonstrated during the Cold War, is
as a crisis-management tool.53

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2018

Autumn2018Review.indb 55

61

8/6/18 8:49 AM

56

NAVA L WA R C O L L E G E R E V I E W

Naval War College Review, Vol. 71 [2018], No. 4, Art. 1

ESCALATION IN EAST ASIAN WATERS
This section asks whether the dampening effect that a maritime strategic environment has on escalation applies to the current situation in East Asia. This
theater presents a complex array of challenges, with maritime boundary disputes
interacting with the wider issues that have developed because of China’s rise and
the increasing sophistication of its maritime strategy.
Currently, the nature of interactions at sea in East Asia conforms to the construct outlined above. Boundary and strategic disputes in the region have created
a maritime environment in which instability is a prominent feature, yet escalatory
acts, though frequent, have remained limited in nature and so far have not created an escalatory spiral or resulted in the outbreak of sustained violence.
Maritime Disputes
China’s 2015 defense white paper, China’s Military Strategy, calls for the “traditional mentality that land outweighs sea” to be abandoned and for China to develop into a maritime power.54 This white paper documents China’s progressive
emphasis on sea power, both to protect its regional interests and to support its
growing number of overseas strategic priorities.55 Such an approach is designed
to further China’s vision of a new maritime status quo for the region, one in
which China has broad economic exploitation rights beyond those that UNCLOS
grants and in which China maintains a position of geostrategic preeminence.56
China’s approach has been to legitimize its maritime claims in East Asia
through the use of domestic law, obstruct other littoral nations from exploiting
their own resources, and facilitate the operations of Chinese state and nonstate
economic actors in the region.57 The coercive actions of these state and civilian
actors in carrying out Beijing’s vision have led to several incidents and clashes,
which have resulted in sustained low-level instability but no significant escalation.
Disputes over resource exploitation arising from contested maritime boundaries also have occurred among other claimant states in the South China Sea. The
naval and maritime law-enforcement forces of Taiwan, the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Vietnam all have clashed at sea. These disputes have resulted in
standoffs, gunfire, and spectacular water fights at sea between rival sets of coast
guard and civilian actors. However, as with the incidents involving China directly, they have not yet resulted in war, sustained escalation, or significant loss of life.
A snapshot of significant maritime incidents in the South China Sea reveals
that, of fifteen significant clashes in 2016, twelve involved Chinese naval or coast
guard forces.58 The level of force used included ramming, harassment, and even
the firing of shots, but in none of the cases did escalation occur after the initial
clash. A similar pattern prevailed in 2015, during which eight out of ten major
incidents involved Chinese forces.59
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In the East China Sea, a comparable trend of low-level instability without
escalation can be observed. Chinese government and private vessels consistently
have operated in Japanese-claimed waters, particularly around the disputed
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands.60 According to the Japanese government, over a fouryear period between 2012 and 2016, each month an average of fifty-seven Chinese governmental and nongovernmental vessels operated in the contiguous
zone surrounding the disputed islands, and an average of nine vessels operated
in the claimed territorial seas.61 These monthly averages are punctuated by occasional spikes in activity; for example, in August 2016 over two hundred Chinese
fishing vessels escorted by China Coast Guard ships entered the contiguous zone
around the islands.62 Such contestation operations have resulted in some significant but isolated clashes in the region, including collisions between fishing boats
and coast guard vessels, the use of water cannon, and the previously highlighted
lock-on incident.
Violent clashes at sea, with no further escalation, also occur in the fertile fishing grounds off the coast of South Korea. Chinese fishing vessels consistently
have performed illegal fishing activities in South Korean waters, even in the highly sensitive areas around the NLL. South Korean sources suggest that between
April and June—the height of blue crab season—over two hundred Chinese
boats per day have fished illegally in that region.63 Such activities have resulted
in numerous, even deadly clashes between South Korean coast guard vessels and
Chinese fishermen. In 2011, a South Korean officer was murdered by a Chinese
fishing captain during efforts to seize the Chinese vessel.64 In 2016, three Chinese
fishermen were killed accidentally during boarding operations, and in a separate
incident a small South Korean coast guard vessel was sunk after being rammed
by a Chinese trawler.65
The United States, China, and Freedom of Navigation
While the United States is not a claimant state in the disputes in the East and
South China Seas, it does have substantial strategic and economic interests in
the region. China’s use of coercive pressure to enforce its claims and its islandbuilding activities have drawn substantial criticism from U.S. policy makers. This
derives from both normative and strategic concerns. China presents a potential
challenge to U.S. maritime dominance in Asia and is in dispute with many U.S.
allies and security partners, most notably Japan. Further, the United States does
not recognize China’s expansive claims in the region, nor does it accept China’s
assertion that China as a coastal state can regulate foreign military activities in its
EEZ.66 These factors have combined to create substantial but not insurmountable
strategic tensions between Washington and Beijing.
The United States challenges China’s expansive claims in the region through its
freedom of navigation operations (FONOPs). This has resulted in operations at
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sea that have brought U.S. naval vessels into proximity with Chinese civilian, paramilitary, and military actors. While the United States officially views FONOPs as
normal operations, the Chinese perceive them as potentially threatening. In 2016,
a Chinese admiral stated that “China consistently opposes so-called military freedom of navigation, which brings with it a military threat and which challenges
and disrespects the international law of the sea.”67 Despite such sentiments, to date
the Chinese have not challenged U.S. FONOPs substantially on an operational
level, instead preferring to engage on a political and rhetorical one.
Under the Obama administration, U.S. naval vessels conducted five widely
reported FONOPs in the South China Sea, and at the time of this writing the U.S.
Navy has conducted four more FONOPs since President Trump took office.68 So
far no case of FONOPs has resulted in escalation to the use of substantial force;
however, robust incidents have occurred. These incidents, as with clashes over
maritime disputes, conform to the pattern of low-level instability seen in recent
years at sea. The now-infamous 2009 incident of Chinese harassment of USNS
Impeccable highlighted the potential for diverging views of freedom of navigation to lead to isolated clashes at sea. The general Chinese response has been to
shadow vessels conducting such operations with naval and coast guard assets.
Additionally, it has been reported that in the case of USS Lassen a number of
Chinese fishing and merchant ships maneuvered around the U.S. ship as it sailed
by the Chinese installation on Subi Reef.69 In December 2016, a Chinese vessel
removed a U.S. underwater drone from the water within eyeshot of a U.S. naval
vessel.70 This was a blatant obstruction of U.S. navigation rights, yet it did not
result in an escalation to violence.
FONOPs also were carried out during the Cold War. The initial Soviet response was diplomatic, but the Soviets felt that such FONOPs were unnecessarily provocative, and responses escalated to more-forcible measures, notably
the ramming of USS Yorktown in 1988 while it was conducting a FONOP in
the Black Sea. However, the parties found military and political solutions.71 The
military solution prescribed further rules for interaction between vessels. The
political solution, agreed to in 1988, saw the Soviet Union acceding to the U.S.
interpretation of the law of the sea and the United States determining that it no
longer needed to assert its right of freedom of navigation in the Black Sea.72 This
was an elegant solution for both sides, in that the United States did not give up
its right to perform FONOPs, yet it got the USSR to agree to the established laws
of the sea, while the Soviet Union put a stop to what it perceived as destabilizing
behavior. This suggests that political solutions to freedom of navigation issues
can be found and that clashes over FONOPs, if they occur, can be managed once
it is in the interests of both parties to do so.

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol71/iss4/1

Autumn2018Review.indb 58

64

8/6/18 8:49 AM

Naval War College: Autumn 2018 Full Issue

59

B OWERS

The Potential for Escalation
Currently, available data suggest that the trend of maritime interactions in the
seas of East Asia is mirroring that seen during and after the Cold War. This would
indicate that sustained low-level instability will continue to characterize the strategic picture, but that escalation is unlikely.
Significant clashes did occur in the South China Sea in 1974 and 1988. However, in both cases, Chinese and Vietnamese forces clashed over the control of
disputed features, not as a result of operations at sea. In 1974, China wrested
control of the Paracel Islands from Vietnamese forces, and in 1988 the militaries
of the two countries fought as they attempted to secure Johnson South Reef in the
Spratly Islands. While this article focuses on the potential for escalation arising
out of clashes resulting from incidents at sea, it also is worth noting that following
both of these cases no substantial further escalation occurred.73
However, East Asia has a unique characteristic when it comes to strategic-level
interactions. Unlike during the Cold War and the case of the Korean Peninsula, in
East Asia the main crucible of interaction is located at sea. China and the United
States have no forces opposing each other on land, and with the exception of
Taiwan there are no arenas where the United States and China could clash that
have significant populated areas. This arguably reduces the risk of a clash at sea
spilling over onto land; therefore, the restraining effect of devastating war that
was operative during the Cold War may be weaker. This may allow Chinese or
U.S. commanders the freedom to escalate a clash, given that the potential strategic costs resulting therefrom would be lessened.74
However, while there is no existential threat, conflict between the United
States and China would mean conflict between the world’s two biggest economies
in some of the world’s most economically vital seas. This places pressure on both
sides to manage the instability caused by conflictual interactions. As Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi stated in 2017, “There cannot be conflict between China
and the United States, as both sides will lose and both sides cannot afford that.”75
Operationally, the increasing presence and prominence of civilian lawenforcement actors such as coast guards and the role of paramilitary maritime
militias are new phenomena. This introduces a variable that has not been seen
previously. A clash between coast guard or militia vessels may escalate to the
involvement of naval vessels. However, so far—despite substantial clashes at sea
between maritime law-enforcement actors—such escalation has not occurred.76
A further issue arising from competing maritime claims in Asia is their linkage with nationalism and history. Contested claims over the sovereign control of
islands and operations in contested waters have provoked significant public reaction in countries across the region, including China, Vietnam, and the Philippines.
Clashes that occur at sea increasingly are portrayed on social media, and while
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that might constrain maritime actors from acting aggressively, it also could stoke
protests to which governments might feel the need to respond, to assuage their
publics. Significant protests occurred in China following Japan’s nationalization of
the Senkaku Islands and in Vietnam following China’s exploration activities near
the Paracel Islands, but these did not result in escalatory processes and the governments in question eventually acted to quell public displays of dissatisfaction.77
However, it should be acknowledged that even a single future clash at sea may act
as a trigger for nationalist sentiment, which could elevate an incident beyond its
objective political or strategic value and result in unforeseen escalation.
As with the Cold War, tensions have produced some positive outcomes, particularly in managing interactions at sea and reducing the risk of miscalculation.
The 2014 multinational Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES) agreement indicated a desire to manage interactions at sea. Similarly, the 2016 agreement between China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
on CUES and ongoing negotiations over a code of conduct for the South China
Sea should be seen as starting points to mitigate further the potential for unintended escalation at sea.78
Given the concerns that the Soviet Union highlighted in the 1970s regarding
the escalatory potential of inexperienced officers, the rapid expansion of Asian
coast guards should be noted. The circumstances of East Asia, where coast guards
are taking the lead in enforcing maritime claims, suggest a need for similar agreements within this context. Such agreements should be tailored to the specific
roles that coast guards undertake.79 As with naval agreements during the Cold
War, for such agreements to be successful it is vital that all sides perceive their
operational and political benefits.
Hotlines also are present in Northeast Asia, most notably between the military
services of South Korea and Japan and those of South Korea and China.80 There
also are moves toward a working-level hotline between China and ASEAN. Further, there is a South Korea–China coast guard hotline, which soon could be replicated between China and the Philippines.81 However, hotlines are effective only
when both sides agree to use them. There is some evidence that in times of crisis
China has not used hotlines effectively. In January 2017, a fleet of Chinese military aircraft entered the South Korean air-defense identification zone. Reports
suggest that the Chinese did not answer the hotline when South Korean officials
attempted to contact them to clarify the fleet’s intentions. Nevertheless, Japan
and China also are in the process of agreeing on a communication mechanism to
de-escalate unintended incidents in the East China Sea.82
This analysis suggests that the fear that escalation will result from an incident
at sea is, by and large, overemphasized. Clashes in areas of strategic tension or
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contested maritime boundaries are to be expected; however, there is little evidence that such clashes lead to escalatory cycles or sustained violence.
This absence of escalatory behavior can be attributed to several factors that
maritime strategic geography imposes. Historically, the strategic or political benefits of escalation at sea rarely have outweighed the potential costs. The bottom
line is that what happens at sea rarely materially affects populations on land, and
therefore a costly war over maritime issues is less likely to occur.
De-escalation after an incident is facilitated by the fact that the sea cannot
be controlled permanently, so the costs of withdrawal are reduced, as such a
move does not result automatically in the loss of territory. Further, the size of the
maritime environment, coupled with the speed of clashes at sea, allows for easier
de-escalation, as time is needed to concentrate often-dispersed maritime forces.
Organic escalation therefore is less likely to occur, since political and military
elites would be required to commit expensive assets intentionally to continue a
clash. Equally, information gathering also is hindered by the nature of operations
at sea. Time often is required to ascertain facts fully, and this gap allows for political and strategic tensions to cool.
It would be wrong to suggest that it is impossible for an outbreak of sustained
violence at sea in Asia to occur. Decision makers could choose to escalate following a clash at sea, or they might feel they had no other option. Further, the
geostrategic situation in East Asia, where the stakes are not existential, may increase the risk of one side seeing a strategic or political benefit from escalating
such a clash deliberately. However, to date, incidents at sea in the region have not
resulted in substantial escalation; instead, they have conformed to the patterns
outlined in this analysis.
More attention should be paid to differences arising from geostrategic competition occurring at sea rather than on land. It is important for all parties to realize
and accept that, in the conditions currently present in Asia, clashes at sea are normal. The keys to maintaining stability in these conditions of sustained low-level
instability are crisis management and the ability to cope with the initial clashes
that inevitably will occur when strategic and territorial interests collide at sea.
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THE GREAT WHITE FLEET SAILS TODAY?
Twenty-First-Century Logistics Lessons from the 1907–1909
Voyage of the Great White Fleet
Christopher McMahon

We need above all things, a proportionate Navy, one that is perfect in
every essential particular, not simply the ships that are necessary for
fighting, but the ships that are necessary to sustain the ships that do the
fighting, to carry coal [fuel] and supplies . . . and without these ships,
the Navy would be as helpless in case of war as we would be without the
battleships or the fighting ships of the Navy.

I

SENATOR FRANCIS G. NEWLANDS (D-NV),
CONGRESSIONAL HEARING, MARCH 1908

n the numerous conflicts since the founding of the republic, and in particular
since the late nineteenth century, the United States has relied on its ability to
project military power far from its shores. With the country isolated from much
of the world by massive oceans, America’s military has employed sealift and—to
some extent, since early in World War II—airlift to move troops, equipment, ammunition, and supplies around the world.1 The majority of this lift capacity has
been provided by commercial merchant vessels under the operational control of
the military.
World War II offers the most spectacular examChristopher J. McMahon currently holds the Mariple
of strategic lift in the history of warfare. Using
time Administration Emory S. Land Chair of Merhundreds of Army and Navy logistics vessels and
chant Marine Affairs at the Naval War College. He
is a graduate of the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy
over five thousand merchant vessels, the United
at Kings Point, New York, and holds master’s degrees
States carried more than 132 million measurefrom American University, Long Island University,
2
and Starr King School. He is an unlimited master ment tons of cargo during the war. This included
mariner and a commissioned rear admiral, U.S.
the movement of nearly 1.4 million vehicles, two
Maritime Service. He has held several Senior Executhousand locomotives, and nearly eight million
tive Service positions with the Department of Transportation and the Maritime Administration.
soldiers, plus vast amounts of ammunition, supplies, and other equipment.3 As it mounted the
© 2018 by Christopher McMahon
largest naval armada in history, the U.S. Navy
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would have found it impossible to achieve its accomplishments in the Atlantic
and Pacific theaters without the thousands of Army and Navy logistics ships and
commercial merchant ships that supported the fleet.
Recognizing the direct relationship of logistics to the ability of the U.S. military to forward-deploy around the world and acknowledging the need to coordinate military lift capabilities for all the services, the U.S. Merchant Marine,
and the airline industry, the U.S. government created the U.S. Transportation
Command (USTRANSCOM, or simply TRANSCOM) in 1987.4 TRANSCOM is
headquartered at Scott Air Force Base in Illinois and is a four-star unified command. TRANSCOM components include the Air Force’s Air Mobility Command
(AMC), the Army’s Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command
(SDDC), and the Navy’s Military Sealift Command (MSC). Augmenting and
supporting MSC is the Ready Reserve Force (RRF) of the Maritime Administration (MARAD). The RRF consists of government-owned ships that MARAD
and its contracted companies maintain in a ready status. These ships fall under
MSC’s operational control when activated and are used in sealift emergencies to
support all the armed services. For more than thirty years—through numerous
conflicts, military actions, and deployments—TRANSCOM and its component
commands (and MARAD’s RRF) have proved their efficiency and effectiveness.
They have played vital roles in the success of American military actions—in the
air, on land, and at sea.
Yet, as well as many military leaders and planners in all the services understand and appreciate the critical importance of sealift logistics, too often as time
passes some military professionals and politicians forget or overlook the lessons
learned from past logistics failures. We are again at a time in history when the
importance and vulnerability of sealift, for both military and commercial activities, need to be considered and reassessed. The voyage of the U.S. Navy’s Great
White Fleet around the world from December 1907 to February 1909 offers some
powerful lessons in this regard.
During the latter half of the nineteenth century, European powers rushed
headlong into the building and expanding of global empires around the world.5
As the twentieth century dawned, with most of the United States and its territories explored, America too launched itself into imperialist actions as it sought
great-power status. A particular manifestation was the Great White Fleet’s voyage, which seemingly proved that America’s navy could project power forward
to any region of the world and defend the country’s newly acquired overseas
territories and its trade. Credit can be given to President Theodore Roosevelt
for envisioning this voyage, which, by most measures, was an unparalleled
success. Never before had any navy in the world embarked on such a voyage,
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circumnavigating the globe and visiting as many countries with such a large and
powerful battle fleet.
Less known with regard to the 1907–1909 voyage is the logistics backstory.
This background demonstrates the critical importance of strategic sealift and the
ultimate vulnerability of any navy, army, or air force that is dependent on logistics
ships for fuel, stores, and ammunition. This story provides lessons that remain as
important for all the armed services of the twenty-first century as they were to the
U.S. Navy of the early twentieth century—lessons that often go unappreciated or
forgotten. While today the U.S. Navy, and the U.S. military writ large, have great
logistics capabilities through the strategic sealift managed by USTRANSCOM,
MSC, RRF, and the commercial U.S. Merchant Marine, there are serious challenges that need to be considered and overcome. The ability of America’s navy
and all its armed services to forward-deploy depends on doing so.
BACKGROUND TO THE VOYAGE
The U.S. Navy ended the Civil War with, in theory, almost seven hundred ships
in commission. This included some sixty-five ironclads. But by 1880, Navy vessels had dropped to only forty-eight in number—and all of them were essentially
technologically obsolete.6 During this period, the U.S. Merchant Marine was in
equally poor shape. To make matters worse, those shipowners who had transferred their vessels to neutral flags during the Civil War to avoid attacks from
Confederate forces were considered traitors, so Congress passed a law specifically
forbidding the reflagging of those ships back under the U.S. flag.7
Exhausted from the war and with the huge interior of their country largely
unoccupied (except by native peoples) and offering great promise, Americans
turned inward and ignored the sea, their navy, and their merchant marine. Partially contributing to the lack of interest in a sizable U.S. Merchant Marine was
the fact that by 1890 there were twenty-two coastal states and twenty-two inland
states, resulting in a decline in political support for maritime industries.8
During these years following the Civil War, industrialization spread rapidly in
the United States; American industry eclipsed that of Great Britain by the end of
the century.9 With industrialization came incredible wealth, which went to a new
class of Gilded Age businessmen but spread as well to many average Americans
and the country at large.
As the United States became more dependent on overseas trade during this
period, political leaders in Washington began to look at the decrepit state of the
Navy and the Merchant Marine. There was fear that if overseas powers threatened
seagoing trade, the United States did not possess a navy adequate to protect the
nation’s interests, much less a merchant marine capable of carrying a significant
portion of the nation’s international trade.10
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It was Secretary of the Navy William H. Hunt who began to build a new and
more powerful U.S. Navy in the early 1880s. Under his leadership and that of
subsequent Navy secretaries, Congress appropriated funds for the construction
of modern cruisers.11 By 1890, six armored cruisers had been built and were
operational. During the same year, Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan, USN (later
rear admiral and President of the Naval War College, in Newport, Rhode Island),
published his seminal book, The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660–1783.
In the book, Mahan argued that sea power was critical to establishing national
strength and dominance in global trade.12 (Importantly, Mahan also noted that
one of the critical attributes of sea power was a capable and robust commercial
merchant marine, although ever since Mahan first offered his thesis most in
America have overlooked this observation.)13
Mahan’s book had a tremendous impact, not just in the United States but
around the world. Huge, expensive battleships, large fleets, and decisive battles
seemed to be the order of the day. At the same time, newcomers to colonialism,
such as Germany, Japan, and the United States, clamored for overseas colonies—
if necessary, to be obtained and then protected by the force of their navies.
In the United States, the Naval Appropriations Act for 1891 (better known as
the Battleship Act of 1890) for the first time authorized the construction of three
battleships, which would be christened USS Indiana, USS Massachusetts, and
USS Oregon. During the next ten years, several more battleships were completed,
bringing the U.S. Navy, by some metrics, from a ranking of twelfth among the
world’s navies in 1870 to fifth place.14
PRESIDENT TEDDY ROOSEVELT AND THE GREAT WHITE FLEET
By the conclusion of the Spanish-American War in 1898, the U.S. Navy had destroyed the Spanish fleets in the Philippines, Cuba, and Puerto Rico and seized
the Philippines and Puerto Rico as possessions in a new “American Empire.” The
American navy, with its new and apparently proven ships, was the pride of the
nation.15
As luck would have it for the growth of the fleet, the political sun continued to
shine on the Navy with the accession of Theodore Roosevelt to the presidency in
1901. As a former Assistant Secretary of the Navy in the early days of the war with
Spain, Roosevelt was an ardent advocate of naval power and a fervent believer in
the words of Mahan. Under his tenure as president, the Navy continued to grow
in both size and power.
World events during Roosevelt’s administration contributed to support for a
larger and more powerful navy. In 1903, the Roosevelt administration eagerly
encouraged and provided resources to rebels in Panama to help them gain independence from Colombia. The motive was ultimately to establish a treaty with a
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new Panamanian government whereby the United States could build and operate
a canal across the isthmus. This would enable the U.S. Navy to move from ocean
to ocean rapidly to deal with conflicts in Europe or Asia.16 U.S. tensions with
Japan began during these years, and the shocking defeat of the Russian fleet at
the naval battle of Tsushima during the Russo-Japanese War in 1905 seemed to
prove Mahan’s theories of decisive naval battles and the need for large, powerful
battle fleets. Roosevelt and Congress grew concerned about the ability of the U.S.
Navy to protect newly acquired territories and colonies in the Pacific, notably
the Philippines.17 The launching of HMS Dreadnought in 1906 also had profound
effects on the psychology of naval strategists around the world. Dreadnought was
essentially an all-big-gun ship, and its steam-powered turbines made it fast for
battleships of the day.18 Over the course of the next three years, the world’s navies
ordered nearly seventy of these powerful—and expensive—ships.19
In 1901, the U.S. Navy possessed nine battleships, with eight more under
construction. Responding to pressure from Roosevelt and support from the
press and the public, Congress authorized the construction of an additional ten
battleships and four armored cruisers in the years from 1901 to 1905. In 1906 and
1907, two additional battleships were authorized, and in 1908 two more. By this
time, the United States had emerged as a first-rate naval power.20 In fact, in 1908,
the U.S. Navy ranked as number two in the world, second only to Great Britain’s
Royal Navy.21 (This would change in ensuing years as Germany continued its naval arms race with Britain; its navy moved from the number three to the number
two spot by the start of World War I.)
During the early 1900s, navies, and especially their battleships, became tangible and dramatic symbols of national power. Even countries that could ill afford
the cost of building and operating battleships built one or two to demonstrate
that they too were great naval powers, or at least to provide some substantive
support for the notion. The best way to show off a nation’s power was to hold
or participate in naval expositions or parades or to visit the ports of other major
naval powers. Indeed, it was a statement of respect when a nation received an
invitation to join another nation’s naval festivities, and when invitations were
received utmost attention was given to impressing others with a display of one’s
own powerful battleships.22 In this environment, President Roosevelt first conceived of sailing a USN fleet around the world.
THE VOYAGE OF THE GREAT WHITE FLEET
Roosevelt’s plan for sending America’s battle fleet around the world apparently
began to develop in 1905.23 The genesis of this idea may have been his observation
of and admiration for the epic transit of Russia’s Baltic Fleet from Saint Petersburg
to the Far East to challenge the Japanese navy in the Russo-Japanese War.
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In 1904, the tensions between Japan and Russia over Korea and Manchuria
reached the boiling point and the two nations found themselves at war. The illtrained and ill-equipped Russian Far East Naval Squadron was no match for the
modern and highly trained Japanese navy, which, on February 8, 1904, attacked
and heavily damaged what Russian naval power was available in eastern Russia.24
In response, the tsar decided to send the entire Baltic Fleet to the Far East
to engage the Japanese, destroy their fleet, and quickly win the war—or so he
thought. But it was not to be so. The Russian fleet departed Revel (modern Tallinn, Estonia) on October 15, 1904. After a grueling 18,000-mile journey from
northern Europe to the Tsushima Strait off the coast of Japan, on May 27, 1905,
the Russian fleet engaged the Japanese. In the ensuing fierce battle most of the
Russian ships—including all the battleships—were sunk, with only a few ships
reaching Russian ports and three cruisers escaping to the Philippines.25 The war
soon came to a close. Both sides, exhausted, agreed to peace negotiations and
eventually signed a treaty—engineered by none other than President Theodore
Roosevelt—in Portsmouth, New Hampshire.26
Despite this complete disaster (from the Russian perspective), Roosevelt
was probably very impressed by the long voyage of the Russian Baltic Fleet—
particularly since the world press covered it extensively during the seven-month
span. He may have been inspired to send the U.S. Navy’s battle fleet on an even
longer voyage. Then there were the unsettling tensions with Japan. Considering
Japan’s devastating defeat of the Russian fleet at Tsushima, its growing belligerence in China and Korea, and the rapid growth of its merchant marine, Americans on the West Coast were becoming increasingly uneasy. The initial voyage
of the Great White Fleet (from the American East Coast to the West Coast) was
clearly an attempt to reassure Americans that their Navy could defend the West
Coast.27 In his autobiography, written in 1913, Roosevelt also stated that the purpose of the cruise was to “impress the American people in order to gain support
for a program to build more battleships.”28
Amid the growing tensions with Japan in the summer of 1907, it was originally
Admiral George Dewey who suggested to Roosevelt that he send the battle fleet
to the Far East as a show of force.29 Apparently during that summer Roosevelt
began to consider seriously a “world cruise” for the fleet, but he kept this idea
to himself for a time. Then, in late summer, the Roosevelt administration announced that sixteen battleships would make a voyage from the East to the West
Coast of the United States via the Strait of Magellan. In December 1907, the fleet
departed Hampton Roads, Virginia, bound for San Francisco.30 Initially this fleet
included sixteen battleships, eight armored cruisers, and six torpedo boats.31 The
officers and men of the fleet, at this point, were aware that the voyage probably
would continue around the world; the world press was still in speculative mode,
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but as the weeks progressed intentions for the voyage of the Great White Fleet
became clear.32 The ships would travel from the West Coast of the United States
to New Zealand, Australia, Japan, and the Far East, then to Sri Lanka, through the
Suez Canal and the Mediterranean to Spain, and finally across the Atlantic and
back to Hampton Roads, arriving in early 1909.
This would be a 43,000-mile, around-the-globe voyage to twenty ports on
six continents. It was a world first for the large battle fleet of any nation—an accomplishment that brought envy, concern, pride, or criticism, depending on the
source.33 It was, in any case, an impressive accomplishment for a relatively young
nation and a rising naval power.
THE “REST OF THE STORY”: COAL AND STORES
The expression “An army marches on its stomach” (attributed to both Frederick
the Great and Napoléon) is well understood by most people. It seems rather
obvious that food and fuel (fodder for horses was the equivalent of the latter in
premodern times) are basic necessities if an army is to move from one point to
another. What may be less obvious is that the same is true for a navy. Granted,
some types of warships can carry substantial amounts of food, supplies, fuel, and
ammunition, but in general warships’ steaming range, and therefore their ability
to fight, is limited—often only a few days’ underway time.
The ships of the Great White Fleet were no exception. In that era, a battleship
steaming at sea speed consumed its coal supply within a week.34 Fresh water—
crucial throughout maritime history—was even more important in the age of
steam power, since steamships were dependent on liberal amounts of fresh water to resupply their boilers.35 Then there was the question of feeding warships’
crews. On the voyage of the Great White Fleet, the crew complement of the fleet
consisted of some fourteen thousand men.36 The one other often-critical commodity for warships, ammunition, was not a concern on the peacetime voyage of
the Great White Fleet—in stark contrast to the situation of the Russian fleet as it
steamed toward its fateful rendezvous in the Tsushima Strait.37
Roosevelt and Navy planners were well aware of the supply issues facing the
Great White Fleet, but the solutions were daunting and dangerous. For example,
they were aware that Admiral Dewey’s wholesale destruction of the Spanish fleet
in the Philippines and the U.S. Navy’s pursuit of the Spanish fleet off Cuba during the Spanish-American War were, in many respects, quite fortuitous because
they exposed that the Navy’s ability to resupply its combatants with coal, stores,
and ammunition during war was seriously limited and reliant on foreign-flag
merchant ships.38
Despite the massive growth in the number of USN battleships and other combatants from 1898 into the first decade of the new century, the Navy possessed
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only three U.S.-flag supply ships: USS Celtic, USS Culgoa, and USS Glacier.39 Further complicating this vulnerability at the time of the voyage of the Great White
Fleet, the Navy possessed only six old colliers (some still rigged with sails) to support the fleet on its voyage. It was estimated that the fleet would consume upward
of five hundred thousand tons of coal just on the voyage from the United States to
the Far East.40 The Russians, for example, had needed to charter sixty foreign-flag
colliers to supply their fleet on its voyage from the Baltic to the Far East.41
A study the Naval War College conducted in early 1907 estimated that the
Great White Fleet would require some one hundred chartered colliers to support
it on its voyage around the world.42 The problem was that there were no U.S.-flag
colliers to charter, because the U.S. Merchant Marine had been allowed to atrophy
during the decades after the Civil War. As Assistant Secretary of the Navy prior
to the Spanish-American War, Roosevelt, along with Mahan and senior Navy
officials, had advocated to Congress that a sufficient fleet of U.S.-flag colliers be
built to enable the Navy to forward-deploy. But this proposal never gained any
traction, and Congress took no action on its own to support a revitalized U.S.
Merchant Marine. Only warships, no colliers or supply ships, were authorized
and built.43
Accordingly, in October of 1907, the Navy Department—now desperately in
need of logistics ships—contracted for thirty foreign-flag colliers to supply the
Great White Fleet on its voyage from Hampton Roads to San Francisco. The majority of these were British-flag merchant ships. In an interview just after the fleet
began its voyage, contemporary German naval critic Graf Ernst zu Reventlow
underscored that “the lack of supply ships and colliers left the Americans and
the Great White Fleet in a highly vulnerable position given their dependency on
foreign flag ships, especially British ships.”44 He would be proved right. In total,
more than forty-one British merchant ships were chartered to carry coal and supplies for the Great White Fleet during the around-the-world voyage. Many other
foreign ships, mostly European, also were chartered.45 As expected, there were
many more chartered supply ships supporting the Great White Fleet than there
were warships on the voyage.46 (It is important to emphasize that any requirement
to resupply naval ordnance would have necessitated even more supply ships.)
In the Pacific, the U.S. Navy learned firsthand the dangers of becoming too dependent on foreign-flag ships to carry the fleet’s coal. During a portion of the Pacific voyage, no colliers were available to resupply the fleet. Some historians have
suggested that diplomatic tensions over a possible U.S.-German alliance against
a Japanese-British alliance caused the British to withdraw their coal ships—and
their coal—for a period. The coal was as important as the ships: during this part
of the Pacific voyage, the U.S. Navy was forced to buy Australian coal, which was
inferior in quality, requiring nearly half again as much to achieve the same output
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol71/iss4/1

Autumn2018Review.indb 74

80

8/6/18 8:49 AM

Naval War College: Autumn 2018 Full Issue

75

MCMAHON

from the fleet’s boilers.47 Rear Admiral Charles S. Sperry (the fleet commander
on the later part of the voyage) noted in subsequent congressional testimony that
this demonstrated clearly how Great Britain “could control the actions of the
fleet.”48 Exacerbating this problem, throughout the voyage there were frequent
rendezvous problems with contracted foreign-flag vessels; in some cases, they
simply never met the fleet.49
Coal was not the only commodity dependent on shipping that was less than
fully reliable. When the Great White Fleet was in the Mediterranean, an earthquake in Italy created a serious humanitarian crisis. Admiral Sperry dispatched
the U.S. supply ship USS Culgoa to assist. But the fleet depended on this one
ship for food and other supplies, so to compensate the Navy chartered a Britishflag ship, SS Republic, to bring food and supplies to the fleet while it was in the
Mediterranean. Unfortunately, Republic sank in a collision in fog with another
vessel. Fear of famine created widespread panic throughout the fleet. It was only
when the Royal Navy provided the Great White Fleet with basic rations from its
stores at Gibraltar that the crisis was averted. Additional food and supplies from
America never did arrive, but through strict rationing the fleet successfully sailed
from Gibraltar to Hampton Roads.50
On February 21, 1909, the Great White Fleet steamed majestically into Hampton Roads to a huge celebration and a proud president and nation. The U.S.
Navy had accomplished a magnificent feat, and for the most part had gained the
respect of seafaring nations across the globe.
CRITICISM, AND VULNERABILITIES EXPOSED
Even before the Great White Fleet departed on its voyage, critics noted that the
lack of a U.S. Merchant Marine limited the ability of the Navy to forward-deploy,
much less to sail around the world in a conflict situation. Senator Eugene Hale
(R-ME, 1881–1911), chairman of the Senate Naval Affairs Committee, was appalled that the magnificent battleships of the U.S. Navy were almost completely
dependent “on the indulgence of foreign powers” to forward-deploy on any voyage beyond the Atlantic Seaboard.51 In a Senate debate and congressional hearing, Senator Hale was quoted as saying that “due to the lack of U.S. flag colliers
and supply ships, the Great White Fleet was ‘as useless as a painted ship upon a
painted ocean.’”52
The fact that the Great White Fleet was almost completely dependent on having foreign-flag commercial ships, especially of the British merchant marine,
available to follow the fleet around the world to resupply it was not revealed fully
until after the fleet had returned to the United States.53 Indeed, it is curious that
during the period of the voyage the Germans had been hoping to establish an
alliance between their country and the United States for a possible war against
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2018

Autumn2018Review.indb 75

81

8/6/18 8:49 AM

76

NAVA L WA R C O L L E G E R E V I E W

Naval War College Review, Vol. 71 [2018], No. 4, Art. 1

Japan and Britain. What the Germans apparently did not consider is that the size
and capability of the U.S. Navy mattered not, because without sufficient USN
logistics ships and an American merchant marine capable of resupplying the
fleet, any U.S. naval contribution to a war against Japan and Britain would have
been negligible.54
With the successful return of the Great White Fleet to the United States, the
Navy enjoyed substantial support from the public, Congress, and the press. That
said, the voyage exposed significant vulnerabilities in the Navy and its ability to
project power around the world. As Scientific American noted, “We refer to our
great shortage of colliers and to the fact that had it not been for the foreign bottoms in which coal was shipped to the fleet at various points of rendezvous, it
would have been impossible for this voyage to have been made. . . . [In a wartime
setting] with no colliers of our own available to carry the necessary fuel, our sixteen battleships would have been as useless as so many anchored.”55
Following the return of the fleet in 1909, Congress became fully aware of
the serious lack of U.S.-flag colliers and supply ships and the Navy’s absolute
dependence on foreign-flag merchant ships to deploy on voyages beyond the
continental United States. This shortage obviously rendered the Navy impotent
in potential conflicts far from U.S. shores. In a March 20, 1908, Senate debate
on a shipping bill amending the 1891 Act to Provide for Ocean Mail Service between the United States and Foreign Ports, and to Promote Commerce, Senator
Newlands of Nevada noted that the War Industries Board had been consulted
regarding the needs of the U.S. Navy in case of a war. The board indicated that
“about 232 commercial ships and/or auxiliaries would be needed to use as scouts,
transports, colliers, and dispatch boats.” Senator Newlands commented that “we
all know we have no such merchant marine as well as such supply ships.”56
Through the course of several congressional hearings and debates after the
voyage of the Great White Fleet, it was acknowledged that a sizable U.S. Merchant
Marine was critical to national security, and yet Congress took little action until
the eve of World War I to support a commercial merchant marine. In the absence
of a robust U.S. Merchant Marine, and realizing the critical vulnerability the lack
of logistics ships and commercial vessels represented, the Navy in 1908, with
the consent of Congress, allocated 59 percent of its ship-construction budget to
building a new fleet of Navy colliers and supply ships.57
AMERICA’S TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY NAVY—
LESSONS LEARNED OR FORGOTTEN?
One hundred twenty-five years after the publication of Mahan’s Influence of Sea
Power upon History and 110 years after the voyage of the Great White Fleet, the
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Navy’s Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower: Forward, Engaged, Ready,
issued in 2015, stated in part:
Forward naval presence is essential to strengthening alliances and partnerships, providing the secure environment necessary for an open economic system based on the
free flow of goods, protecting U.S. natural resources, promoting stability, deterring
conflict, and responding to aggression. As global maritime commerce expands, populations increase, competition for energy and natural resources grows, and advanced
military technologies proliferate across the oceans and through the littoral, so too will
challenges arise for anyone operating in those regions.
The American people will continue to rely on the Sea Services to respond to fastchanging and complex world events that threaten the security of the United States
and our allies and partners.58

Although international objectives may have changed, the importance of sea
power that Mahan formulated has not diminished. In fact, given the rapid growth
of navies around the world over the last twenty years, there is little question that
great world powers are as eager today to possess large and powerful navies as nations were more than a century ago. It can be argued that currently there is under
way a naval arms race much like that which occurred in the early years of the
twentieth century. For decades after the end of the Cold War, the U.S. Navy had
no near-peer competitor; this situation has changed considerably in recent years
with the rapid growth of navies around the world.
Unfortunately, it seems that many operational strategists and planners have
almost forgotten some of the lessons learned from the voyage of the Great White
Fleet regarding fleet logistics. This is especially true when it comes to realizing the
importance of a U.S. Merchant Marine in deploying all the armed forces around
the world, including the Navy, as Mahan discussed. The coal-burning battleships
of the Great White Fleet required refueling after one to two weeks’ steaming
time, depending on voyage speed. Yes, today’s nuclear-powered carriers and
submarines can steam for decades without refueling, but gas turbine–powered
destroyers and cruisers require fuel nearly as often as coal-burning steamships
did, and much more often if they are engaged in combat operations. In addition,
maintaining combat air operations requires a carrier to replenish jet fuel at least
every five days.59 Simply put, Navy combatants today are as dependent on logistics ships as their predecessors were during the voyage of the Great White Fleet.
TODAY’S STRATEGIC SEALIFT/LOGISTICS CAPABILITIES
To keep warships and land and air forces forward deployed and capable of
fighting, the military today has an asset that did not exist a century ago:
TRANSCOM. One of its component commands, Military Sealift Command,
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provides logistics sealift for all the armed services. MSC’s mission is clear: “Military Sealift Command exists to support the joint warfighter across the full spectrum of military operations. Our mission is timeless and essential. Regardless of
the challenge, we prevail! Working seamlessly with key partners to master the
maritime and cyber domains, MSC provides on-time logistics, strategic sealift,
as well as specialized missions anywhere in the world, under any condition, 24/7,
365 days a year.”60
MSC is a capable, well-organized, and efficient organization with numerous
missions. Supporting all the armed forces, MSC operates nearly 130 ships around
the world. MSC ships are divided into eight mission sets: fleet oilers, special
mission, prepositioning, service support, sealift, fleet ordnance and dry cargo,
afloat staging, and expeditionary fast transport. Specifically to provide Navy
fleet-logistics support around the world, MSC operates fifteen fleet oilers and
fourteen fleet ordnance and dry-cargo ships. Other MSC ships support the Army
and Air Force and other essential military missions not related to supplying Navy
ships.61 MSC government-owned, U.S. Naval Service ships are crewed by civilian,
government-employee mariners. Many other MSC vessels are commercial merchant ships chartered to provide logistics support for all U.S. armed forces around
the world. These ships are crewed by civilian, union mariners.
The Maritime Administration (part of the U.S. Department of Transportation)
has complementary government and commercial strategic sealift capabilities to
support all the armed forces. MARAD’s primary government sealift asset is the
RRF, which consists of forty-six former merchant ships: thirty-five roll-on/roll-off
(RO/RO) vessels, eight of which are fast sealift support vessels; two heavy-lift or
barge-carrying ships; six auxiliary crane ships; one tanker; and two aviation-repair
vessels. These ships are dedicated to strategic sealift, and when activated in times
of national emergency they fall under the operational control of MSC. RRF ships
are berthed at various U.S. ports. Each is expected to be fully operational within
its assigned five- or ten-day readiness status, thence to sail to designated loading berths. Through competitive contracts, commercial U.S. ship-management
companies provide systems maintenance, equipment repairs, logistics support,
activation, and operations management for RRF vessels. American civilian mariners contracted through maritime labor unions constitute the crews.62
MARAD’s commercial sealift capability also includes managing the Maritime
Security Program (MSP), which provides an annual operating subsidy for sixty
commercial cargo ships under the U.S. flag. This program supports an active,
privately owned, U.S.-flag and U.S.-crewed liner fleet in international trade,
which becomes available to support Department of Defense (DoD) sustainment
operations when necessary. The MSP facilitates maintenance of a base labor pool
of approximately 2,400 American mariners available to crew government and
commercial ships in times of peace and war.63
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Finally, MARAD also oversees the Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement
(VISA) program. The VISA program is a partnership between the U.S. government and the maritime industry to provide DoD with “assured access” to
commercial sealift and intermodal capacity to support routine and emergency
deployment and sustainment of U.S. military forces. The VISA program enables
DoD to benefit from the maximum use of a modern, global logistics network
and intermodal capabilities, including dry-cargo ships, shoreside equipment,
terminal facilities, and intermodal management services. All MSP ships are part
of the VISA program.64
The global strategic sealift capability of the U.S. military through
USTRANSCOM’s MSC and MARAD and the programs these organizations
administer is, indeed, impressive, and is unmatched by any other nation. These
entities’ efficiency and effectiveness have been proved in countless U.S. military
deployments; the battle testing they received during Operations E NDURING
FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM was especially significant.
However, compliments aside, there is growing concern that the strategic sealift
(logistics) nightmares the Navy faced during the voyage of the Great White Fleet
could affect similarly (i.e., negatively) not only the deployment and readiness of
USN combatants but the forward deployment of all U.S. armed forces, traceable
to some of the same factors the Great White Fleet experienced.
Clearly the strategic sealift capabilities of the U.S. military in general, and the
U.S. Navy in particular, are greatly superior to those of the U.S. Navy of a century
ago. However, the size of the American fleet, the missions of the U.S. Navy and
the military as a whole, and the degree of forward deployment of U.S. forces also
are vastly greater and more complicated than they were a century ago. As impressive as the voyage of the Great White Fleet was, it pales in comparison with what
the U.S. military does every day around the world in the current era. In other
words, although the strategic sealift capabilities of the United States are impressive, so too are the demands on and potential challenges to the capabilities of the
logistics system that supports the Navy and the military as a whole.
For decades, the U.S. Navy has faced no capable competitors as it sailed the
seven seas. For decades, USN task forces and ships have engaged in combat operations around the world, with no serious threat from other forces. For decades,
U.S. military strategic sealift ships, whether government owned or commercial,
could sail throughout the world with no threat of attack from an enemy. Now
this situation has changed completely. Today, enemy threats on logistics ships
abound, whether in the form of kinetic strikes or a loss of control and incapacitation from cyber-warfare attacks. There are other challenges as well, some of
which are discussed in the sections that follow.
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Lack of a Sizable U.S. Merchant Marine
Alfred Thayer Mahan’s most famous work, The Influence of Sea Power upon History, published in 1890, drew from a series of lectures he gave at the Naval War
College. In the book he concluded that merchant shipping was both a source of
maritime power and something that navies naturally needed to defend.65 As if
to prove Mahan’s point, shortly after the book’s publication, during the SpanishAmerican War, the United States found itself without the commercial shipping it
needed to support the U.S. Navy. In fact, it was necessary to charter and purchase
foreign-flag ships to resupply U.S. fleets during the war, and only serendipity
enabled the United States to do so.66
The lack of a sizable U.S. Merchant Marine for economic and strategic sealift manifested itself again at the outbreak of World War I. European belligerents removed their vessels from U.S. trade, which seriously damaged the U.S.
economy.67 Recurrence of the same problem in World War II was partially
avoided by the vision of the Franklin D. Roosevelt administration and Congress,
which enacted the Merchant Marine Act of 1936. This legislation initiated a massive buildup of commercial shipyards and the construction of huge numbers of
U.S.-flag merchant ships.68
Today, there are more than ninety thousand commercial ships in the world, a
majority of which are engaged in global deep-sea trade.69 (This figure does not
include hundreds of thousands of inland commercial vessels.) The nation owning
and controlling the most merchant ships is China, with more than 5,400 vessels
registered, mostly in China (and Hong Kong), but with hundreds of other Chinese ships registered in flag-of-convenience (FOC) nations.70 The United States
has only eighty-one merchant ships in international trade under the U.S. flag.
The majority of these ships are operated by U.S. companies that are subsidiaries
of larger shipping companies that are owned and located in other nations, such as
Denmark, Switzerland, Germany, and France. (Sixty of these ships are supported
through MARAD’s MSP.)71
The question is whether in a global conflict involving the United States there
would be enough U.S.-flag ships to support the U.S. armed forces, including the
U.S. Navy. The answer is: possibly. However, the crux of the problem is this: if, in
a contested environment, U.S.-flag shipping experienced casualties, there is no
reserve of commercial, U.S.-flag ships on which to call; there is no “bench,” so to
speak. Could the United States rely on foreign ships registered in other countries
and crewed by foreign nationals? If there were no MSC or other commercial,
U.S.-flag vessels available, could the U.S. Navy rely on foreign-flag ships to resupply a task force? Possibly yes—but quite possibly no. So, if foreign-flag ships and
crews were not available because of particular circumstances (and one can think
of many combinations of factors that would have that effect), the U.S. military
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very quickly would be immobilized, rendered incapable of carrying on a fight far
from U.S. shores. The Navy of today would be in the same position as the Great
White Fleet more than a century ago.
Today, USN task forces are resupplied by the fifteen fleet oilers and fourteen
ordnance and dry-cargo ships that MSC operates. These ships draw fuel and
supplies from various depots around the world, in both U.S. and foreign ports.
Depots in the United States are supplied by U.S.-flag merchant vessels; depots
in other countries are supplied by both U.S.- and foreign-flag ships. However,
there are only six U.S.-flag product tankers to supply fuel for the entire U.S. Navy
around the world.72 There are no other U.S.-flag tankers in international trade,
and very few, if any, other product tankers in domestic trade that could be used in
an emergency. In a manner similar to its practice during the voyage of the Great
White Fleet, the Navy today frequently relies on foreign-flag tankers and cargo
ships to carry Navy fuel and supplies because of the limited number of U.S.-flag
merchant ships.73
In a contested environment, if one or more of the limited number of MSC
or U.S.-flag merchant ships were taken out of action by kinetic or cyber means,
would there be a work-around? Quite possibly no.
Inability to Protect Logistics Ships
There is great concern about the Navy’s ability to protect logistics ships, both
government owned and commercial. Of course, the U.S. Navy has substantial
war-fighting capabilities; however, the Navy’s fleet of combatant ships currently
(in 2018) numbers 272 ships and submarines, and these vessels already have
multiple war-fighting missions that stretch the capabilities of the fleet substantially.74 In a 2014 congressional hearing on sealift force requirements, the deputy
commander of TRANSCOM was asked about the ability of the Navy to protect
logistics ships. He replied as follows: “So in terms of protecting ships as they go
across [the ocean] we—just so you know—we don’t have a lot of attrition built
into our modeling. So we . . . that’s not something we build in there.” In other
words, although the United States has substantial strategic sealift capability, even
modestly successful kinetic or cyber attacks on MSC, RRF, or MSP/VISA merchant ships could have far-reaching consequences for the Navy and the military’s
ability to forward-deploy and conduct combat operations.75 Simply put, currently
no doctrine is in place to protect merchant shipping, and protection for strategic
sealift vessels is not factored adequately into U.S. policies or plans.
Nonavailability of U.S. Mariners
During the numerous conflicts of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, there
have been no examples of U.S.-flag carriers refusing to offer their ships in times
of national emergency. Similarly, there have been no examples of American
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merchant mariners refusing to enter contested environments and thereby preventing U.S.-flag ships from serving the military. Quite to the contrary, U.S. merchant mariners have served with distinction in all U.S. conflicts. During World
War II, for example, nearly six thousand U.S. merchant mariners were killed or
lost at sea. This represents the greatest percentage loss of any U.S. service during
the war.76 (One in twenty-six mariners serving on U.S. merchant ships during the
war died in the line of duty.)77
Some have suggested that foreign ships and mariners might be available to
serve the logistics needs of the military in a U.S. conflict. However, there is no
guarantee this would work. Despite the relatively benign environment of the Persian Gulf during the Gulf Wars, chartered foreign-flag ships and crews did refuse,
on occasion, to deliver U.S. military cargoes.78 There are many political scenarios
under which foreign vessels and their crews would be prohibited by their governments from supporting the U.S. military.
Clearly, the availability of experienced U.S. mariners is crucial for crewing the
RRF, MSC commercial merchant ships on charter, and U.S.-flag ships in the MSP
and VISA programs that are supporting military sealift. However, ensuring such
availability in a future national emergency would require that there be an adequate pool of available mariners. Just as important, there also must be a pipeline
of younger mariners entering the commercial maritime workforce throughout
the years ahead. All this can happen only if there is a stable U.S. Merchant Marine
with a number of jobs adequate to ensure employment.
However, because of the shrinking number of commercial ships and commercial seagoing billets, it has become increasingly difficult for younger mariners to
gain the sea time and experience necessary to raise the level of their commercial
licenses and to sail in positions of higher responsibility.79 As the U.S. Merchant
Marine continues to decline, the number of available jobs in the industry also
decreases. Senior leaders at TRANSCOM and MARAD are deeply concerned
that the military readiness of the United States is currently at risk because the declining number of U.S.-flag commercial ships means the pool of available, experienced mariners continues to get smaller.80 At the present time, it is questionable
whether there would be enough American mariners available during a conflict—
particularly a long one—and the picture grows bleaker with each passing year.81
Effectively U.S. Controlled Ships Dwindling
Ships owned by Americans and U.S. interests but flagged in other countries,
particularly FOC countries, have been termed effectively U.S. controlled (EUSC)
ships. The theory is that these vessels would be available to the United States in
times of national emergency. Expecting and relying on the availability of EUSC
shipping constituted a long-standing policy of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In 1989,
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for example, President George H. W. Bush signed a National Security Sealift
Policy that reiterated the importance of EUSC shipping as part of the military’s
strategic sealift capability.82
However, the problems with relying on EUSC shipping are twofold. First,
while the owners of EUSC ships theoretically might be willing to support the
United States in a national emergency, there is no guarantee that the flag states
of those EUSC vessels would allow them to be used to support U.S. interests
or objectives. For example, Panama has the largest number of merchant ships
registered under its flag. China owns 534 vessels under the Panamanian flag.83
A Chinese company operates the two major marine terminals on the ends of
the Panama Canal, and the Chinese have numerous other business interests in
Panama.84 For these reasons, the Panamanian government might be reluctant to
allow the United States to use any vessel under Panamanian registry in a conflict
between the United States and China. Further, EUSC vessels are crewed by foreign nationals, not Americans, and there is no guarantee that foreign crews would
be willing to serve on EUSC vessels in a U.S. conflict.
In any case, because of U.S. tax laws passed in 1979 and 1986, American owners of EUSC ships no longer can avoid paying taxes on their incomes. As a result,
the number of EUSC ships has dwindled dramatically in the decades since.85
Because there are fewer American citizens involved in EUSC shipping than in
the past, it is no longer a viable source of ships for the American military in times
of national emergency.86 Compounding this problem, of the vessels owned by
Americans and registered in other countries, the proportion that are militarily
useful is very small.
Aging of the Fleet
Companies that participate in and receive funds through MARAD’s MSP are required to keep relatively new ships in the program. This does not pose a particularly onerous burden, since the participants’ parent companies (the vast majority
of which are foreign owned) maintain large fleets of modern ships under other
flags of registry. MSP operators are encouraged to replace aging MSP vessels with
newer ships, and must replace them before they reach age-out limits defined in
the MSP. This keeps newer vessels composing the MSP-VISA fleet.
The situation with the Ready Reserve Force is quite different. RRF vessels
are largely foreign-built vessels, plus some U.S.-built vessels constructed and
operated commercially in the late 1970s and early ’80s. Some RRF vessels are
even older, with a few (such as the fast sealift vessels, former Sealand Services
vessels) approaching and exceeding fifty years of age. Although well maintained
by MARAD and the companies contracted to manage them, these formerly commercial RRF ships were not designed and built for half-century life cycles.
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For MSC and MARAD to maintain the state of readiness necessary to provide
emergency strategic sealift, it is critical to have a solid and continually wellfunded vessel-replacement program in place. Yet current budget constraints
make this a daunting challenge. This puts at extreme risk the ability of MSC and
MARAD to provide logistics ships for strategic sealift for all U.S. armed forces,
including the U.S. Navy.
In a report delivered to the Secretary of the Navy in 1946, Fleet Admiral Ernest J.
King noted, “Whatever else [World War II] is, so far as the United States is concerned, it has been a war of logistics.”87
The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 established the U.S. Transportation Command. With its component commands of AMC, SDDC, and MSC,
USTRANSCOM fully integrated the military’s transportation modes, so that for
the first time in history the U.S. military operated all its military transportation
resources under a single command.88 TRANSCOM soon proved its worth in
1990–91 with the buildup and war against Iraq in DESERT SHIELD and DESERT
STORM, which together constituted one of the largest logistics deployments in
history.89 TRANSCOM and its components have proved their efficiency and effectiveness continually since that time, most notably in Operations ENDURING
FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM.
The voyage of the Great White Fleet of 1907–1909 demonstrated the emerging capabilities of the U.S. Navy and proved that the United States quickly was
becoming a great world power. But it also revealed the critical importance of
logistics and logistics ships in keeping a navy supplied in any forward-deployed
situation. Although the voyage was completed successfully, there were many
challenges and logistics near disasters during the voyage. This primarily was owing to the lack of U.S. logistics ships and the lack of a substantial U.S. Merchant
Marine capable of supporting the U.S. Navy—and this was a peaceful operation,
facing no threats from an enemy navy. The U.S. Navy and Congress learned from
this voyage and, at least for a time, placed emphasis on developing Navy logistics
capabilities using U.S.-flag ships. But these lessons had to be relearned in World
War I and in the years leading up to World War II.
Given the massive responsibilities the U.S. military shoulders around the
world today, it faces challenges similar to those the Great White Fleet faced more
than a century ago—but on a much larger scale. As able and efficient as MSC,
MARAD’s RRF, and the MSP/VISA fleets are, their capabilities were developed to
operate at sea in an uncontested environment. None of the vessels in these fleets
are capable of self-defense.
But the continuation of a benign environment on the seas of the world no
longer can be assumed. In today’s world, in a conflict involving the United States,
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sea lines of communication may pass through contested waters, and U.S. strategic
sealift ships, whether government owned or commercial, may be attacked. World
powers are building and operating powerful navies and intense cyber-attack
capabilities. Even if the Navy were to develop doctrines and strategies to protect
sealift ships, the number of USN warships available to protect logistics ships is
very limited at best. In some scenarios, it would be next to impossible for the
Navy to protect logistics ships in a heavily contested environment.
In the early years of World War II, the Germans had the ability to deploy only
one to two dozen submarines at any one time. Yet because defense of merchant
vessels supporting the British economy and war effort was inadequate or nonexistent, the Germans nonetheless were able to sink six million tons of British
shipping from 1939 to 1941.90 This represented more than 1,400 ships sunk by
a small fleet of German submarines.91 The naval resources needed to defeat the
German submarine threat in the Battle of the Atlantic ultimately were staggering,
running into the hundreds of billions in today’s dollars.92
In the Pacific, the Japanese did not mount an effective defense of their logistics ships or their merchant marine. Their lack of doctrine and maritime trade–
warfare defense enabled the U.S. Navy to destroy more than eight million tons of
Japanese logistics and merchant marine vessels, virtually eviscerating the Japanese economy and war machine and starving the nation.93
In other words, without sufficient protection of logistics and U.S.-flag merchant ships today, losses from an even modestly capable enemy could be substantial. The problem is compounded by the limited numbers of MSC, RRF, and
MSP ships available and of American mariners to crew them. The loss of one or
more of the twenty large, medium-speed, RO/RO (LMSR) vessels in MSC’s fleet
(each of which has a capacity of between 290,000 and 380,000 square feet of cargo
space) would have catastrophic effects on a U.S. Army deployment that depended
on the timely arrival of supplies and equipment.94 The loss of one or more of the
six American commercial tankers on charter to MSC or the fifteen MSC fleet
oilers or fourteen MSC ordnance and dry-cargo ships could devastate Navy resupply of one or more task forces. The same would be the case if the foreign-flag
tankers on which MSC depends no longer were available.
The logistical issues and the lack of USN logistics and American commercial
merchant ships nearly paralyzed the around-the-world voyage of the Great White
Fleet and provided powerful and enduring lessons that need to be looked at with
fresh eyes today. In his 1908 congressional testimony, Senator Newlands noted
that “[i]n case of war these fighting ships would, without an auxiliary navy [i.e.,
logistics ships], be absolutely derelict in the ocean, unable to move. Our Navy
may be compared to a man with strong lungs and a strong heart, perfect organs,
without legs or arms. . . . We need above all things, a proportionate Navy, one that
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is perfect in every essential particular, not simply the ships that are necessary
for fighting, but the ships that are necessary to sustain the ships that do the
fighting.”95
This observation is just as true today as in 1908, and not just for the Navy but
for the entire U.S. military.
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THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS
AND THE JOINT CHIEFS
Military Operations to Meet Political Ends
Dan Martins

T

he role the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) played in the Cuban missile crisis offers
a significant historical lesson on the primacy of defining political objectives
over pursuing an expedient military solution. The recommendations the JCS
provided to the president were consistent with decades of military experience,
as well as doctrine designed to keep the Soviets in check through deterrence, but
President John F. Kennedy did not take those recommendations, and the crisis
was resolved by other means.
Following the Cuban missile crisis, General Thomas S. Power, the commander
of Strategic Air Command (SAC), cited SAC’s overwhelming nuclear deterrent as
the reason President Kennedy was able to achieve a diplomatic solution to the crisis.1 During the crisis, SAC stood an airborne nuclear alert, conventional forces
massed in the southeastern United States to prepare for an invasion, and the
U.S. Navy carried out a blockade. On October 19,
Commander Dan Martins, USN, is a naval helicop1962, the chiefs disagreed with the president’s aster pilot. He is executive officer of Helicopter Marisessment of Soviet premier Nikita S. Khrushchev’s
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Force operations. Furthermore, the military’s Operational Plans (OPLANs) 312,
314, and 316 and the initial actions the JCS took were aligned with the Kennedy administration’s Cuba policies following the Bay of Pigs invasion of April 1961. From
October 15 to 24, 1962, the JCS pressed military planning and deployments that
placed U.S. nuclear forces at their highest state of readiness during the Cold War.
President Kennedy ultimately pursued a course that was at variance with the
initial military recommendations from the JCS. Yes, nuclear and conventional
deterrence were keys to resolving the Cuban missile crisis, but it was avoiding
a confrontation that would have required Khrushchev and Kennedy to make a
full conventional or nuclear response that provided the balance that allowed the
crisis to be resolved.
Having dutifully advised the president over the course of the Cuban missile
crisis, including disagreeing as appropriate, the JCS—particularly the Air Force
and Navy chiefs—then faithfully executed the president’s direction. This offers
a narrative of the crisis that is far more nuanced than a simplistic hawks-versusdoves interpretation.
This article relies on military command histories, declassified notes and
chronologies from JCS meetings during the crisis, and declassified oral histories.
Furthermore, this analysis relies heavily on the Miller Center transcripts of the
presidential recordings. While digesting the voluminous declassified documents
presents a challenge, this article focuses on primary sources that reveal how
the JCS maintained their primary recommendation for military action against
Cuba. Lastly, my research builds on James G. Hershberg’s “Before ‘The Missiles
of October’: Did Kennedy Plan a Military Strike against Cuba?,” which deftly
examines the covert and contingency plans for a U.S. removal of Castro and the
invasion of Cuba.2 The Cuban missile crisis must be viewed as a Soviet response
to the Bay of Pigs invasion and the Kennedy administration’s continued efforts
to remove Castro. Hershberg’s article is key to understanding the normalization
of military operations and planning among military commanders with respect
to Cuba. Leading up to the Cuban missile crisis, the Joint Chiefs developed plans
and conducted exercises aimed at removing Castro from Cuba and overthrowing
the Communist government. This supports my conclusion that the JCS decision
to support air strikes was a normal response to the discovery of Soviet missiles in
Cuba and was in keeping with years of military planning.
The JCS recommendation to conduct air strikes against Cuba was aligned with
previous Kennedy administration Cuba policies, but ultimately did not take sufficiently into account the political costs of taking such unilateral action. On October 19, 1962, after four days of planning, the JCS argued forcefully to President
Kennedy in favor of air strikes against Soviet targets in Cuba. But while the JCS
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worked to implement a military solution to the crisis, the president maximized
the variables of space and time to achieve a diplomatic solution. After the JCS
had made their case for air strikes and an invasion to accomplish the removal of
the Soviet missiles, the successful implementation and execution of the blockade
demonstrate that solving any complex crisis must be guided by the sought-after
political outcome, not by which action seems expedient or decisive.
MISSILES IN CUBA AND MEETINGS IN WASHINGTON
Beginning in March 1962, covert U-2 surveillance flights tracked the Soviet
buildup in Cuba. These Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) flights eventually
observed surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites, missile-armed patrol boats, and
Soviet-built MiG-21 fighter jets.
When the CIA began flying over Cuba, SAC used a lower-echelon command—the 544th Reconnaissance Technical Group’s Research Center, under
Lieutenant Colonel Eugene F. Tighe Jr.—to study the Cuban intelligence. The
544th was able to shorten the time necessary to discover possible SAM sites, and
eventually MRBMs, because it concentrated its initial analysis efforts on locations described in CIA reports, relying on information passed on from Cuban
operatives. As director of SAC intelligence, Brigadier General Robert N. Smith
provided the SAC commander in chief (CINCSAC), General Power, the latest
assessments on Cuba.3 The 544th’s Cuba assessments were one of the many ways
SAC monitored worldwide Soviet threats to the U.S. nuclear force.
By late June 1962, “[a]ll-source intelligence”—corroborated by “refugee and
agent reports, communications intelligence, and the like—had begun to highlight certain areas as centers of unusual activity.”4 Photo interpreters at the 544th
observed ground sites prepared in Cuba that matched SA-2 missile sites in the
Soviet Union. When Tighe had served in West Germany in 1958, he had watched
the Soviets deploy similar rings of SA-2 sites at Glau, East Germany. The effect
had been to elevate the risk of reconnaissance flights, and thus to deter U.S. observation of Soviet missile deployments in East Germany.5
General Power, Brigadier General Smith, and Lieutenant Colonel Tighe
briefed their assessment of possible missile deployments in Cuba at the Pentagon, but the reception in Washington was lukewarm. The National Photographic
Interpretation Center (NPIC), the CIA, and the Air Staff discounted SAC’s
assessment.6 Not until late August did further photo intelligence reveal roads
with “the characteristic ‘star of David’ pattern associated with the SA-2.”7 Tighe’s
assessment jibed with a memo from CIA director John A. McCone to President
Kennedy that interpreted the SAM deployments as predecessors to offensive
missile deployments.8 A preponderance of evidence pointed to the presence of
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offensive weapons in Cuba, which President Kennedy publicly stated would be
intolerable for U.S. national security.9
On the afternoon of October 14, 1962, SAC and the 544th used the trackercamera film from a U-2 overflight of Cuba to confirm the presence of Soviet
MRBMs. When the JCS convened for a three-hour meeting at 2:00 PM (EST)
on Monday, October 15, 1962, the meeting content suggests that SAC relayed
its assessment of the U-2 flight photography. This put events in motion at the
Pentagon a day before NPIC director Arthur C. Lundahl briefed the president on
October 16, relying on analysis of the higher-resolution main-camera film. On
Monday evening, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) informed the Pentagon
that the October 14 U-2 flight revealed “cylindrical objects that equated to 700
or 1100 nautical mile ballistic missiles in the Pinar del Rio area west of Havana.”10
Yet despite the DIA information, the JCS did not meet until the next day, at 10:00
11
AM, Tuesday, October 16.
While mention of SAC’s assessment of the tracker film is absent from the JCS
meeting notes of October 15, the Pentagon thereafter planned and operated as if
the presence of Soviet missiles in Cuba had been confirmed. Defense Secretary
Robert S. McNamara summarized as follows: “[The] President wants no military
action within the next three months, but he can’t be sure, as he does not control
events. For instance, aerial photos made available this morning show 68 boxes on
ships that are not believed to be Il-28s and cannot be identified.”12 The meeting
discussed the long lead times for the troop movements necessary to prepare an
invasion force, and McNamara cited the Suez crisis, stating, “We can’t do what the
British and French did over Suez—say we will take action, then do nothing while
a long buildup is completed. We can’t do nothing during the 18-day preparatory
period for OPLAN 314 while the enemy prepares and world pressure mounts.”13
The meeting notes are sparse for a three-hour meeting, but the JCS decided that
Commander in Chief, Continental Air Defense Command should provide a report on the air defense of the southeastern United States, along with estimates of
casualties and damage from an air strike from Cuba.
Additionally, the JCS requested that Commander in Chief, Atlantic Command
(CINCLANT) revise OPLANs 314 and 316.14 On October 15, 1962, the JCS
directed revisions to invasion plans for Cuba before NPIC had interpreted the
preliminary results of the October 14 U-2 flight.15 Thus, even before the presence
of MRBMs was confirmed, the Pentagon already had begun to address the delays
inherent in the existing military plans and to prepare revised and additional military options to respond to Soviet missiles in Cuba.16
The chiefs were decidedly hawkish on the next actions the United States
should take. At 7:30 AM on October 16, DIA director Lieutenant General Joseph
F. Carroll briefed Secretary McNamara on the ballistic missiles found near San
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol71/iss4/1

Autumn2018Review.indb 94

100

8/6/18 8:49 AM

Naval War College: Autumn 2018 Full Issue

95

M A RT I N S

Cristóbal.17 At the 10:00 AM meeting, the DIA briefed the Joint Chiefs that three
MRBM sites could be operational within twenty-four hours.18 The Chief of Staff
of the Army (CSA), General Earle G. Wheeler, favored a surprise air strike, followed by invasion, and the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), Admiral George
W. Anderson, concurred. General William F. McKee, the Vice Chief of Staff of
the Air Force, dissented only slightly, believing that an invasion was not necessary
on top of air strikes and a naval blockade, and the Chairman of the JCS (CJCS),
General Maxwell Taylor, agreed. The Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC),
General David M. Shoup, recommended that the United States give the Soviets
an ultimatum to remove the missiles, or the United States would eliminate them.
The meeting concluded with the JCS agreeing that the first step should be to
recommend additional intelligence flights, then “surprise attacks on missiles,
airfields, patrol torpedo [i.e., PT] boats, SAMs, and tanks; concurrently reinforce
Guantanamo, [and] prepare to initiate an invasion.”19 General Taylor took these
recommendations to the first meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council (ExComm).20
At 4:30 PM on October 16, General Taylor summarized the first ExComm
meeting to the Joint Chiefs and select subordinates, including General Power
(CINCSAC); General Walter Sweeney, Commander, Tactical Air Command; and
Admiral Robert L. Dennison, CINCLANT. Taylor highlighted the perspective of
Secretary of State Dean Rusk, who viewed the Soviet move to place missiles in
Cuba as a measure to further Khrushchev’s objectives in Berlin. McNamara laid
out three courses of action: he classified political moves as useless; he weighed the
possibility of open surveillance and a blockade; and he supposed that an all-out
military action could trigger a Soviet response.21
Out of this meeting, the Joint Chiefs cautiously agreed that low-level reconnaissance flights did not recommend themselves as a course of action, since the
effort could appear to be an attack. Intent on eliminating any Soviet threat on
Cuba, the JCS decided it was not advisable to attack only the MRBM sites, leaving
Soviet aircraft, SAMs, patrol boats, and tanks untouched.22 Thus, while the JCS
were careful not to take actions, such as low-level flights, that could be mistaken
as a prelude to invasion, they agreed that any action taken should be decisive: a
large strike, against all Soviet forces.23
At the October 16 evening ExComm meeting, Taylor echoed his morning
position and took an approach in favor of gaining more intelligence, to build
time for a decision. “Our recommendation would be to get complete intelligence,
get all the photography we need, the next two or three days, no, no hurry in our
book. Then look at this target system. If it really threatens the United States,
then take it right out [with a] hard crack.”24 Taylor reiterated the stance the Joint
Chiefs had taken that morning, during the 10:00 AM meeting at the Pentagon.25
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This desire by General Taylor and the Joint Chiefs for more intelligence gave the
Pentagon additional time to refine military plans, thus delaying any immediate
decision that would reveal U.S. knowledge of the missile sites. On the basis of
McNamara’s and Taylor’s guidance, the JCS prepared to conduct the defense of
the United States and contingency air strikes against Cuba. The lead time for a
possible air strike allowed President Kennedy additional time to contemplate the
consequences of air strikes on Cuba and the possible Soviet response.
On the morning of Wednesday, October 17, President Kennedy met with West
German foreign minister Gerhard F. Schröder. They discussed recent developments in Berlin with respect to visa initiatives and Soviet intentions to restrict
movement into Allied zones by West Germans. This conversation between Kennedy and Schröder, occurring as it did early on during the Cuban missile crisis,
shows that for Kennedy the Soviet measures in Berlin were important political
considerations, to be factored into the analysis of Khrushchev’s placement of
missiles in Cuba.
The early planning meetings of McNamara and the JCS focused on surveillance and preparations for either an invasion of or an air strike against Cuba.
Absent from the JCS meeting notes are any extensive discussions of Soviet motives or expected follow-on actions by Khrushchev, other than General Taylor’s
comment that amassing a force for a large-scale invasion of Cuba would tie up
250,000 U.S. soldiers—“playing Khrushchev’s game.”26 In contrast, Kennedy’s
meeting with Schröder on October 17 illustrated that the president viewed the
placement of missiles in Cuba as a political act that held wider implications for
the Western presence in Berlin. At the October 19 ExComm meeting, the Joint
Chiefs disagreed with the president that military action against missiles in Cuba
would lead to a Soviet response in Berlin.27 Yet Kennedy continued consistently
to view the placement of missiles in Cuba as part of the Soviets’ wider Cold War
engagement with the United States.28
The Joint Chiefs reconvened at the Pentagon at 10:00 AM on October 17, 1962.
Overnight the staff had prepared sortie estimates based on McNamara’s five
courses of action for air strikes, and had forwarded these estimates to the White
House. Yet—in evidence of planning myopia—the estimates did not account for
support missions related to the air strikes, including “escort, suppression of air
defenses, and post-strike reconnaissance.” General Taylor chastised the staff,
proclaiming, “What! These figures were reported to the White House. You are
defeating yourselves with your own cleverness, gentlemen.”29 Nonetheless, the
Joint Staff had sidestepped the chairman. Whether the staff did this intentionally
or through ineptitude, the result was the same: from there the sortie estimates
subsequently climbed, increasing the projected scale of an air strike against Cuba.
Furthermore, the Joint Chiefs remained adamant that it would be pure folly to
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol71/iss4/1

Autumn2018Review.indb 96

102

8/6/18 8:49 AM

Naval War College: Autumn 2018 Full Issue

97

M A RT I N S

strike only the MRBM sites. The staff subsequently (on October 17) produced a
memorandum to McNamara “advocating air attack against all missile sites, all
combat aircraft, and nuclear storage, combat ships, tanks, and other appropriate
military targets in Cuba, in conjunction with a complete blockade . . . and advising that the elimination of the Castro regime would require an invasion, preferably under OPLAN 314.”30
On October 17, an internal study that examined Soviet intentions contributed
to the military leadership’s entrenchment in its position that air strikes were
necessary. The Joint Strategic Survey Council (JSSC), a planning body under the
Joint Staff, concluded that “the USSR would not resort to general war in direct
response to U.S. military action against Cuba, that the most likely Soviet reactions would be at sea, against Iran or an ICBM [intercontinental ballistic missile]
‘accident’ on the Pacific Test Site, and that sharp and strong encroaching actions
at Berlin, short of direct seizure, could reasonably be expected.”31 General Taylor
debriefed the chiefs on the Wednesday morning meeting at the White House
with personnel from the State and Defense Departments—Secretary of State
Dean Rusk, Under Secretary of State George W. Ball, Ambassador at Large for
Soviet Affairs Llewellyn E. Thompson, and Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Paul H. Nitze—along with Attorney General Robert
Kennedy. General Taylor relayed State’s preference for political measures—which
would minimize damage to alliances—including perhaps a summit meeting
with Khrushchev. At the State Department meeting the feeling had been that a
blockade necessitated a wider war, and was considered as an additional step only
by those who did not feel air strikes alone were enough to eliminate the threat of
Soviet missiles in Cuba.32 By the 17th, internal memos and external meetings had
reinforced the Joint Chiefs’ views that air strikes were the primary action necessary in Cuba, and that Russian reactions to such strikes would be confined to the
periphery and incidental to main U.S. interests.
From October 16 to 19, the JCS consistently advocated for some form of air
strikes and prepared for an invasion of Cuba. On the 18th, U-2 photos revealed
MRBM sites at Guanajay, San Julian, San Cristóbal, and Santa Cruz. At the 9:00
AM JCS meeting that day, General Taylor aligned with the chiefs in support of air
strikes and an invasion. He outlined to the JCS three plans that the ExComm was
considering: “(1) maximum political effort; (2) a combination, with military effort being built around blockade, then reconnaissance; (3) no political discussion,
air strike followed by invasion.”33 The CJCS reported that the Secretary of State
had proposed a period of discussions with the United Nations, the Organization
of American States, and Khrushchev, thereafter proceeding to a blockade “and
state of war.”34 After three days of planning, General LeMay expressed frustration
at the hesitation to commit to a military solution, saying, “Are we really going
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to do anything except talk?” On the basis of the October 17 meetings, General
Taylor outlined the likely approach, suggesting that there would be a political
overture and warning, followed by a blockade, air strike, and invasion, starting
sometime the next week. The earliest date an air strike could be ready was October 21, with the optimum date being October 23, followed by an early invasion
on October 28, but optimally on October 30, 1962.35
At the October 18 meeting, Taylor directed that planning efforts should continue to examine a “total blockade, selective blockade, and the necessity for a
declaration of war.”36 This direction did not precipitate a lightbulb moment of
clarity for the Joint Chiefs, with General LeMay responding negatively to the
blockade proposal: “It would be pure disaster to try that.”37 Taylor told the JCS
that the options on the table were either an air strike against all targets, with an
invasion and blockade possibly to follow, or the aforementioned political action,
with a blockade to follow. The JCS were due to meet with the president on Friday
morning, so they codified their recommendations as follows: “(1) Notify [British
prime minister] Macmillan and possibly [West German chancellor] Adenauer,
two hours in advance. (2) Carry out a surprise attack on comprehensive targets.
(3) Reconnaissance surveillance. (4) Complete blockade. (5) Invade Cuba? CSA,
CSAF [USAF Chief of Staff], and CNO say yes; CJCS says only be prepared to do
so. (6) Realize there will be a strain upon and NATO problems about Berlin.”38
McNamara dissented from the Joint Chiefs’ belief that the Soviet deployments
affected the strategic balance of power, but the chiefs found the presence of Soviet
missiles in Cuba to be militarily unacceptable.39
“ALMOST AS BAD AS THE APPEASEMENT AT MUNICH”
On October 19, following a 9:00 AM planning session at the Pentagon, the JCS
drove to the White House for a meeting with the president in the Cabinet Room.
The CJCS laid out for the president the chiefs’ united position: that the United
States should attack the missile sites, continue surveillance to watch for other
sites, then blockade Cuba to prevent additional Soviet weapons from entering.
Taylor admitted that the JCS had not considered fully the political implications of this course of action or the “political disabilities” inherent in the JCS
recommendation.40
For the president, the entire situation was tied directly to Khrushchev’s motives in Berlin. “When we balance off that our problem is not merely Cuba but
it is also Berlin and when we recognize the importance of Berlin to Europe, and
recognize the importance of our allies to us, that’s what made this thing be a dilemma for three days. Otherwise our answer would be quite easy.” General Taylor
agreed with the president, offering that the JCS thought that if the United States
did not respond in Cuba it would hurt U.S. credibility in Berlin.41
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General LeMay agreed that decisive action in Cuba was necessary to ensure
U.S. credibility in Berlin, but echoed the JSSC assessment on expected Soviet
actions in Berlin if the United States should strike or invade Cuba. LeMay disagreed with the president that the Soviets would take Berlin if the United States
invaded or bombed Cuba. The Air Force general went further: “This blockade
and political action, I see leading into war. . . . This is almost as bad as the appeasement at Munich. [pause] Because if this blockade comes along, their MIGs
are going to fly. Their IL-28s are going to fly against us. And we’re just going to
gradually drift into war.” LeMay and the JCS felt that maintaining a blockade—
involving large military forces on high states of readiness—ran the risk of accident and misinterpretation, and closed off the military advantage of surprise.
LeMay concluded his long statement as follows: “I just don’t see any other solution except direct military intervention right now.”42
CNO Anderson and CSA Wheeler both agreed with LeMay’s statement. Anderson acknowledged President Kennedy’s opening statement to the meeting
regarding the president’s concern over Soviet intentions in Berlin. The CNO asserted that the United States must demonstrate resolve in Berlin in conjunction
with the attack, blockade, and invasion of Cuba: “We recognize the great difficulty of a military solution in Berlin. I think on balance, the taking [of] positive,
prompt, affirmative action in Berlin demonstrating the confidence, the ability,
the resolution of the United States on balance, I would judge it, would be to deter
the Russians from more aggressive acts in Berlin.” Anderson and Wheeler reemphasized the JSSC assessments, with Wheeler adding that “from a military point
of view, the lowest-risk course of action if we’re thinking of protecting the people
of the United States against a possible strike on us is to go ahead with a surprise
air strike, the blockade, and invasion because these series of actions progressively
will give us increasing assurance that we really have got the offensive capability
of the Cuban-Soviet cornered.”43 Wheeler’s statement of his case to the president
was effective, appealing as it did to the fact that Khrushchev had not declared
Cuba a part of the Warsaw Pact, nor had he made an announcement that the
Soviet Union was establishing a base in Cuba. On this evidence, Wheeler found
an attack prior to such an announcement to be not only a low-risk maneuver but
politically advantageous.
CMC Shoup reflected that the American people already lived under the threat
of a Soviet nuclear strike from Russia, and that adding the capability to strike
from Cuba was a Soviet move to tie the United States up in its own back yard.
“And each time you then have to take some action in Berlin, South Vietnam, Korea, you would be degrading. You’d have to degrade your capability against this
ever-increasing force in Cuba.”44
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To each of the chiefs, Kennedy agreed or disagreed openly, leading to the
infamous LeMay-versus-Kennedy exchange in which LeMay told the president,
“You’re in a pretty bad fix,” and the president responded, “You’re in there with
me . . . personally.” The president solicited the earliest date an air strike could
be conducted, and LeMay offered October 21 and 23 as the earliest and optimal
dates, respectively.45
Before the president concluded the meeting, General Wheeler asked, “Today
. . . am I clear that you are addressing yourself as to whether anything at all should
be done?” President Kennedy replied, “That’s right.” Wheeler followed up, “But
that if military action is to be taken, you agree with us.” The president replied with
an affirmative, “Yeah.”46 Thus, Kennedy agreed with the JCS that it might come
to an air strike and invasion, but he was not going to make that decision yet. That
afternoon the president remained uncommitted.
Before departing, Kennedy had a private discussion with McNamara, after
which the Secretary of Defense issued orders to the CJCS to develop fully the
planning for a blockade and continue to work on the details for an air strike.47 At
the JCS meeting on the morning of October 19, Anderson had voiced his concern
regarding the difficulties of conducting a blockade, but after the meeting with the
president the Joint Chiefs would press ahead with two planning efforts.48
After McNamara and Taylor departed, Wheeler, LeMay, and Shoup continued
their discussion. There in the Cabinet Room Shoup voiced his final dissent, and
the secret tape recorder continued to capture their conversation.
SHOUP: You, you pulled the rug right out from under him.
LEMAY: Jesus Christ. What the hell do you mean?
SHOUP: I just agree with that answer, General. I just agree with you a hundred
percent. He [President Kennedy] finally got around to the word escalation. I
heard him say escalation. That’s the only goddamn thing that’s in this whole trick.
It’s been there in Laos; it’s been in every goddamn one [of these crises]. When he
says escalation, that’s it. If somebody could keep them from doing the goddamn
thing piece-meal. That’s our problem. You go in there and friggin’ around with
the missiles. You’re screwed. You go in and frig around with anything else, you’re
screwed.
LEMAY: That’s right.
SHOUP: You’re screwed, screwed, screwed. And if some goddamn thing some
way, he could say: “Either do this son of a bitch and do it right, and quit friggin’
around.” That was my conclusion. Don’t frig around and go take the missiles
out.49
The generals agreed that the president equated Berlin with Cuba, and Wheeler
suggested that, on the basis of Kennedy’s statements, the president was leaning
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toward political action and a blockade. But the Joint Chiefs had made their case
for the best military solution to the president, and their recommendations had
an effect. As the president departed Washington on a campaign trip, he requested
that McGeorge Bundy, the presidential assistant for national security affairs (i.e.,
the national security advisor) keep the air-strike option open despite the president’s inclination toward a blockade.50
General LeMay’s comments during the meeting with the president were
pointed. Admiral Anderson and General Wheeler were forthright in their counsel to the president. The JCS had such an effect that the president’s planning
continued in both directions. At McNamara’s direction, the Pentagon divided
into two planning teams to explore the details of the blockade and air strikes.
During the JCS meeting on Saturday, October 20, at 10:00 AM, Admiral Anderson
“protested to the SECDEF [Secretary of Defense] that this would [be] locking the
barn door after the horse had been stolen. Blockade would not accomplish the
objective, was not in the U.S. interest, would be imposed after the missiles had
been emplaced, and would bring a confrontation with the Soviet Union rather
than Cuba.”51 So Anderson still thought the blockade alone would not eliminate
the missiles in Cuba, but nonetheless he directed the Navy planning effort to
implement a blockade.
JCS meetings continued throughout Saturday, culminating with General
Taylor’s return to the Pentagon to debrief the afternoon meeting at the White
House. Announcing that “[t]his was not one of our better days,” Taylor described
how Rusk, McNamara, and Ambassador to the United Nations Adlai Stevenson
had weighed in to support a blockade, to commence twenty-four hours after the
president’s television address. The Joint Chiefs were to plan for a naval blockade against offensive weapons and “be prepared to execute an air strike against
missiles only, (1) without warning on Monday or Tuesday or (2) after 24 hours’
notice.”
Taylor recounted to the JCS in the Pentagon, “The President said to me, ‘I
know that you and your colleagues are unhappy with the decision, but I trust
that you will support me in this decision.’ I assured him that we were against the
decision but would back him completely.” In this statement Taylor appealed to
the absolute professionalism of the military in the execution of the lawful orders
of the president of the United States. Kennedy knew that by asking for Taylor’s
backing he was calling expressly on the Joint Chiefs to execute their duty-bound,
constitutional obligation or resign. Taylor, in turn, relayed this to the JCS and
put the matter to rest, effectively telling the Joint Chiefs to get in line. The chiefs
complied, although Wheeler raised a last flag of protest, stating, “I never thought
I’d live to see the day when I would want to go to war.”52
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ONLY A BLOCKADE AWAY FROM THERMONUCLEAR WAR
Over the weekend following the Friday, October 19, JCS meeting with the president, the Navy continued planning to make the quarantine a reality and the Air
Force prepared for air strikes. On Sunday morning, President Kennedy met with
Tactical Air Command’s General Sweeney to review the general’s estimate on the
likely success of any air strike. The meeting lasted from 11:30 AM to 12:30 PM.
CIA director John McCone and McNamara agreed that the number of launchers totaled approximately forty, with thirty-six sites known. General Sweeney,
with the support of General Taylor, maintained that to be effective any air strikes
against missile sites would have to include sorties against Soviet fighter jets and
bombers, pushing sortie counts for an air strike up to five hundred. Although on
Saturday Kennedy had shut down the idea of an air strike, on Sunday morning
the president reviewed the plan with General Sweeney and directed McNamara
to be ready to execute such an attack as early as Monday, October 22, if required.53
Kennedy had to keep the possibility of a direct attack on Cuba poised for execution should the blockade fail entirely. The JCS and Air Force stood ready to give
the president military options during the crisis.
Although the meeting was not archived on Kennedy’s secret tape-recording
system, the ExComm convened again on Sunday, October 21; the meeting lasted
from 2:30 PM until 4:50 PM.54 In this meeting Admiral Anderson described how
the blockade would follow “accepted international rules,” and reported that forty
Navy ships already were in position.55 Anderson further recommended that the
blockade commence twenty-four hours after the president’s scheduled speech on
October 22, 1962, to allow the Soviets time to issue instructions to their ships.
Anderson proposed that if Soviet ships or aircraft took hostile actions, the Navy
would have permission to respond. McNamara backed the CNO, stating that he
favored such rules of engagement.56 At the conclusion of the meeting the president and CNO had their famous exchange, in which President Kennedy said,
“Well, Admiral, it looks as though this is up to the Navy,” to which the CNO
responded, “The Navy will not let you down.”57
That night the Navy worked to answer the concerns regarding the blockade
(even as the president’s speech was adjusted to use the word “quarantine” instead
of “blockade”). Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell L. Gilpatric further informed the Navy that the Secretary of Defense required the drawing up of rules
of engagement regarding the blockade and Guantánamo. The CNO remained
at the Pentagon until 11:25 PM, finalizing a message to CINCLANT Admiral
Dennison, for approval by the Secretary of Defense (the Secretary of State had
approved the message previously).58 Navy personnel worked through the night,
and by 7:20 AM had produced a rules-of-engagement document that outlined
how the Navy would respond to Soviet ships approaching the blockade line.59 The
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memorandum referenced established Navy procedures and specified that compliant Soviet ships would be diverted to non-Cuban ports. Should a Soviet ship
not comply, “the blockade would be carried out with minimum use of force.”60
Late in the evening of October 22, 1962, following President Kennedy’s address
to the nation, McNamara and Anderson began the process of identifying which
ship would be the first to be stopped.61
As commencement of the blockade drew closer on October 23, 1963, in a
10:00 AM ExComm meeting President Kennedy and the ExComm held detailed
conversations on which ships were likely to be stopped first, with McNamara
identifying Kimovsk. Further, the Secretary of Defense reviewed possible alternatives by which the president could respond if SAMs shot down a U-2. The
ExComm and the president dug further into the details of the military execution
of the blockade and the surveillance flights over Cuba.62 Given the risks involved
if the blockade effort escalated and Kennedy’s interest in the details of military
procedure, McNamara’s review with the president of the delegation of authority
to respond to a SAM “shootdown” of a U-2 was understandable.
At the second ExComm meeting that day, at 6:00 PM, the ExComm members
debated how to handle Soviet ships approaching the quarantine line. Kennedy
read the quarantine proclamation aloud, going through it point by point. He
paused in his reading to voice his understanding that if a Soviet ship was hailed
it would have the option to divert to a non-Cuban port. McNamara followed up:
“The question is: Can we search a vessel which was proceeding toward Cuba,
was hailed, requested to stop, did not do so, but turned around and proceeded
to reverse direction away from Cuba. . . . I don’t believe we should undertake
such an operation.” To which President Kennedy replied, “Not right now.” McNamara again agreed with the president, “Not immediately. That’s right. So my
instruction to the Navy was: Don’t do it.” Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy
argued in favor of seizing a Soviet ship to obtain further evidence of Soviet missile shipments to Cuba, and raised the possibility of exploiting the weapons for
intelligence purposes. Secretary of State Rusk, Robert Kennedy, McNamara, and
National Security Advisor Bundy debated the merits of seizing ships suspected of
carrying offensive material. President Kennedy stopped the discussion, forestalling any decision on seizing ships, and returned the focus to editing the proclamation.63 Thus, while the Navy had established rules of engagement on the morning
of October 22, as late as the evening of October 23 the ExComm still was debating
tactical-level decisions for conducting the quarantine, while the president edited
the quarantine proclamation.
Near the end of the October 23 ExComm meeting, President Kennedy asked,
“Okay, now what do we do tomorrow morning when these eight [Soviet] vessels continue to sail on? We’re all clear about how we handle it?” JCS Chairman
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General Taylor offered, “Shoot the rudders off of them, don’t you?” McNamara added that he would like to hold off issuing more-specific instructions to
CINCLANT Admiral Dennison until the morning. The ExComm walked
through various scenarios, such as whether ships carrying nurses or baby food
would press through the quarantine. Kennedy found none of the scenarios in
which ships continued beyond the quarantine line acceptable. The president realized the difficulties and joked, “I’ll tell you, for those who considered the blockade course to be the easy way, I told them not to do it!” The president received a
loud outburst of laughter from around the room.64
Ultimately, the possibility that bothered the president was a tactical engagement in which USN sailors forcibly boarded a Soviet ship, then got killed by
machine-gun fire. The ExComm did not have an easy answer for the president,
so finally General Taylor offered, “I think we just have to say, Mr. President, [to
use] a mission type of order: to use the minimum force required to cause—” The
president stopped Taylor: “Well, except that doesn’t give them quite. . . . I think
this is the point. If he disables a ship and they’re eight hundred miles out and
they refuse to let us aboard, I don’t think we ought, he ought to feel that he has to
board that thing in order to carry out our orders.” Taylor responded, “Well, he’s
to keep the ships from going into Cuba, that’s his basic mission now.” Kennedy
drilled further down into the quarantine procedures: “I think at the beginning it
would be better if this situation happened, to let that boat lie there disabled for a
day or so, not to try and board it and have them [unclear] with machine gunning
with thirty to forty people killed on each side.”65
Whether Kennedy was thinking back to his own service in the Navy and the
life-and-death decisions a commander faced, or he simply sought to minimize
the chance that an escalation of force would spiral out of control, the effect was
the same. The ExComm and McNamara did not press the president any further
on his guidance.
McNamara briefed Kennedy on suspected submarine movements and Kennedy communicated his concern for the survivability of the carriers Enterprise
and Independence. Assured by Taylor that the Navy could track the Soviet
submarines reasonably well, the president closed the tactical discussion on the
quarantine as follows: “All right. Well, Mr. Secretary, I think I’d like to make sure
that you have reviewed these instructions that go out to the Navy, having in mind
this conversation that we’ve just had.” McNamara replied, “I have, and I will do
so again tonight, Mr. President.”66 Following the ExComm meeting, McNamara
and Gilpatric returned to the Pentagon and directed the Navy to set up a meeting
in Flag Plot to discuss the first Soviet ship intercept. The discussion on Russian
submarines must have had an effect on President Kennedy, because at 7:35 PM
the White House phoned the duty officer at the Pentagon and directed the Navy
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to “put a hold on any depth charge attacks on submarines for 48 hours.” The duty
officer later logged that McNamara phoned the President at 10:00 PM for clarification on the depth charge order, and McNamara obtained permission to use
“noise type” depth charges against Soviet submarines to cause them to surface.67
Thus, with the blockade less than a day away, the White House and Department
of Defense still were finalizing guidance to the Navy.
The different accounts of the Flag Plot meeting between CNO Admiral Anderson and Secretary of Defense McNamara are incongruent in several particulars.
The Secretary of Defense’s oral history from 1986 recounted a long tirade by
McNamara emphasizing the blockade’s political nature to Admiral Anderson.68
A more balanced investigation into the meeting (which was actually held in Intelligence Plot) depicted a calmer encounter, with the meeting focused on suspected
Soviet submarine positions and the Secretary of Defense directing Navy ships to
positions intended to force the interdiction of specific Soviet ships on October
24.69 Following the meeting in Intelligence Plot, the CNO returned to Flag Plot
and relayed McNamara’s orders to CINCLANT Admiral Dennison, determining
which Navy ships would intercept Kimovsk, Gagarin, and Poltava.70
Reviewing McNamara’s account in light of the ExComm transcripts and
recordings from October 23 reveals that, while President Kennedy asked the
Secretary of Defense to review the quarantine procedures with the Navy, McNamara missed the president’s ultimate concerns. Kennedy understood that
the Navy had to stop the Soviet vessels if they breached the quarantine line.
The CNO met with the ExComm on Sunday, October 21, and explained the
procedures, and had codified them into rules of engagement by the morning of
October 22. The president’s message—which McNamara did not convey—was
the president’s fear of escalation if the Navy had to board a Soviet ship. If all the
previous week’s planning is reduced to McNamara’s supposed statement, according to his account—“There will be no firing of any kind at that Soviet ship
without my personal authority”—it means that his direction ran counter to the
president’s intent.71 Earlier in the interview, McNamara stated, “We established
the quarantine, not particularly to stop the Soviet ships, but to convey as forcefully as possible the political message.”72 Yet despite McNamara’s recollection, the
actual concerns that the ExComm and the president explicitly expressed on the
evening of October 23 concerned the political disaster that would ensue if Soviet
ships with offensive weapons were allowed to proceed through the quarantine
line. The ExComm meeting centered on ensuring that the Navy was prepared to
stop the Soviet vessels.
While the Secretary of Defense’s oral history makes for a great “sea story,” the
presidential recordings of the ExComm meetings reveal a nuanced understanding of the difficulties the Navy could anticipate in upholding the quarantine. In
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the end, neither the Navy nor the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Anderson,
let the president down.
On October 24, at the 10:00 AM ExComm meeting, CIA director McCone received a message from the Office of Naval Intelligence that Poltava, Gagarin,
Kimovsk, Dolmatovo, Moscow Festival, and Metallurg Kursk either had stopped
or had changed direction.73 Thus, the quarantine had the desired tactical effect:
it turned around the Soviet ships inbound to Cuba.
After the initial quarantine standoff, diplomacy continued, as did the threat of
all-out war. The crisis was not resolved until Sunday, October 28, 1962, with Radio Moscow’s broadcast and Khrushchev’s letter to Kennedy agreeing to remove
the missiles from Cuba in return for the United States pledging not to invade the
Communist island.74
Sheldon M. Stern’s The Cuban Missile Crisis in American Memory: Myth versus
Reality compares secondary literature and primary-source recollections on the
Cuban missile crisis with the presidential recordings. The analysis reveals that
the participants shaped the lessons they drew from the Cuban missile crisis so as
to align themselves with the ultimate outcome: a political resolution to a Soviet
nuclear missile deployment ninety miles from the United States.
The simplistic narrative of the Cuban missile crisis painted the Joint Chiefs of
Staff in a dogmatically warmongering light. McNamara’s oral history cast Admiral Anderson as a naval officer who would have preferred to blow the Soviets out
of the water at first light. The truth is just not that simple. Both Stern’s work and
any review of the ExComm recordings reveal that nearly every member of the
ExComm shifted his views on supporting an air strike or establishing a blockade.
The only consistent member of the ExComm was President Kennedy, who sought
room to maneuver and delayed making a decision, and whose overriding concern
was avoiding a path that would lead to all-out war.
The Joint Chiefs, on the other hand, had decades of institutional knowledge
and military planning behind them when they gave President Kennedy their
recommendation for air strikes and a subsequent invasion of Cuba. Presented
with a military problem, the Department of Defense returned a military solution. Kennedy finally opted for the quarantine, keeping the air strikes as an option depending on the Soviet response to the quarantine. The Air Force placed
its bombers on alert and the Navy readied the Atlantic Fleet. The Joint Chiefs
disagreed with the president’s quarantine decision, but they executed his orders
faithfully and expertly. Furthermore, the chiefs understood that if the quarantine
failed, the military could be called on to execute the air strikes and an invasion.
Experience uniquely informs decisions, and the military experience of the Joint
Chiefs informed their decisions and actions during the Cuban missile crisis.
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol71/iss4/1
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Military and political leaders are forged in the organizational culture and by
the personal experiences of their careers. The JCS remained entrenched in their
initial assessment and provided a military option to end the Cuban missile crisis. Their assessment of the larger political crisis and possible Soviet reactions
to an air strike differed from President Kennedy’s. As commander in chief, the
president cast the deciding vote, after careful consideration of his subordinates’
opinions. President Kennedy weighed the resolution of conflict against the cost
of war with the Soviet Union.
The outcome of the Cuban missile crisis was that a Communist dictatorship
became entrenched in Cuba. But as politically abhorrent to the Kennedys (and
many later U.S. presidents) as Castro proved to be, after the crisis Cuba failed to
prove itself to be an existential threat to the United States. Yet until the resolution
of the missile crisis, Castro’s removal was considered.
The president always will have a military solution available, and the quarantine, by any definition, was a military operation against Soviet shipping.
Perhaps one of the many lessons of the Cuban missile crisis is that the military
is the sharpest tool of diplomacy. Yet military operations must be conducted
with clearly defined objectives, and military solutions should serve as options to
achieve those objectives—and as deterrents, to ensure the continuation of political discourse and diplomacy.
The implicit trust underlying military service, which includes the inherent
possibility of sacrifice, is that when sailors, Marines, soldiers, and airmen are
called on to defend the nation, their lives will not be treated as merely an expedient solution, without recourse to thoughtful diplomacy. “The Navy”—and
the Department of Defense—“will not let you down.” But when dealing with a
dictator—whether in Russia, North Korea, or Syria—our elected leaders must
take the long view when balancing the achievement of political objectives against
the cost of military action.

NOTES

1.	Thomas S. Power [Gen., USAF], Design for
Survival (New York: Pocket Books, 1965), pp.
4–6.
2.	James G. Hershberg, “Before ‘The Missiles of
October’: Did Kennedy Plan a Military Strike
against Cuba?,” Diplomatic History 14, no. 2
(April 1, 1990), pp. 163–98.
3.	The U-2 aircraft carried two cameras, a main
camera with higher-quality resolution and a
second camera with variable resolution, used

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2018

Autumn2018Review.indb 107

to correlate ground-track positioning. Since
the National Photographic Interpretation
Center in Suitland, Maryland, spent the bulk
of its time viewing the main-camera film, the
544th’s photographic interpreters reviewed
the tracker-camera film—which often was
available weeks before the main-camera
film. Sanders A. Laubenthal [Capt., USAF],
The Missiles in Cuba, 1962: The Role of SAC
Intelligence (U), SAC Intelligence Quarterly
Project Warrior Study (Peterson AFB, CO:

113

8/6/18 8:49 AM

108

NAVA L WA R C O L L E G E R E V I E W

Naval War College Review, Vol. 71 [2018], No. 4, Art. 1

544th Strategic Intelligence Wing, May 1984),
pp. 2–6, previously available at www.afhso
.af.mil/, now available from author on request.
4.	Ibid., p. 6.
5.	Ibid., p. 8.
6.	Tighe interview, as cited in ibid.
7.	Laubenthal, The Missiles in Cuba, p. 8.
8.	Mary S. McAuliffe, CIA Documents on the
Cuban Missile Crisis 1962 (Langley, VA:
Central Intelligence Agency, History Staff,
October 1992), pp. 27–28.
9.	Arthur J. Olsen, “Kennedy Pledges Any Steps
to Bar Cuban Aggression; Says U.S. Would
Protect Hemisphere from Threat Posed by
Soviet Arms,” New York Times, September 5,
1962, available at query.nytimes.com/.
10. R. C. Forbes [Col., USA], to Historical Division, Joint Secretariat, Joint Chiefs of Staff,
“Chronology of JCS Decisions concerning
the Cuban Crisis,” memorandum, December
21, 1962 [hereafter “Chronology of JCS Decisions”], p. 13, available at jfk14thday.com/.
11. “Notes Taken from Transcripts of Meetings of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, October–November
1962, Dealing with the Cuban Missile Crisis”
(handwritten 1976, typed 1993), pp. 2–3,
National Security Archive, George Washington Univ., Washington, DC [hereafter NSA
GWU], available at nsarchive2.gwu.edu/.
12. Ibid., p. 2.
13. Ibid.
14. CINCLANT Contingency Operation Plan
No. 312-62 provided for a tailored air strike
against single or multiple targets in Cuba
to eliminate a threat to the United States,
with little lead time from order to execution.
OPLAN 314-62 provided for a simultaneous
amphibious landing and airborne assault,
requiring an eighteen-day buildup prior to
attack. OPLAN 316-62 provided a shortenedtimeline alternative to OPLAN 314-62, with
the amphibious/airborne assault beginning
seven days after the air strikes. Headquarters, U.S. Atlantic Command, “CINCLANT
Historical Account of Cuban Crisis—1963,”
000119/J09H, April 29, 1963, Post-1946
Reports Collection, box 16, Archives Branch,
Naval History and Heritage Command,
Washington, DC.

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol71/iss4/1

Autumn2018Review.indb 108

15. “Chronology of JCS Decisions,” pp. 7–8.
16. Ibid., p. 13.
17. Michael B. Petersen, Legacy of Ashes, Trial by
Fire: The Origins of the Defense Intelligence
Agency and the Cuban Missile Crisis Crucible,
Defense Intelligence Historical Perspectives
1 (Washington, DC: Defense Intelligence
Agency, 2011), pp. 19–20, available at www
.dia.mil/.
18. “Notes Taken from Transcripts of Meetings,”
p. 3.
19. Ibid., p. 4.
20. John F. Kennedy, “The Establishment of
Executive Committee of the National Security
Council,” National Security Action Memorandum 196, October 22, 1962, available at www
.jfklibrary.org/. This NSA memo formalized
the ExComm beyond its ad hoc membership
and meeting schedule that had prevailed prior
to October 22, 1962.
21. “Notes Taken from Transcripts of Meetings,”
p. 5.
22. Ibid.; “Chronology of JCS Decisions,” p. 10.
23. “Notes Taken from Transcripts of Meetings,”
pp. 4–6; “Chronology of JCS Decisions,” pp.
14–17.
24. Timothy J. Naftali, Philip Zelikow, and Ernest
R. May, eds., John F. Kennedy: The Great Crises, vol. 2, The Presidential Recordings (New
York: Norton, 2001), p. 436, available at prde
.upress.virginia.edu/. For all citations to The
Presidential Recordings the author verified the
web-page transcript as being true to the audio
recording, including attention paid to the
speaker’s tone and whom he was addressing.
25. “Notes Taken from Transcripts of Meetings,”
p. 3.
26. Ibid., p. 5.
27. Naftali, Zelikow, and May, The Presidential
Recordings, pp. 583–85.
28. Ibid., pp. 394–95. Specifically, Kennedy was
alarmed by the September 28 letter from
Khrushchev regarding Berlin and the Soviet
leader’s statements in the run-up to congressional elections.
29. “Notes Taken from Transcripts of Meetings,”
p. 6.
30. Joint Chiefs of Staff memorandum (JCSM)–
794-62 is referenced in ibid., p. 7. The quoted

114

8/6/18 8:49 AM

Naval War College: Autumn 2018 Full Issue

summation of JCSM-794-62 is found in
“Chronology of JCS Decisions,” p. 15.
31. J. S. Holtoner, David W. Gray, and J. C. Wylie,
Joint Strategic Survey Council, to JCS Chairman Maxwell Taylor, “Prospective Soviet Responses to US Action,” JSSC Memorandums
185-62 and 186-62, October 17, 1962, Taylor
file, box 6, October 1962, NSA GWU.
32. “Notes Taken from Transcripts of Meetings,”
p. 7.
33. Ibid., p. 9.
34. Ibid.

53. David S. Patterson, gen. ed., Foreign Relations
of the United States, 1961–1963, vol. 11, Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath, ed. Edward
C. Keefer, Charles S. Sampson, and Louis J.
Smith (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1996), available at history.state
.gov/.
54. Sheldon M. Stern, The Week the World Stood
Still: Inside the Secret Cuban Missile Crisis,
Stanford Nuclear Age Series (Stanford, CA:
Stanford Univ. Press, 2005), pp. 75–76.

36. “Notes Taken from Transcripts of Meetings,”
pp. 9–10.
37. Ibid., p. 10.

56. Ibid., p. 528.

38. Ibid.

57. Stern, The Week the World Stood Still, p. 76.

39. Naftali, Zelikow, and May, The Presidential
Recordings, pp. 441, 513. The intelligence
on October 19 indicated sixteen MRBM
launchers, with two previously identified
MRBMs assessed as possible intermediaterange-ballistic-missile sites, capable of firing
missiles with a range of 2,200 nautical miles.
Additionally, there were three confirmed
coastal-defense cruise-missile sites, twentytwo SA-2 SAM sites, and thirty-five to thirtynine MiG-21 fighters. “Chronology of JCS
Decisions,” p. 19.

58. William D. Houser [Capt., USN], Francis J.
Roberts [Col., USA], and Sidney B. Berry [Lt.
Col., USA], Duty Officers Journal, 8B 10-2162 Duty Officers, October 21, 1962, October
20–25, 1962, Secretary of Defense CMC files,
Cuba 381, 1962, box 1, record group 330,
NSA GWU.

40. “Meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the
Cuban Missile Crisis on 19 October 1962,”
in The Presidential Recordings, ed. Naftali,
Zelikow, and May, tape 31.2.
41. Ibid.
42. Ibid.
43. Ibid.
44. Ibid.
45. Ibid.
46. Ibid.
47. Ibid.
48. “Chronology of JCS Decisions,” p. 14.
49. “Meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the
Cuban Missile Crisis on 19 October 1962.”
50. Naftali, Zelikow, and May, The Presidential
Recordings, pp. 598–99.
51. “Notes Taken from Transcripts of Meetings,”
p. 12.

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2018

109

52. Ibid., pp. 12–13.

55. “Minutes from the 506th Meeting of the
National Security Council,” in Cuban Missile
Crisis and Aftermath, ed. Keefer, Sampson,
and Smith, pp. 526–27.

35. “Chronology of JCS Decisions,” pp. 17–18.

Autumn2018Review.indb 109

M A RT I N S

59. William D. Houser [Capt., USN], Francis J.
Roberts [Col., USA], and George S. Brown
[Brig. Gen., USAF], Duty Officers Journal, 9C
10-22-62 Duty Officers, October 22, 1962,
October 20–25, 1962, Secretary of Defense
CMC files, Cuba 381, 1962, box 1, record
group 330, NSA GWU.
60. Herbert D. Riley [VAdm., USN], Director,
Joint Staff, to Deputy Secretary of Defense,
“Rules of Engagement,” memorandum, document 7, October 22, 1962 (Top Secret—
excised copy), Taylor file, Misc. Papers, box 6,
NSA GWU.
61. Houser, Roberts, and Brown, Duty Officers
Journal, October 22, 1962.
62. “Executive Committee Meeting of the National Security Council on the Cuban Missile
Crisis on 23 October 1962,” in The Presidential Recordings, ed. Naftali, Zelikow, and May,
tapes 34 and 35.1.
63. Ibid., tape 35.2.
64. Ibid.
65. Ibid.
66. Ibid.

115

8/6/18 8:49 AM

110

NAVA L WA R C O L L E G E R E V I E W

Naval War College Review, Vol. 71 [2018], No. 4, Art. 1

67. William D. Houser [Capt., USN], Francis J.
Roberts [Col., USA], George S. Brown [Brig.
Gen., USAF], and Sidney B. Berry [Lt. Col.,
USA], Duty Officers Journal, 10C 10-23-62
Duty Officers, October 23, 1962, p. 10, October 20–25, 1962, Secretary of Defense CMC
files, Cuba 381, 1962, box 1, record group
330, NSA GWU.
68. Robert S. McNamara, oral history interview,
part 3, July 24, 1986, transcript by Alfred
Goldberg, Lawrence Kaplan, and Maurice
Matloff, available at robertsmcnamaracom
.files.wordpress.com/.
69. William H. J. Manthorpe Jr. [Capt., USN
(Ret.)], “The Secretary and CNO on 23–24
October 1962: Setting the Historical Record

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol71/iss4/1

Autumn2018Review.indb 110

Straight,” Naval War College Review 66, no. 1
(Winter 2013), pp. 25–26.
70. Ibid., p. 27.
71. McNamara oral history, p. 6.
72. Ibid., p. 4.
73. “Executive Committee Meeting of the National Security Council on the Cuban Missile
Crisis on 24 October 1962,” in The Presidential Recordings, ed. Naftali, Zelikow, and May,
tape 36.3.
74. “Cuban Missile Crisis,” John F. Kennedy Presidential Library & Museum, microsites
.jfklibrary.org/.

116

8/6/18 8:49 AM

Naval War College: Autumn 2018 Full Issue

COALITION COORDINATION DURING
THE BOXER REBELLION
How Twenty-Seven “Councils of Senior Naval Commanders”
Contributed to the Conduct of Operations
Umio Otsuka

I

n China’s Shantung (Shandong) Province at the end of the nineteenth century,
xenophobic bandits known as Boxers emerged, and violence against foreigners
and Christians increased. Ministers representing foreign countries in Peking
(Beijing) complained to the Qing court and requested that warships be deployed
to protect their nationals.1 At that point a matter that had begun as terroristic attacks by bandits became a conflict between the naVice Admiral Umio Otsuka is Director General, De- tions involved: the Qing government declared war
fense Intelligence Headquarters, Ministry of Defense
against foreign powers. The military operations
of Japan. He graduated from the National Defense
Academy in 1983 and joined the Japan Maritime that the foreign states—which included Japan, a
Self-Defense Force. A surface warfare officer, he exnewly emerging Asian power—conducted during
ercised command at sea at multiple levels. His shore
this war were the first coalition operations of the
assignments have been in the fields of naval diplomodern era.2
macy, education, and intelligence. He served as senior national representative to the U.S. Central ComOn June 5, 1900, Vice Admiral Edward Seymand at the outset of the war against Iraq. His flag
tours have included service as vice president of the mour, Royal Navy, Commander in Chief, British
Maritime Command and Staff College; commander
China Squadron, the senior naval officer present
of the training squadron deployed to the Western
in the port of Taku (Dagu), took the initiative. He
Hemisphere; director general of the C41 Departassembled a council of the naval commanders of
ment of the Maritime Staff Office; and chief of staff
to the commander in chief of the Self-Defense Fleet.
the foreign powers represented in Taku on board
His previous assignment was as President, Maritime
his flagship, with the aim of achieving concerted
Command and Staff College. He graduated from
3
the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International action. Between then and October 25, twentyStudies at Johns Hopkins University with a master’s seven such councils convened.4 The senior naval
degree in international public policy in 1997.
officers of all the foreign powers with ships in Taku
composed the membership. Councils assembled
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on an ad hoc basis and functioned as the supreme consultative body for the
commanders.
Historical analysts assess that “on the whole, this consensual method worked
well.”5 By way of contrast, the theater commanders who led the army forces that
the foreign powers deployed to conduct the ground campaigns assembled only
at the most crucial point during their pursuit of the ultimate goal, which was to
rescue the diplomatic corps in Peking. Naval commanders, by assembling the
Council of Senior Naval Commanders periodically throughout all phases from
the outset of the uprising to the end of major operations, ensured that coalition
operations were conducted smoothly. Because the naval councils were the sole
mechanism for command and coordination of the coalition forces, they shaped
the course of not only naval operations but all military activities that the foreign
powers conducted during the war.
Today’s Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, as part of the global war on terrorism,
which broke out in 2001, has become the largest example of coalition warfare at
the beginning of the twenty-first century—one hundred years after the foreign
response to the Boxer Rebellion represented the first coalition warfare of the
twentieth century.6 In Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, U.S. armed forces have created
a model of command and coordination for coalition warfare.7 Joint publications
governing Operation ENDURING FREEDOM provide for parallel command structures, with no single force commander designated—which was the case during the
Boxer Rebellion as well.8 However, the leadership of any coalition must develop
a means of coordinating among the participants to attain unity of effort, so employing some coordination center is essential.9 The Council of Senior Naval Commanders worked so well during the Boxer Rebellion because it served as the multinational coordination center for the commanders of the foreign navies present.
This article examines the roles the Council of Senior Naval Commanders
played during the Boxer Rebellion throughout the conflict’s phases—with that
role changing on the basis of the nature of the particular challenge at hand—and
how these councils contributed to the smooth coordination of coalition warfare.
The most important supporting documentary reference is the official naval rec
ord edited by the Kaigun Daijin Kanbo (Office of the Minister of the Navy), Meiji
33 Nen Shinkoku Jihen Kaigun Senshishou Kan 1–5 (Naval History of the Northern
Qing Incident in 1900), which contains all the documents regarding the twentyseven councils, including minutes of their deliberations, Japanese translations
thereof, reports of the participants, and the related orders submitted by the respective authorities. (The numbering of the councils from first to twenty-seventh
is in accordance with this document.)
For the sake of convenience in discussing similar items with regard to each
council, the article divides the period of the Boxer Rebellion into four phases. To
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol71/iss4/1
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PHASE 1: ESTABLISHING THE COALITION AND
SETTING ITS COURSE
Since a British priest had become the first victim of the most recent bout of Chinese xenophobia in 1899, the Boxers repeatedly had attacked Christian churches
and killed foreigners. On May 28, 1900, when the Boxers destroyed a train station
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in a suburb of Peking, the ministers of the foreign powers in the capital requested
the deployment of marines to protect the embassies, and warships of the foreign
powers started arriving off Taku. By June 2 the foreign navies with ships in the
vicinity of China had sent 442 marines to Peking. Seymour arrived off Taku on
June 1 and went ashore on the 3rd to inspect the Tientsin area.10
As the senior naval officer present, Seymour believed he should initiate any
action. He consulted Rear Admiral Charles Courrejolles of the French navy, the
next-most-senior naval officer present, who suggested that Seymour convene a
council on his flagship. The immediate aim was to inform the other naval representatives of the request for relief from the ministers in Peking. Seymour issued
the following invitation to the commanders.
In view of the gravity of affairs at Peking and its neighbourhood, and the possibility
of all communication being cut off by the “Boxers” between the Capital and Tientsin, leaving our respective Ministers isolated and unable to communicate with their
Government or with us in this anchorage; it seems to me desirable that the respective
Senior Officer of the Ships of War present here (except the Chinese) should meet together to consider the situation. As I happen to be the Senior Naval Officer present I
therefore take on myself to have the honour of putting the above question before you;
and should you agree I would suggest you might assemble on board this ship at
4 p.m. to-day for the above purpose.

On the 5th, Seymour assembled the first Council of Senior Naval Commanders of the foreign powers on board his flagship, Centurion.11 This action represented the very outset of the formation of a coalition: the consolidation of twentyfive ships, from eight navies, that happened to be present off Taku. It marked the
beginning of a series of twenty-seven Councils of Senior Naval Commanders.
Seymour had no authority to command or control the foreign navies, and the
humble wording of the invitation letter implies the difficulty of his position. At
the first council, in addition to Seymour, the participants were Rear Admirals
Courrejolles of France, Vesselago of Russia, and Kempff of the United States and
Captains Guelig of Germany, Casella of Italy, and Nagamine of Japan. In addition, a commander represented Captain Montalmar of Austria, as he would at the
second and third councils as well.
At the first council, the participants agreed to points as follows:
• The purpose of the coalition was to protect the lives and properties of their
countrymen via a peaceful and defensive mission, which in no way was
directed against the Chinese government.
• Actions of the coalition should be taken according to the desires and with
the consent of the ministers, and it behooved the commanders to act in
concert.
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol71/iss4/1
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• If the ministers in Peking were isolated and communicating with them was
impossible, and if time permitted, the commanders should consult their
superior naval authorities.
• If affairs were so serious and urgent that time did not permit such consultation, the commanders should consult with each other and act without further
consultation with authorities.12
At the second council, on the 6th, Seymour presented a telegram from the
British minister at Peking asking, as the collective will of the diplomatic corps,
that, should railway and telegraph lines be cut and Peking besieged, the commanders off Taku would consult with one another and march to the ministers’
relief. The commanders discussed the matter and decided on a concept for deploying their embarked marines, as follows:13
• Command and control: While different foreign guards should consult their
own consuls with regard to the protection of their consulates in Tientsin, if
combined forces made an advance on Peking there would need to be a single
officer in command. Seymour asked the participants to consider whether
an officer should be nominated to command the forces, and if so who that
officer should be.
• Rules of engagement: In his telegram, the British minister strongly urged
that permission be granted for the guards to respond to hostility with active
measures. The only comment on or response to this request from the British minister came from the U.S. Navy’s Admiral Kempff, who stated that
if the Chinese attacked the guards who were protecting lives and properties and keeping communications open with Peking, they must accept the
consequences.
While the ministers were taking an active line with regard to the possibility
of military engagement, the naval commanders’ approach seems generally restrained; the missions of the deploying marines were to protect lives and property
and restore communications with Peking.14
The first and second councils were conducted with no prearranged format to
the meetings—there was no time for the participants to prepare. However, during the second council it was agreed that if anyone received a dispatch containing
news of great importance he should send it to Seymour so that, if necessary, the
Council of Senior Naval Commanders might be convened. The participants also
agreed that the senior naval officer present should preside over each meeting,
meaning that if Seymour should be absent from Taku the next-most-senior naval
commander present would preside.15
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The ministers in Peking recognized on the 8th that the Chinese governmental
forces had no intention of defending Peking from the Boxers. Seymour decided
to send marines to Tientsin to augment its defenses and announced his intent to
the other naval commanders at the third council, which took place on the 9th.
The French and Russian commanders proposed that a request be submitted to
the Chinese government to suppress the rebels, but Vice Admiral Bendemann of
Germany, attending the council for the first time, stated that the German government had directed him to consult with the other powers on how best to relieve the
ministers; he argued that anything beyond that was the province of the diplomats
in Peking. The French-Russian proposal was denied. This indicates that the naval
commanders considered the province of the council to be military affairs only,
staying out of diplomacy.16
After the conclusion of the third council, Seymour received a message of alarm
from the British minister in Peking. The admiral sent a letter to Captain Nagamine of Japan, commanding officer of Kasagi, in which he argued that time was
limited. Seymour therefore requested commencement of a combined action, for
which Seymour planned to land as many forces as possible immediately and take
command himself.17 Seymour took this precipitate action not only because speed
was paramount but also because the perceived risk in taking military action was
low, as the enemy was considered to be mere bandits.18
An additional consideration was that by taking action the British government
could forestall Russian occupation of the territory around Peking, as well as the
railway in northern China.19 This consideration vis-à-vis Russia may have been
an important factor, as demonstrated by the fact that Seymour communicated
his critical decision—to land forces and take direct command—only to Japan,
without convening the council.
As reasons why coalition operations were executed smoothly under the auspices of the Council of Senior Naval Commanders, despite the fact that the coalition contained, within its eight powers, nations in competition with each other
(e.g., Japan versus Russia, France versus Germany), Eric Ouellet offers four, as
follows: Seymour, the senior commander, was from the Royal Navy, which was
the world’s leading navy; all the commanders shared a sense of urgency; the powers believed it would be easy to suppress the Boxers; and all the powers sought to
expand their influence in China.20
The theme of the initial three councils, comprising Phase 1, was how to deal
with the crisis unfolding in Peking, and the powers—despite their diverse diplomatic calculations—framed an initial posture concentrated on relieving the
besieged diplomatic corps. Seymour believed that if the commanders had no time
to confer with their home authorities, it was most important that they consult as
a body. Thereafter the Council of Senior Naval Commanders was considered the
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supreme decision-making body among the powers fighting against the Boxers
in theater. A corroborating fact is that when the diplomats in Peking sent their
telegraph beseeching that “should this (the siege of Peking) happen we beg immediate instructions be sent to Officers commanding Squadrons Taku to consult
together and march to our relief,” it was sent to the naval commanders. This
indicates that the diplomats approved the Council of Senior Naval Commanders
functioning as the supreme decision-making body at the outset of the incident.
The diplomatic position of each power vis-à-vis China varied, depending
on the respective governmental policy. Britain intended to maintain the status
quo—preventing Russia from taking advantage of the Boxers’ uprising—while
other powers swarmed over China seeking to extract concessions over finance,
trade, and territory.21 In this international environment, the Councils of Senior
Naval Commanders held during Phase 1 played the role of determining the strategic course of action of the coalition, as well as functioning as a body of liaison
and coordination, and even of decision-making to execute military operations.
PHASE 2: SUPPORTING SEYMOUR’S EXPEDITION
As soon as Seymour landed on June 10 he began leading the coalition forces
composed of marines on their march toward Peking. On the same day, communications between Peking and Tientsin were cut. On the evening of the 11th, the
first armed engagement against the Boxers occurred, and the railway between
the coalition forces and Tientsin was cut. Vice Admiral Hiltebrandt of Russia,
the senior commander present in Taku, was informed that the Boxers were approaching Taku to occupy the train station and destroy the railway and were contemplating mining the mouth of the Peiho (Hai) River. Hiltebrandt convened the
fourth council on the evening of the 15th aboard his flagship, Russia. The council
decided to direct the commanding officers of the gunboats anchored in the Peiho
to protect the railway station and the trains but not to take any offensive action
initially; however, if the Chinese forces attempted to occupy the railway station
the naval forces were to attack, first at the station, then at the fort.22
On the morning of the 16th, the fifth council convened aboard Russia. The
commanders judged that the minelaying that had been conducted at the mouth
of the Peiho demonstrated the will of the Chinese government to cut the transportation link from Peking and Tientsin to Taku. The commanders off Taku
needed to maintain their communications with Seymour’s force, so they could
not overlook the danger of an attack from the fort at Taku. The commanders decided to propose that the Chinese evacuate the fort, and if this was not accepted
they would occupy the fort by force. They set a deadline of 2 AM the next day.
However, Admiral Kempff rejected the proposal and refused to sign the minutes,
believing that an attack on the fort could lead to war with the Qing government.
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Thereafter the coalition forces attacked the fort at Taku and occupied it after a
fight of a few hours.23
Immediately after the occupation of the fort on the 17th, the sixth council was
held aboard Russia. The commanders discussed how to dispose of the Chinese
ship Hai Yung that was anchored in the harbor.24 Inviting Admiral Yeh of the
Chinese Navy aboard, they directed Yeh to forbid the departure of the ship; he
agreed to do so, albeit unwillingly.25 Kempff was waiting for instructions from
his government, and left the council before its adjournment without signing the
minutes.26
Seymour wrote in his memoir that, although he had been absent at the time
and thus was not in a position to comment authoritatively, he felt that it had been
necessary for the commanders off Taku to make a judgment without him and
that under the circumstances occupying the fort at Taku was the right decision.27
However, subsequently the conservative faction in the Qing court took advantage
of the coalition navies’ attack on the fort to declare war against the powers, with
the empress dowager issuing a proclamation to that effect.28
The seventh council took place aboard Russia on the 20th. The commanders
resolved to notify Chinese governmental officials that the purpose of coalition
military operations was to relieve their nationals in Peking, and that their targets
were the bandits who were hindering that aim.29 However, heavy resistance by
both the Boxers and Qing forces halted all advance by Seymour’s force on the
18th, and the marines started retreating to Tientsin on the 19th. The coalition
forces set up defenses around the city while their opponents closed in. On the
23rd, augmenting army forces broke through the encircling net around Tientsin
and succeeded in contacting Seymour and his marines.
On the same day, the naval commanders convened the eighth council, again
on Russia, and discussed a request received from the senior consul general in
Shanghai, in the south of China, for the protection of foreign nationals there.30
The commanders deemed that no ship was available to allocate to Shanghai while
the crisis was still going on in northern China, especially since the situation in the
south was still relatively calm. This council also agreed that Admiral Vesselago
of Russia would assume command of the forts and gunboats in the Peiho River,
while Lieutenant Commander Wise, USN, was appointed commander of forces
at the Tongku (Tanggu) railway station near Taku.
Admiral Togo of Japan, who had arrived at Taku the day before, attended this
eighth council. To finesse the issue of seniority, thereafter Rear Admiral Dewa
attended almost all councils on behalf of Togo.31
Following the failure of Seymour’s expedition, the coalition marine forces finally returned to Taku on the 26th. Any further relief operation was postponed
until additional army forces arrived to augment the marines. Japan, as the
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power located closest to northern China, was expected to send a good number
of soldiers.32
The term of the Seymour expedition coincided almost exactly with that of
Phase 2. During this phase the senior naval commanders used the councils to
discuss how to support Seymour’s force and how to break the encirclement of
Tientsin, including by their attack on the fort at Taku. The councils were not the
venue by which to exercise tactical command over the attack on the fort; however, it was the strategic decisions the councils made, especially to attack the fort,
that changed the nature of the struggle from the suppression of bandits to a war
against China, even if this development was unintended.
Although northern China remained the focal area, the Yangtze River area,
which included Shanghai, had become an additional area of interest for some
coalition nations. One reason advanced for this is that the diplomatic priority for
Britain—the most important actor in the coalition—was to maintain its national
interests in the Far East in general, with the specific issues at stake in Peking and
with regard to the Qing dynasty being of secondary importance.33 Separately, the
British government had ordered its deputy consul general in Shanghai to build a
cooperative relationship with the Chinese viceroys there, and the Admiralty had
ordered the China Squadron to take measures sufficient to protect the lives and
property of British nationals along the Yangtze River. This demonstrated the government’s great interest in southern China—and that maintaining those interests
was even more important than the relief of Peking.34
PHASE 3: DIFFUSION OF COALITION OBJECTIVES
While he was in Tientsin Seymour sent a letter to Rear Admiral Bruce, the nextmost-senior RN officer off Taku, directing him to request that Japan augment
the coalition forces in response to reinforcement by the enemy. The senior naval
commanders convened the ninth council on Russia and decided to ask Japan for
an army division, and that they would conduct boardings to prevent ammunition
and military equipment from flowing into northern China.
In his letter Seymour also requested consultations about the situation in
Shanghai, at the Woosung (Wusong) forts, and regarding the Chinese cruisers
and other ships in that area; however, there is no evidence the commanders discussed these subjects at the council. One might presume that this was because
they already had made a decision regarding the Shanghai area at the eighth
council. But Seymour’s attempt to swing the discussion over to Shanghai served
to demonstrate the magnitude of British interests in southern China. Britain realized an immense profit from the enormous commercial network it had formed
in the south around the Yangtze River, and the British government was very keen
to maintain order in the Shanghai area.35 On June 27, the consuls general of the
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powers in Shanghai concluded an agreement with the viceroys there to maintain
order in southern China, with the viceroys attesting to their desire for peace,
including no confrontations with foreign powers.36
The tenth council, held on July 7 aboard Russia, convened at the request of
Admiral Kempff, whom Washington had directed to ask the coalition navies’ collective opinion regarding how many soldiers it would require to relieve Peking.
At the eleventh council, convened on the 8th, again on Russia, the execution
of boardings of merchant ships sailing under the flags of the council members’
nations, which already had been discussed at the ninth council, was the theme.
Seymour returned to his flagship, Centurion, on the 12th, fresh from completing a plan to capture Tientsin that had been produced with the army commanders of the forces of Japan, the United States, and France.37 The attack on Tientsin
took place the next day and the city was liberated on the 14th. Seymour convened
the twelfth council on July 13 on Centurion, with Admiral Togo participating. It
had been more than a month since Seymour last presided over the council. The
body resolved to order the consuls to conduct boardings to enforce the embargo
against weapons and ammunition flowing into China. Even though the attack
on Tientsin commenced that day, the only issue relating to the ground campaign
discussed was a proposal to request that the Japanese army take the initiative in
the defense of the fort at Taku.
On the 16th, the army commanders of the foreign powers gathered at the
Tientsin headquarters of Lieutenant General Alekseyev of Russia and discussed
the governance of the city. On the same day, in response to a request from Alekseyev, Seymour convened the thirteenth council aboard Centurion (with Togo
again in attendance) to discuss the management of the railway between Tongku
and Tientsin. It was resolved by majority vote, with Britain and the United States
opposed, that management of the line should be placed in the hands of Russia,
which would assume the responsibility to guard it, with the reservation that the
railway would be returned to the former administration as soon as military circumstances permitted. Having taken this action, the Coalition Transportation
Committee, which had been established at the eighth council, was dissolved.
Admiral Seymour and Major General Gaselee, commander of British army
forces, were dissatisfied with this conclusion; they thought that the matter of
the railway’s operation should not be decided by the fleet alone. It was true that
the Russians in actuality were already in charge of maintaining and protecting
the railway; that the Coalition Transportation Committee was then the only
organization authorized to delegate railway management; and that the senior officer of that committee was Russian. Yet given that it was the eighth council that
had granted the committee its authority, it would have been appropriate for any
amendment of that agreement also to be discussed and resolved by the council.
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That, presumably, is why General Alekseyev had requested that the council
convene. This episode illustrates that the nature of the Council of Senior Naval
Commanders had changed by this stage, with the core concern shifting to the
relief of Peking by army forces.
On the 23rd Seymour left Taku, cruising south with his flag in Alacrity, arriving at Shanghai on the 26th. On the 24th, Hiltebrandt convened the fourteenth
council aboard Russia, at Bendemann’s request. Berlin had directed Bendemann
to propose a discussion of the blockade of the Chinese fleet in the Yangtze River
and measures to prevent the Chinese from reinforcing the forts along the Chinese
coastline. The commanders decided to send a letter to Seymour, who was then
en route to the south, and the naval commanders in the Yangtze area to dictate
to the local Chinese authorities that there was to be no departure by the Chinese
fleet from the Yangtze River and no reinforcement of the coastal forts.38 In his
letter of response dated August 6, Seymour would write that such a request was
inappropriate at that time.39
Also at the fourteenth council, the commanders discussed the earliest possible
relief of the diplomatic corps in Peking. It also resolved to request that the viceroy
in Shantung send a letter to the Tsungli-Yamen (Zongli Yamen) (the government
body in charge of foreign policy in imperial China) requesting that a letter be
produced signed by the ministers themselves, to prove they were safe.40
On the 27th, Seymour handed command of all British forces over to General
Gaselee. Lieutenant General Linevich arrived as commander of Russian forces
on the 31st. The commanders of the ground forces of all eight foreign powers
convened on August 4. With this, the ground forces were being reinforced, a
leadership structure was being consolidated over them, and a concrete plan for
the relief of Peking was being prepared. On the 28th in Shanghai, the consuls
general resolved to entrust the protection of the foreign settlement there to the
naval ships of the foreign powers anchored in Shanghai. Seymour, who was in
Shanghai, accepted the new charge.
Back in Taku, Hiltebrandt convened the fifteenth council on August 2. The
commanders applied themselves only to a purely practical business issue: they
discussed and agreed on the landing point of undersea cables that were being
laid from Chifu (Yantai), which lay across the Gulf of Chihli (Bohai Sea) to the
southeast.
On the 5th—the day the ground forces started marching on Peking—
Hiltebrandt convened the sixteenth council. He proposed to notify Seymour to
direct the commanding officers of coalition navy ships in Shanghai to halt the
departure of Chinese warships, a step with which all the commanders off Taku
agreed. Seymour, however, sent a letter, dated the 19th, in which he wrote that he
was unable to give orders to Chinese warships. Instead he notified the Chinese
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that they should inform the consuls general of the purpose of any departure by
Chinese warships, so that any misunderstanding by coalition navy commanders
could be avoided.
During this period Seymour acted as the senior naval commander in Shanghai, and through a second council of senior naval commanders there he exerted
his influence among the powers. As early as July 3 the British Admiralty already
had notified Seymour of the shift of command authority over military operations in China from him to Gaselee, so Seymour could concentrate his efforts
on activities intended to maintain British interests in southern China without
worrying about the operation to relieve Peking. Therefore, even though the operation to relieve Peking was still going on, he cruised south on July 23 and met
the viceroy in Nanking (Nanjing). His intent was to confirm for himself whether
the China Squadron could shift its focus to southern China once Gaselee’s army
forces were launched into northern China.41 Following his consultations with
Chinese officials in southern China, on August 18—when the relief of Peking had
been completed—Britain landed two thousand troops in the south, on its own
discretion.42 Seymour’s denial of restrictions on the ability of the Chinese fleet to
maneuver—contrary to the resolution of the sixteenth council in Taku—makes it
quite clear that Seymour’s activities in southern China were aimed at protecting
British national interests in that area, regardless of whether Peking was relieved.
Russian interests in Manchuria started to suffer damage at the end of June. In
response, the Russian emperor approved the deployment of forces to Manchuria, and battles began to occur in various places. Like Britain, Russia prioritized
protection of its national interests, in its case in Manchuria, ahead of the relief of
Peking, which likely weakened the Russian will to invade the city.43 On the other
hand, since Russia had no direct interest in southern China, it must have looked
favorably on the competition among foreign powers in that region, as it might
divert the attention of the other powers away from northern China.
Off Taku on August 10, Admiral Courrejolles presided over the seventeenth
council aboard D’Entrecasteaux. The commanders again discussed a purely
practical business matter, having to do with a contract with a civilian company
regarding a lighthouse boat.44
Peking was relieved on August 14. On the 23rd, Rear Admiral Candiani of
Italy presided over the eighteenth council on Fieramosca. Matters discussed were
how to handle contributions received for the men wounded, asking Rear Admiral
Dewa to convey a collective message of gratitude from the coalition to the government of Japan for the Japanese treatment of the wounded men, and how to
deliver messages that arrived via the submarine cable that had opened just two
days before.45
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The fourth through eighteenth councils used French as their official language,
and minutes were recorded in that language.46 This probably was because Hiltebrandt did not speak English.47 By contrast, almost all the senior officers were
proficient in French, as it was common for people from the upper echelons of
European societies, from which most senior officers were drawn, to learn French.
In modern coalition operations as well, language differences within a multinational force can present a real challenge to command and control, efficient communications, and unity of effort. From a tactical and an operational perspective,
proficiency in French influenced the cohesion of the 1900 coalition positively.48
In Phase 3 the major action shifted away from the navies to the armies, and
the primary focus of the coalition became the planning and implementation of
a ground campaign springboarding from the capture of Tientsin to the relief of
Peking. As was seen in the record of the ninth council, at which the request for
Japan to deploy an army division for the relief of Peking was resolved, the commanders (unanimously) participated in that strategic decision made early in
Phase 3.
In contrast, it is worth noting that Britain and Russia—two major actors in
China—acted more for their own important interests than for the relief of Peking,
which was the initial common goal of the coalition. On completion of the relief,
the foreign powers started acting unilaterally to build a new order in China—
prioritizing their own interests.49 During the latter stages of this phase the focal
points of discussion in the Councils of Senior Naval Commanders became unsettled, and the role of the council became unclear.
PHASE 4: EXECUTING OPERATIONS IN SHANHAIKWAN AND
CHINWANGTAO
Once Peking was subjugated, the withdrawal of troops started taking place in
September. Marshal Waldersee of Germany, the commander in chief of coalition forces, arrived in Taku on the 25th. On the 27th, Seymour convened the
nineteenth council aboard Alacrity in response to a request from Bendemann.
Bendemann introduced Waldersee’s contention that occupation of Chinwangtao
was necessary to maintain transport connections during the winter, and that the
navy should conduct the operation.50 The senior naval commanders agreed to
this proposal, except that Rear Admiral Skrydroff of Russia reserved comment,
as he had no instructions from General Alekseyev. Two days later, on the 29th,
the twentieth council discussed the details of the operation. Seymour would take
overall command of the operation in Chinwangtao, and an anchoring plan was
decided on. No American representative attended the twentieth council—in fact,
the United States did not send anyone to any of the remaining councils—and the
United States did not participate in the Shanhaikwan operation.
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On the 30th, Seymour presided over the twenty-first council. The commanders decided that the expedition would depart for Shanhaikwan on October 2.
This council settled the tactical details of the operation, including the allocation
of forces, the order of march, and reporting procedures. In comparison with
most of the other councils, this one was more tactical and operational, aimed at
conducting a specific campaign; it was most similar to the council that preceded
the capture of the fort at Taku.
Meanwhile, Walter Hillier, a former British diplomat who had been stationed
in Peking, voluntarily proceeded to Shanhaikwan aboard the British gunboat
Pigmy to recommend surrender to the Chinese. Surprisingly, the Chinese commander in Shanhaikwan followed this advice and evacuated the forts with no
conditions. By the time the coalition forces landed at Shanhaikwan the Chinese
troops already had completed their evacuation, so the forts were reoccupied
without any conflict. At the twenty-second council, on October 1 aboard Centurion in Taku, Seymour notified the participants of the reports from Pigmy, and
the council resolved that the national flags of the seven countries involved should
be hoisted and that the commanders should land at 7 AM on October 2 to fix the
location of the flags.51 Then Admiral Skrydroff shocked the other participants by
declaring that, because Shanhaikwan was at the left front of the Russian maneuver area in Manchuria, it was included within the Russian sphere of influence.52
On the 2nd, the flagships of the coalition powers anchored off Shanhaikwan
and the commanders went ashore. They gathered at Fort No. 1, made an inspection, and then convened the twenty-third council at the railway station—the
first council held ashore. The commanders made interim decisions on which
countries should occupy the five forts, the magazine, and the railway station and
how to hoist the national flags, pending submission of these matters to Waldersee for approval.53 On the 4th, Seymour presided over the twenty-fourth council
aboard Centurion, at which it was agreed that the principal place of disembarkation would be at Chinwangtao and that a small jetty would be constructed at
Shanhaikwan.
It was resolved further that the taotai (daotai) (the Chinese official in charge
of administration and foreign diplomacy) and the principal officials of the walled
town of Shanhaikwan were to be summoned to appear before the representatives
of the coalition nations at Fort No. 1.54 On the 5th, the Chinese general and other
Chinese officials presented themselves at the fort, demonstrating their submission. Thereupon the twenty-fifth council convened at the fort and drew up minutes of what had been discussed with the Chinese officials.55
Although the twenty-fourth council had determined by majority vote to
build a jetty at Shanhaikwan, Rear Admiral Dewa continued to insist that it was
possible to transport goods from the sea and unload them without the expense
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of constructing a jetty. He sent Seymour a letter repeating his opinion, and Seymour agreed to raise this issue anew at the next council.56 Accordingly, when
the twenty-sixth council convened on the 8th aboard Centurion off Taku, the
commanders agreed to nominate officers to a committee that would assemble at
Chinwangtao and Shanhaikwan to consider the question and advise what piers,
if any, should be constructed at each place, where they should be positioned, and
for whose use they should be appointed.57 The twenty-seventh council, held on
the 15th aboard Centurion, decided to construct one pier at Chinwangtao and
three jetties at Shanhaikwan. The council also received notification of the departure of the Chinese cruiser Hai Yung, escorted by an RN ship, to be kept under
watch in Weihaiwei (Weihai).58
During the first half of Phase 4 the Councils of Senior Naval Commanders
served as naval operational planning conferences aimed at capturing Shanhai
kwan and Chinwangtao. During the second half the commanders discussed the
management of these two places, which the coalition fortuitously had occupied
without bloodshed. In short, the councils of this phase almost exclusively discussed issues related to the Shanhaikwan-Chinwangtao operation. Thus, the
focus of discussion in the councils of Phase 4 did not blur, as it had during Phase
3. The primary reason was that by the early part of July Britain’s China Squadron already was interested in occupying Shanhaikwan, and once the squadron
had completed its activities in southern China, Seymour—as chairman of the
council—could focus the council’s attention on the Shanhaikwan-Chinwangtao
operation.59
Historically, navies have fulfilled a role of protecting nationals and assets endangered overseas during peacetime. In the case of the Imperial Japanese Navy, the
mission of protecting overseas nationals was regulated by the Gunkan-Gaimurei
(Orders for Expeditionary Fleets) that the Navy Ministry had issued in 1898;
therefore, a military operation conducted for this purpose was not considered
“war.”60 In addition, one result of the Opium and Sino-Japanese Wars was that
port calls by warships and the landing of marines in China by the relevant foreign
powers, including Japan, were authorized by treaty. Therefore, at the outset of
the Boxer Rebellion it was the navies that took the initiative, and the Council of
Senior Naval Commanders was expected to serve as the sole coordinating body
among the foreign powers throughout the incident.
During Phase 1, when no framework yet existed under which the representatives of the eight foreign powers could discuss issues of mutual interest, Admiral
Seymour, the senior naval officer present off Taku, proposed convening a Council of Senior Naval Commanders, and the commanders of the foreign navies
present agreed. The council would serve as the decision-making body to set the
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coalition’s strategic direction, including clarifying the coalition’s purpose and
ensuring that it acted in concert. The commanders further agreed to convene
councils as necessary to share the latest information and make any decisions
required. Commanders’ intent during this phase was unified.
During Phase 2—the period of the Seymour expedition—the naval coalition
supported Seymour’s forces indirectly by capturing the fort at Taku, as well as by
breaking through the net encircling Tientsin. The council provided the venue for
exercising command and control.
At the council at which the commanders decided to attack the fort at Taku, the
U.S. commander opposed the plan and did not sign the minutes, and the next day
he carefully left the council that had been convened on completion of the capture
of the fort before the meeting’s end so again he could avoid signing the minutes.
The reason given was that he still was waiting for direction from his government;
however, his behavior can be interpreted as a desire not to constrain the coalition
from adopting its overall course of action unanimously. In this way the coalition
could adhere to the original objective of supporting the Seymour expedition and
maintain unity of effort.
During Phase 3 the army became the primary actor in military operations,
and the expectations of the foreign powers began to diverge from each other.
As a result, the focus of the councils began to blur and the role of the council
became unclear. Nonetheless, even though four different commanders presided
over these councils, each council continued to produce useful results, including
the request for Japanese reinforcements, the boarding of merchant ships, the
managing of railways, the disposal of the Chinese warships in the Yangtze River,
and the laying of submarine cables.
Finally, during Phase 4 the councils functioned as tactical-operational conferences. In this mode they conducted the Shanhaikwan-Chinwangtao naval operation and managed its aftermath.
In each phase the senior naval commanders of the foreign powers present acted in concert—although on the basis of their own national interests—even when
they could not communicate with their respective ministers in Peking. It was
the coordination that the Councils of Senior Naval Commanders accomplished
that made this “system” work, enabling them to conduct coalition operations
smoothly. In short, the commanders were able to maintain their unity of effort,
with the councils providing the means of coordination.
At the outset of the twenty-first century—one hundred years after the Boxer
Rebellion—the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) created a coordination
mechanism to carry out Operation ENDURING FREEDOM—another coalition
operation—by hosting roughly four hundred liaison officers from approximately
sixty countries at MacDill Air Force Base in Tampa, Florida. The goal was to
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create a coordination mechanism by which the U.S. commander conducting
the operation could liaise and coordinate easily with his coalition counterparts,
obviating the need for complex diplomatic processes.61 This unique mechanism
provided a venue at which representatives of all participating nations were
gathered in one place, with the United States as host. It has served its purpose
very successfully, carrying out the liaison and coordination roles efficiently and
effectively. In executing the war, the CENTCOM commander is the primary
actor and the coalition partners are in position to support him. To conduct the
administrative work, such as the business procedures for managing the coalition,
senior national representatives (SNRs) set up an SNR Coordinating Group, with
a chairman elected by mutual vote.62
For operations during the Boxer Rebellion, although Admiral Seymour played
an important role, the courses of action the coalition followed were determined
at the Councils of Senior Naval Commanders. Each council was presided over
by a particular officer, whoever happened to be the senior naval commander
present—not necessarily British. The business practices of the council—such as
who would propose a council, who would chair the meeting, and what language
would be used—were established in an ad hoc fashion, without a standing secretariat. The Council of Senior Naval Commanders functioned as the unique
mechanism for coordinating coalition operations. This council, during the first
major coalition operation at the beginning of the twentieth century, performed
essentially the same function that coalition operations still require in the twentyfirst century.
At the ninth council the Japanese representative was Rear Admiral Dewa,
not Vice Admiral Togo. Togo had attended the eighth council, over which Hiltebrandt presided even though Togo was senior to him. Dewa later wrote in a
report that Togo directed him to attend subsequent councils on his behalf so that
Hiltebrandt could preside—in accordance with the “circumstances.”63 There is no
clear explanation for this decision. The editor of Meiji 33 Nen Shinkoku Jihen Kaigun Senshishou merely footnotes the dates of promotion of Togo and Hiltebrandt,
adding the comment “suffice it to mention the fact.”64 One might conjecture that
Japan sought to avoid an unnecessary confrontation with Russia, that Japan did
not want the other powers to perceive it as eager to take advantage of the Boxer
Rebellion to expand its sphere of influence, that the other powers subtly exerted
pressure to discourage the newcomer from stepping forward, or simply that Japan
lacked confidence to fulfill the role.
For whatever reason, Japan intentionally avoided taking the initiative in
this early coalition operation. It was not until 115 years later that a flag officer of the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force—the successor to the Imperial
Japanese Navy—assumed the duty of Commander, Combined Task Force 151, a
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multinational naval force combating piracy in the Gulf of Aden and off Somalia,
under the Japanese governmental policy of “proactive contribution to peace.”
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“GETTING SERIOUS ABOUT STRATEGY IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA”
WHAT ANALYSIS IS REQUIRED TO COMPEL A NEW U.S. STRATEGY IN THE
SOUTH CHINA SEA?

Steven Stashwick

China’s extensive island-building projects in the Spratly Islands, the aggressive
harassment tactics of its maritime law-enforcement and paramilitary fleets, and
its rejection of binding arbitration rulings on both those activities threaten the
rules-based international order and pose political, economic, and potentially
military threats to U.S. interests in the region. In “Getting Serious about Strategy
in the South China Sea,” from the Winter 2018 Naval War College Review, Hal
Brands and Zack Cooper make an important contribution to the debate on how
the United States should respond to China’s challenge in the South China Sea.1
However, because their argument in favor of finding a new strategy is isolated
from the identified consequences that such new strategies would have on other
policies, their analysis falls short of providing a compelling argument for the
United States to pursue a substantially different South China Sea strategy.
Citing muddled and confused U.S. policies to date, Brands and Cooper systematically evaluate four broad strategies for a U.S. response, as well as the costs
and hazards associated with each. Ultimately, they
Steven Stashwick is a lieutenant commander in the
advocate combining aspects of two strategies—
Navy Reserve. He has served in the Pacific Ocean region throughout his active and reserve careers, both containment and offsetting—for implementation.
afloat and ashore, and at the Pentagon in the InterHowever, in their analysis the authors perpetuate
national Engagement Directorate of the Navy Staff.
a tendency among South China Sea analysts to
He is a regular author on East Asian defense topics
and strategy. He earned a BS in systems engineering restate what makes the region important in isolafrom Virginia Tech and an MA in international relation, but not to make the case about why it is more
tions from the University of Chicago.
important than other aspects of the U.S.-China relationship and adjacent regional priorities.2 Doing
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the latter is necessary to change the incumbent policy hierarchy and defaults.
If such a reordering is self-evident to proponents of more-assertive policies, it
demonstrably is not to decision-making authorities, and “Getting Serious” is
unlikely to change that.
While their analysis admirably defines a universe of strategy options for the
United States, Brands and Cooper do not provide a systematic way to evaluate the
trade-offs they identify between the four strategies and other U.S. policy priorities. Without such a framework for comparing the value of a strategy’s expected
benefits with the expected damage it would impose on other policy priorities, it
is difficult to evaluate the merits of those trade-offs. The result is that the authors’
own strategy-selection criteria appear more subjective than systematic. Neither
is it clear, in any case, that Brands and Cooper’s recommended hybrid strategy
would be substantially different in execution from the strategy that emerged
under President Obama and appears to be consolidating under President Trump.
Brands and Cooper present a compelling list of U.S. strategic interests in
the South China Sea: the free flow of more than three trillion dollars in trade
each year; the natural resources that regional states harvest and extract; the
military-access challenge posed to U.S. forces by China’s island bases in the
event of an armed conflict; regional stability and what is sometimes called the
international rules-based order; and, more broadly, regional states’ ultimate
choice to align and cooperate more with the United States than with China.3 The
authors implicitly argue that America’s defense of these interests is incoherent
and confused owing to a lack of systematic thinking about its strategic options,
the priority objectives it should seek, and acceptable levels of risk in pursuit
of those objectives. Their subsequent analysis evaluates four strategies for the
United States: (1) rollback—to dislodge China coercively from its artificial island
bases, (2) containment—to prevent China’s occupation or reclamation of additional geographic features, (3) offset—to match China’s military advances in
the region with additional military capacity and capabilities of its own, and (4)
accommodation—to acquiesce deliberately to China’s regional dominance.
However, advocating a change in U.S. South China Sea policy (or any policy)
requires an affirmative and compelling argument for decision makers to accept
additional risks to other policy interests in exchange for the expected benefits of a
new course of action. Unfortunately, while Brands and Cooper consider the negative impact of each strategy on other U.S. policy priorities, such as armed-conflict
avoidance, fairness in trade relations, and cooperation on climate change and
North Korea’s nuclear program, and effects on other regional partners, they do
not suggest how to place a value on those hazards. As a result, while a reader gains
insight into why the South China Sea matters on its own terms, it is not clear why,
or even whether, it matters enough to accept new risks to those other priorities
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol71/iss4/1
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in the U.S.-China relationship or to other regional partner relationships. Today,
U.S. South China Sea policies already are effectively subordinated to these other
interests. By not providing an affirmative argument to reorder those strategic
priorities, Brands and Cooper implicitly endorse the current strategic hierarchy,
thereby undercutting their assertion that the United States should accept greater
risk in the region.
Without such a prioritization framework, Brands and Cooper’s recommended
hybrid containment-offset strategy appears compelling less for its departures
from existing policies than its similarities. The authors argue that the United
States should contain China’s ambitions to seize any additional geographic
features in the South China Sea or to embark on renewed island reclamation.
However, since containment would not prevent China from reinforcing its existing South China Sea bases (and might even encourage it), the United States also
should seek to offset any such military advances with enhancements to its own
regional military posture. Yet if this approach is intuitively attractive, it is unclear
how new or substantively different it is from what the United States is pursuing
already.
Their case for containment rests largely on its demonstrable efficacy in previous isolated containment efforts the United States has implemented to prevent
China from occupying or reclaiming additional features in the South China Sea.4
But if Brands and Cooper’s criticism is that U.S. containment efforts have been
only episodic, they elide that China’s recent expansion efforts have been similarly
isolated and episodic. Arguing that U.S. containment now should be more comprehensive seems a distinction with little practical difference, as China has not
occupied or reclaimed successfully any additional features beyond the original
seven Spratly features it reclaimed and built up after 2013.5
In arguing for the offset component of their recommendation, Brands and
Cooper do not differentiate meaningfully their version from the global Third
Offset policy enacted by the Obama Pentagon and the pivot/rebalance to Asia
to counter, in no small part, rising Chinese capabilities.6 While the Trump administration may have abandoned the “offset” name, it does not appear to have
abandoned the underlying policies or acquisition goals, and its subsequently
published strategies make commitment to responding to great-power competition explicit.7 Thus, while Brands and Cooper perhaps have helped clarify the
terms and vocabulary of debate for a U.S. South China Sea strategy, they seem
substantively to be advocating for the policy status quo. If U.S. policy has appeared confused or muddled, this is perhaps attributable less to a lack of analytic
rigor than to issues of execution and the complexity of translating written policy
into real-world effects.
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Granted, the ultimate choice of strategy rests with U.S. political leadership, as
do decisions about how to order U.S. policy priorities when they conflict. Brands
and Cooper recognize this, which perhaps accounts for choosing not to address
how to order the strategic priorities within the scope of their argument. But if the
prioritization of one policy area over another is a political choice, it need not be
a subjective one. Since the publication of their article, the Trump administration
has published its National Security Strategy (NSS), which signals greater focus
on China’s strategic competition generally, and singles out the threat of China’s
island construction in the South China Sea specifically. However, the NSS does
not assign any specific political or military means for addressing the South China
Sea, nor does it provide a hierarchy of U.S. interests vis-à-vis China to assist in
evaluating policy trade-offs.8
As Brands and Cooper assert, the free flow of trade, military access, and the
rules-based order are important U.S. interests in the South China Sea. However,
those interests are not generally self-evidently more or less important than other
aspects of the U.S.-China relationship or other regional interests that would be
hazarded by a new South China Sea policy. Since the Trump NSS does not provide an explicit hierarchy of those interests, it privileges the de facto hierarchy
that deprioritizes the South China Sea today. At the same time, it does not prescribe such a hierarchy by policy guidance, leaving the door open to those who
might advocate for elevating the South China Sea’s importance. However, without
demonstrating why preferred strategies will not affect other priorities adversely
or why South China Sea objectives are sufficiently more important to hazard
them, Brands and Cooper’s analysis is insufficient to compel such a change in
South China Sea strategy.
Nonetheless, Brands and Cooper’s preferred hybrid strategy does suggest a research need and a potential policy opportunity. The authors admit that the hybrid
strategy would not prevent additional militarization on the features China already occupies. This weakness is mitigated by the offset component, which would
in theory match—or, rather, offset—any new Chinese capability in the region
with additional U.S. and partner capabilities. But an offset strategy also effectively
commits the United States to an arms race with China in a region where the latter
enjoys advantages of economic ascendancy; geographic proximity; and the ability
to concentrate forces more easily, given its fewer geographically diffuse security
demands. The implication is that an offset strategy is more likely than not to exacerbate the security dilemma between the two competitors—a vexing problem
the authors identify but leave unexplored. This recommends research into policy
options to halt or limit further militarization of China’s occupied features in the
Spratly Islands, with a specific objective of preventing either permanent or rotational deployment of the force-projection capabilities those islands by now have
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been built up to host. Such a policy course most likely would entail a bargain or
implicit agreement, but—unlike the authors’ accommodation strategy—would
require maintaining some form of leverage or inducement to ensure compliance.
Such a course falls under a family of policies, such as confidence-building
measures, crisis-management tools, arms control, and international law and
institutions, that the United States and other Southeast Asian powers already
pursue on an ad hoc basis or as supporting policies of the four strategies Brands
and Cooper evaluate. But instead of considering these as policies intended only to
mitigate the risks of those broad strategies, their systematic pursuit might constitute a fifth strategy option; call it risk attenuation. Like Brands and Cooper’s hybrid strategy, it is largely a defense of the strategic status quo in the South China
Sea. Such a course would not abandon the role of military balancing and suasion,
but would privilege the prevention of armed conflict as an affirmative objective.
A risk-attenuation strategy may be criticized as Pollyannaish or naive by advocates of assertive versions of containment or offset policies, but such a strategy
recognizes the constraint that those advocates thus far have failed to surmount,
which is to offer decision makers a compelling argument to change the incumbent hierarchy of China policy priorities and accept the additional risk of armed
conflict that their preferred strategies incur. To that end, a comprehensive comparison of those relevant strategic trade-offs is a worthy, if daunting, analytic
endeavor. However, advocates of stronger South China Sea policies must be prepared that a systematic comparison of those priorities may not yield the compelling justification to change the status quo that they imagine; indeed, it may be
just as likely to endorse the current policy “muddle” as being appropriate to the
broader U.S. interests in China and East Asia.

NOTES

1.	Hal Brands and Zack Cooper, “Getting Serious about Strategy in the South China Sea,”
Naval War College Review 71, no. 1 (Winter
2018), pp. 13–32.
2.	Representative of the analytic observation
that other China and regional issues retain
the U.S. government’s priority while appealing for greater attention to the South China
Sea is Ely Ratner in Andrew Erickson et al.,
“China’s Menacing Sandcastles in the South
China Sea,” War on the Rocks, March 2, 2015,
warontherocks.com/.
3.	Brands and Cooper, “Getting Serious,” pp.
16–17.
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4.	The authors cite successful containment of
Chinese interference at Second Thomas Shoal
in 2014 and of an apparent Chinese intent
to conduct land reclamation at Scarborough
Shoal in 2016 following high-level U.S. warnings and commitments to the status quo.
5.	Mischief, Cuarteron, Subi, Fiery Cross,
Gaven, Johnson, and Hughes Reefs in the
Spratly chain, plus the Paracel group to the
north, all were occupied by China prior to
the wave of land reclamation and construction that began in 2013, meaning none were
occupied expressly for that purpose. The
only known subsequent attempt at physical
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occupation and reclamation was the case of
Scarborough Shoal, which the United States
successfully deterred, as Brands and Cooper
note. See “Occupation and Island Building—
China” (China Island Tracker), Asia Maritime
Transparency Initiative, amti.csis.org/.
6.	For an overview of the Third Offset’s goals
and associated activities, see reporting on remarks by Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert
O. Work and the Vice Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, in Cheryl Pellerin, “Deputy
Secretary: Third Offset Strategy Bolsters
America’s Military Deterrence,” DoD News,
October 31, 2016, www.defense.gov/. On the
military component of the rebalance to Asia,
see remarks by the Secretary of Defense in
Ashton Carter, “Remarks on the Next Phase
of the U.S. Rebalance to the Asia-Pacific”
(speech at the McCain Institute, Arizona State
Univ., Tempe, AZ, April 6, 2015), available at
www.defense.gov/.
7.	Offset is no longer explicit Pentagon policy in
the Trump administration, and some of the
Pentagon offices associated with it apparently
have diminished under the Trump administration; see, for example, Paul McLeary, “The
Pentagon’s Third Offset May Be Dead, but No
One Knows What Comes Next,” FP, December 18, 2017, foreignpolicy.com/. However,
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Trump Secretary of Defense James Mattis
announced at the beginning of his tenure that
any focus on capabilities and modernization
would not come until the Pentagon’s 2019
budget was in place; see Secretary of Defense,
memorandum, “Implementation Guidance
for Budget Directives in the National Security
Presidential Memorandum on Rebuilding
the U.S. Armed Forces,” January 31, 2017,
available at media.defense.gov/. The modernization priorities that the Pentagon’s 2019
budget proposal expresses, as well as those of
combatant commanders and service chiefs,
suggest that the technologies and capabilities
that the Third Offset championed, such as
hypersonic weapons, artificial intelligence,
and machine-learning integration, remain
relevant. See “FY2019 Budget Proposal,”
Department of Defense, www.defense.gov/.
Also see, for example, “Statement of Admiral
Harry B. Harris Jr., U.S. Navy, Commander,
U.S. Pacific Command, before the Senate
Armed Services Committee on U.S. Pacific
Command Posture, 15 March 2018,” United
States Senate Committee on Armed Services,
www.armed-services.senate.gov/.
8.	“National Security Strategy of the United
States of America,” White House, December
2017, pp. 2, 46, www.whitehouse.gov/.
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a distant mirror wargaming after world war ii

John T. Kuehn

Blue versus Purple: The U.S. Naval War College, the Soviet
Union, and the New Enemy in the Pacific, 1946, by Hal M.
Friedman. Historical Monograph 24. Newport, RI: Naval War
College Press, 2017. Index, photographs, maps, figures, bibliography, and notes after each chapter. 442 pages. $78.

Hal M. Friedman continues to mine the archives of the Naval War College
(NWC), producing another detailed monograph to add to his already substantial
body of work about the Navy and naval policy in the period just after World War
II. In particular, this monograph, as Friedman makes clear in his introduction,
picks up where Blue versus Orange (2013) and
Dr. John T. Kuehn is professor of military history at
Digesting History (2010) left off. Readers unfathe U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
(CGSC). He spent twenty-three years serving as a na- miliar with the monograph format are cautioned
val flight officer flying land- and carrier-based airthat Friedman’s approach does not lend itself to
craft, and retired from the U.S. Navy in 2004 at the
rank of commander. He has taught a variety of sub- the “casual reading” by which one might address
jects, including military history, at CGSC since 2000. a standard narrative naval, military, or political
He was awarded a Moncado Prize from the Society
for Military History in 2011. He authored Agents of history; however, those readers interested in unInnovation (Naval Institute Press, 2008), A Military derstanding deeply, or academics looking for a
History of Japan: From the Age of the Samurai to
deep treasure trove about, the wargaming process
the 21st Century (Praeger, 2014), and Napoleonic
Warfare: The Operational Art of the Great Cam- during this critical period will be rewarded.
paigns (Praeger, 2015), as well as numerous articles
The structure of the monograph is chronologiand editorials, and coauthored Eyewitness Pacific
cal. After some initial comments and a fine introTheater (Sterling, 2008) with D. M. Giangreco. His
latest book is America’s First General Staff: A Short ductory chapter giving a valuable overview of the
History of the Rise and Fall of the General Board of NWC curriculum, Friedman over several chapters
the Navy, 1900–1950 (Naval Institute Press, 2017).
details the framework and rules for wargaming.
He then begins an in-depth discussion of each
Naval War College Review, Autumn 2018, Vol. 71, No. 4
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exercise and its components, spanning from June 1946 to November 1946 (a total
of seventeen chapters). The focus is overwhelmingly on a “new” enemy labeled
“Purple,” using the old war-plan color-coding system of the interwar period.
Purple stood for the Soviet Union, and the monograph breaks new ground in
showing how—at least for the Navy, at the Naval War College—the Cold War
already was being conceptualized and operationalized as early as 1946.
The intricate discussions are supported throughout by photographs of various
“players” (literally and figuratively), as well as charts and figures that the officers
used in their games. For those unfamiliar with the milieu of wargaming at the
Naval War College, the work highlights how the Navy’s conception in these problems covered vast geographic distances and what can only be described in today’s
doctrine as an operational-level approach—that is, an approach at the campaign
level, although tactics clearly played a big role in gaming.
The choice of the Pacific frames the end point of Friedman’s analysis and
presumably implies another work forthcoming, because the wargaming focus
switched to the Atlantic for the remainder of the 1946–47 academic year (p.
xxii). This may seem odd to those of us who participated in the late Cold War,
with its very Atlantic focus on the problems of the Greenland–Iceland–U.K. gap
and the intricacies of executing the 1984 Maritime Strategy.1 However, Friedman
shows how the shadow of the recent war in the Pacific still dominated the naval
officer culture after the war, and that starting things out in that arena—with the
implication that the Soviets might attempt a Pearl Harbor repeat—made perfect
sense to them, if not to us. Friedman also emphasizes striking parallels with today’s perception of an antiaccess/area-denial (known as A2/AD) threat—despite
démarches from our current Chief of Naval Operations—that was inherent in
the expected adversary’s anti-Navy tactics: “Soviet naval doctrine, for instance,
stressed initial strikes against American carrier battle groups by, first, torpedofiring, later missile-firing, submarines, followed up by strikes from long-range,
land-based naval aviation, and then surface battle groups. Some of the 1946
scenarios at the Naval War College already reflected this pattern of doctrine” (p.
xxii).2
Friedman emphasizes how recent experience in the Pacific War at places such
as Guadalcanal and Okinawa seemed to justify these concerns. He then draws
direct parallels with Chinese naval developments and capabilities today.
Hidden within the detailed account are various nuggets, but the reader
must remain attentive to catch them. For example, in the overview of the curriculum the reader learns that each student was assigned to write two lengthy
(a recommendation of nine thousand words) research papers, on the following
topics: “Relations between Russia and the United States, and Their Influence on
U.S. Foreign Policy” and “The Influence of the Atomic Bomb on Future Naval
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol71/iss4/1
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Warfare.” Clearly, the Navy leadership at the College, including NWC President
Admiral Raymond A. Spruance, had two main concerns on its collective mind.
Later, the reader learns how combined-arms operations—involving aircraft of
various types, submarines, destroyers, and even battleships and cruisers—had become so integrated in all phases of naval warfare, particularly in the early search
and reconnaissance phases of the movement exercises (pp. 70–72). Finally, during an exercise in which officers role-played Purple, one sees elements of World
War II cropping up in an attempted Purple invasion of Attu, as Purple pushes
out from bases on the Kamchatka Peninsula (pp. 142–56). This was prescient;
the peninsula became a key geographic area and base for the Soviet Far Eastern
Fleet during the Cold War.
Throughout the text, a modern War College student will find how open the
dialogue and the criticisms often were. The goal was not so much to wargame
with a view to justifying a capability or force structure as it was to develop the
student-officers’ minds and their decision-making skills. With regard to the
larger arguments of the work, thankfully Friedman summarizes those in a concise and hard-hitting final chapter. He emphasizes the transition from an Orange
(Japanese) enemy to a new threat. With regard to the games’ practical value, he
notes that “major aspects of war gaming reflected the theoretical underpinnings
of the activity itself, as well as more-practical applications of interwar and wartime doctrine.” The focus was not doctrinal conformance but “learning opportunities” aimed at “naval operational decision making” (p. 405). He explains the
apparently counterintuitive focus, especially on surface warfare, which seemed at
odds with the lessons learned about aircraft carriers and aviation becoming the
dominant components of naval warfare. To resolve this problem, he brings up
the historical record and the experience and actions of a surface officer such as
Spruance, or even William F. Halsey Jr., in the Pacific campaigns: from desperate
surface combat in the Solomon Islands, to later plans and actions vis-à-vis Japanese surface threats in the Marianas, and especially at Leyte Gulf (pp. 406–407).
Thus, Navy leaders after the war still took surface threats very seriously indeed. This does not mean they discounted submarine and air threats, but they
realized that any future war at sea would be a three-dimensional, combined-arms
fight. Accordingly, they paid particularly close attention in their scripting to the
“manned cruise missiles” they had faced only recently, at Okinawa in the last year
of the war; and the threat of submarines—which sank more U.S. aircraft carriers
than any single other platform—was never far from their thoughts. They even
gave Purple some aircraft carriers, even though the Soviet Union had none of
those platforms yet. Friedman also argues that Navy leaders did not buy into the
idea that atomic weapons had eliminated the peer maritime threat. They justly
can be credited with anticipating that the main maritime threat indeed would be
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2018
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the Red Banner Fleet of the Soviet Union, and in the games they had it employ
just the sort of tactics and platforms (missiles, submarines, surface ships, and
aviation) that it eventually would do in actuality (p. 408).
Obviously scholars such as I have much to gain by acquiring, reading, and
otherwise examining monographs like this one, but they will provide value and
benefit for anyone else wanting a “deep” look into a distant mirror. BZ, Professor
Friedman.

NOTES

1. Norman Friedman, The US Maritime Strategy
(Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1988).
2. For A2/AD, see, for example, Kyle D.
Christensen, “Strategic Developments in the
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Western Pacific: Anti-access/Area Denial and
the Airsea Battle Concept,” Journal of Military
and Strategic Studies 14, no. 3 (2012).
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lehman’s maritime triumph

Dov S. Zakheim

Oceans Ventured: Winning the Cold War at Sea, by John
Lehman. New York: W. W. Norton, 2018. 368 pages. $27.95.

John Lehman probably was the most powerful Secretary of the Navy since Theodore Roosevelt effectively filled that position. Lehman entered office determined
to reinvigorate the Navy, whose force level had declined precipitously in the aftermath of the Vietnam War, and whose assigned mission in a war with Europe
seemed to consist primarily of establishing sea control to protect convoys to
Europe. An A-6 navigator, Lehman brought to his position both real operational
experience and more than a passing acquaintance with many of the Navy’s most
talented strategists and operators. Both stood him in good stead as he reshaped
the Navy into a larger, more powerful force that during the height of the Cold
War conducted radically innovative exercises that traumatized Soviet military
leaders. Oceans Ventured is not the first book by this warrior-analyst-leader. But
it is, in many ways, the most revealing, because it both draws on recently unclassified material and provides insights into Lehman’s implementation of his bold,
innovative, risky, and highly controversial Maritime Strategy.
Lehman came to lead the Navy at a time when—not for the first time—its force
levels were declining owing to opposition from within the Office of the Secretary
of Defense. As he recounts, while the Navy had thrived under Franklin Roosevelt,
who had spent eight years in the Navy Department, it did far less well under
Harry S. Truman and Louis A. Johnson, the latter named Secretary of Defense
after Truman’s victory in the 1948 presidential election.
When the Korean War broke out in June 1950, little over a year after Johnson
took office, the Navy was still in a position to support American operations in
Korea after the North overran all the air bases in the South. The Marine Corps’s
audacious landing at Inchon in September 1950 virtually coincided with Truman’s firing of Johnson, who (in addition to having an unpleasant personality)
was seen as responsible for America’s initial lack of preparedness at the outset of
the war.
Lehman spends a considerable portion of his
Dov S. Zakheim is a senior fellow at CNA. He was an
Under Secretary of Defense from 2001 to 2004 and book providing an overview of the Navy’s vicisa Deputy Under Secretary of Defense from 1985 to
situdes during the three decades before he took
1987.
office. He points out that the Navy’s fortunes
improved markedly once Truman recognized his
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strategic blunder and reversed himself on defense spending. In fact, Truman
tripled the defense budget, which now included construction of a new aircraft
carrier that Johnson had canceled. Lehman then outlines the increasing demands
on the Navy as it not only supported land operations on the Korean Peninsula
but also played a major role in maritime exercises conducted by the new North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). He goes into considerable detail regarding those exercises, as well as the service’s new strategic role when in 1961 the
Kennedy administration adopted the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP),
which assigned specific targets to both Navy carrier air wings and the Air Force.
Lehman rightly observes that the SIOP severely constrained the Navy’s operational flexibility, which constituted its fundamental competitive advantage over
the Soviets. As he puts it, “The targeting constraints bit into the fleets’ basic needs
for movement, cover, and deception,” which later became the essential ingredients of Lehman’s Maritime Strategy. He applauds the Reagan administration’s
decision gradually to off-load nuclear weapons from the carriers, which afforded
the fleet additional operational flexibility.
Lehman also discusses the role of civilian analysts in fleet operations. He notes
that after World War II analysts began to go to sea to act as “unbiassed [sic] factbased analysts and judges of the effectiveness of weapons, electronics, equipment,
tactics, and overall operations.” The teams of evaluators eventually evolved into
a major component of CNA, which continues to send its analysts to accompany
major naval exercises.
Lehman’s review of the Navy’s strategic and operational role prior to his taking office sets the stage for his extended discussion of its exercises under his
leadership. Before finally describing its operations during his term, however, he
devotes considerable space to the policies of the Carter administration, which he
vigorously opposed. Jimmy Carter’s attitude to the Navy—despite his own background as a naval officer—was to some extent a throwback to the Louis Johnson
years. Carter highlighted his 1976 presidential campaign with a promise to cancel
production of the Navy’s newest nuclear-powered aircraft carrier. It was only after
the 1979 Iranian Revolution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan that Carter
reluctantly accepted the need for another carrier. Nevertheless, the Secretary of
Defense’s Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation (PA&E) not only opposed
the construction of additional carriers but proposed reducing the carrier force
to eight.
It was not merely the Carter administration’s plan to reduce the fleet that
angered Lehman, as well as many of his closest Navy colleagues, such as Captain
James A. “Ace” Lyons Jr.; it was more that the Navy had been assigned a defensive
role in any conflict with the Soviets, with its primary mission being to escort resupplies to land forces fighting along what was then termed the “inner German
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol71/iss4/1
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border.” Lehman and his colleagues chafed at what they viewed as a reluctance to
unleash the Navy’s power directly against the Soviets, thereby both complicating
and undermining any strategic plans Moscow might have developed for a thrust
across the heart of Europe. Lehman points out that by 1980, with the Royal Navy’s
last conventional aircraft carrier retired and the U.S. Navy’s carrier force committed to the Pacific, Indian Ocean, and Mediterranean theaters, “no more than
one lone flattop was expected to be available to try to deter Admiral Gorshkov’s
swollen Northern Fleet” (pp. 72–73). For Lehman and close associates such as
Lyons, this was an intolerable situation.
Lehman notes that despite the Carter administration’s biases, the stage was
being set for a significant change in the Navy’s role—if only a friendly administration would come into office. The Navy’s SEA PLAN 2000, together with the results
of wargames conducted at Newport under the leadership of Francis J. “Bing”
West, the War College’s dean of research, provided the conceptual backbone of
what soon became the Maritime Strategy.
In contrast to the policies of the Carter administration and thanks to Lehman’s
influence, Ronald Reagan already had committed himself to a major expansion of
the Navy well before he was elected president. Once in office, he fully supported
Lehman’s drive to increase Navy force levels from about five hundred to six hundred ships and to increase the number of aircraft carriers from twelve to fifteen.
He also sought to increase the submarine force by as many as twenty-five boats,
with the goal of achieving a total of one hundred attack submarines.
Secretary Lehman fought long and hard to make a six-hundred-ship, fifteencarrier Navy a key priority of the Reagan administration, often in the face of
opposition from analysts in PA&E. I was a witness to the power of Lehman’s
influence at a 1983 National Security Council meeting that President Reagan
chaired and that the Secretary of the Navy did not even attend. At one point in
the meeting, President Reagan interrupted Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick—who
rarely was interrupted by anyone—and asked the assembled group: “I understand
that there is opposition to the 600 ship, 15 carrier Navy. Well, I support it. Does
anyone disagree?” No one dared to speak up. Lehman got the president to settle
the matter without even being present in the room.
Lehman pushed for an accelerated shipbuilding program that even included
funding for two aircraft carriers in a single budget year. Moreover, working
alongside Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Thomas B. Hayward, he pressed for
the acquisition of fourth-generation F-18 aircraft as well as the most-advanced
missile and electronic systems, which would constitute a vastly more capable
deterrent against any aggressive moves by the Soviets, whether at sea or on land.
Lehman’s ultimate objective was not modernization; rather, it was to develop
and then implement an ambitious and radically different strategy that would be
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2018
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buttressed by innovative operations and aggressive tactics for which the Soviets
were completely unprepared. What became known as the Maritime Strategy
called for operations just outside the Soviet Union’s territorial waters, initially in
the far North Atlantic and then in the Pacific.
Precisely because he was an analyst himself, Lehman, along with the Navy
military leadership, exploited the Navy’s network of intellectual resources to refine the Maritime Strategy and its underlying operations and tactics, so that each
succeeding at-sea exercise conducted was more sophisticated than its predecessor. The Navy drew on the findings and evaluations of top operations analysts
from CNA, who continued to accompany battle units as they exercised at sea. The
Navy also incorporated the conclusions of key studies completed by students at
the War College’s Strategic Studies Group and at the Naval Postgraduate School
in Monterey. Finally, it examined elements of the Maritime Strategy at the Naval
War College’s annual Global wargame.
Turning to innovative leaders such as the caustic but tactically brilliant Vice
Admiral Ace Lyons, whom he chose to command the Second Fleet, and rising
stars such as Rear Admirals Henry “Hank” Mustin and Jerry O. Tuttle, Captain
Fox Fallon, and Commander Philip A. Dur, Lehman authorized exercises that
masked the location of large multicarrier task forces until they were within shooting range of Leningrad and beyond. On virtually every occasion, Lyons’s stealthy
techniques caught the Soviets flat-footed.
The first such exercise, dubbed O CEAN VENTURE, from which Lehman’s
book draws its title, was a key part of a series of NATO exercises that began in
July 1981. Lyons led his Navy and NATO colleagues in planning and developing
OCEAN VENTURE ’81 into a massive exercise involving fifteen nations, over a
thousand aircraft, 250 ships, two aircraft carriers, and the British jump jet carrier Invincible. As Lehman notes, “It was the largest such exercise in anyone’s
memory” (p. 77).
The exercise practiced offensive and sea-control operations well north of the
Greenland–Iceland–United Kingdom gap. It also posed major challenges for
the operators; freezing temperatures and high winds and sea states in the North
Atlantic proved to be extremely hazardous. Nevertheless, the exercise continued,
with Lyons masking his entire striking fleet through electronic means, exploitation of the foul weather, and the use of decoys, until it was within striking distance of Murmansk.
The large-scale exercises in the Atlantic, which included allied forces, were
paralleled by similar exercises in the Pacific, which employed the same techniques to threaten the Soviet Pacific bases. Moscow’s military leaders soon realized that any attempt by their forces to cross the inner German border could well
result in the destruction of key Soviet facilities, notably those that housed their
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol71/iss4/1
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second-strike nuclear deterrent—namely, the strategic ballistic-missile submarine forces of the Northern and Pacific Fleets.
The Maritime Strategy often was dismissed, not only by the PA&E analysts but
by influential officials such as Robert W. Komer, who devoted an entire volume to
challenging both its utility and its rationale. At the time, there was no real way to
rebut these critiques, as any attempt to do so would result in the leaking of highly
classified information. It thus took three decades before the critical importance
of Lehman’s innovations finally could see the light of day. It is no exaggeration to
assert, as Lehman does, that the Navy played a vital role in bringing the Cold War
to a successful conclusion in America’s favor.
Lehman’s book does more than provide a valuable record of the Navy’s prominent role in winning the Cold War for the West. In his relatively brief epilogue,
Lehman makes a powerful argument for turning once again to maritime forces to
provide America with a key advantage over near-peer potential adversaries. Russia’s increasing assertiveness in Europe, whether through the conduct of hybrid
warfare or through cyber aggression, has frightened not only longtime NATO
allies such as Norway and Denmark, plus many of Moscow’s former constituent
republics—notably the Baltic States and Poland in the north and Romania and
Bulgaria in the south—but nonaligned Sweden and Finland as well. At the same
time, China’s bald efforts to militarize the South China Sea threaten to upset
long-standing power balances in Southeast Asia.
The Navy has declined to its lowest force levels since the days before World
War II. Although the quality of its individual warships is unmatched, there are
limits to what a fleet of fewer than 285 ships can do when faced with demands
that range from the western Pacific to the Indian Ocean and the Arabian, Mediterranean, Black, Baltic, and North Seas. Add to these challenges the emerging
importance of the Arctic owing to climate changes that have melted what previously were frozen barriers to transit routes, and it is obvious that—once again, as
in Lehman’s day—there is an urgent need for a new naval force buildup. The current defense program calls for funding a 355-ship fleet, including a dozen aircraft
carriers. Whether that goal can be realized is an open question, given the ongoing
expense of both naval air modernization—the ultimate cost of the F-35 has yet
to be determined—and the new fleet of strategic ballistic-missile submarines.
Lehman asserts that “the history of deterrence is a lesson that schoolboys
know: credible threats are respected, while weakness invites unwelcome outcomes. America’s naval decline since the end of the Cold War has invited the
challenges we face today.” He ominously notes, with more than a bit of hyperbole,
that “the allied naval disarmament treaties of the 1920s and ’30s emboldened
Germany, Japan, and their allies and became a contributing cause of World War
II. America’s postwar naval disarmament . . . facilitated the Korean War. The
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2018
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post-Vietnam U.S. naval disarmament had the same result, encouraging Soviet
aggression and expansion globally. Like a law of nature, this fact holds true irrespective of time and place: a decline in sea power invites disaster” (p. 276).
Lehman argues that, at least with respect to naval forces, America can achieve
a rapid buildup that would mirror the one over which he presided during the
1980s. Moreover, “the lesson of this book,” he concludes, “is that we must restore
the capability of our naval forces not because we might have to go to war with
North Korea, Russia, Iran, or some other adversary, but because we must prevent
having to go to war at all” (p. 284).
The Trump administration is committed to a major budgetary increase for
defense, including for maritime forces—but only for the next two years. Moreover, the projected increases will result at best in a Navy of 355 ships, far short of
the force levels required to maintain American naval power sufficient not merely
to confront the three nations Lehman lists but also to maintain a credible presence elsewhere on the world’s oceans. If Lehman’s advice is to be taken seriously,
defense budgets must be captive no longer to any sort of sequester, while the
president and his administration must recognize the contribution of America’s
long-standing allies, even as he also makes it clear that Russia, China, and any
other country with aggressive intent at last will be met by more than mere rhetorical opposition. Anything less will result in outcomes that America may well
regret bitterly for years to come.
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THROUGH A GLASS, DARKLY
Hell to Pay: Operation DOWNFALL and the Invasion of Japan, 1945–1947, by D. M. Giangreco. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2017. 584 pages. $35.

Since August 1945, historians have
debated President Harry S. Truman’s
controversial decision to use the atom
bomb—a catastrophic new military
technology—to force Japan’s Emperor Hirohito to surrender and avoid
a costly Allied invasion of the Japan
home islands. In his well-researched
Hell to Pay (first published in 2009,
but newly updated and expanded
in October 2017), D. M. Giangreco
weighs in on the traditional side of the
debate, arguing that Truman based his
decision on reasonable casualty estimations and sound military planning.
Two schools of thought have framed
the debate. Traditionalists maintain that
Truman’s claims were justified, while
revisionists argue that use of atomic
force was unnecessary because Japan’s
sea, land, and air forces were largely
destroyed and Soviet entry into the war
against Japan tipped the scales toward
inevitable defeat. Giangreco, however,
disagrees with revisionist historians
such as Bernard Bernstein who contend
that Truman exaggerated casualty
projections. Giangreco provides readers
with a rich stream of lesser-known
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dates, facts, and figures, including with
regard to troop movements, Selective
Service needs, and medical supplies.
Both the United States and Japan
scrambled to organize land, sea, and air
resources, drawing inexorably toward
a hellish, last-ditch fight to the finish.
Hell to Pay’s seventeen chapters flow
chronologically from 1944 through
the end of the war in 1945, then
continue with events up to 1947. In this
revised edition, Giangreco adds two
new chapters (chapter 11, “To Break
Japan’s Spine,” and chapter 17, “The
Hokkaido Myth”) and an appendix
that provide facts pertinent to the
Soviet entry into the war. In addition
to these new chapters, several others
stand out as especially noteworthy.
In chapter 2, “Spinning the Casualty
Numbers,” Giangreco gives details on
how U.S. military leaders calculated
total casualty numbers and how, when,
and why they chose to publish them.
The U.S. government wanted public
support for Selective Service, but also
did not want to reveal its deployment
plans to the enemy. Although many
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strategists argued at the time that the
number of replacements needed that
U.S. leaders published was inflated, the
author argues that strategists actually
intentionally underinflated the numbers,
using mostly conservative estimates. U.S.
troops, for example, were familiar with
repeated announcements that at least
five hundred thousand replacements
were needed to continue the war in
Japan, whereas on March 9, 1945, Yank
magazine published figures for U.S.
losses from the beginning of World War
II through February 7, 1945, of “782,180,
including 693,342 for the Army alone”
(p. 20). In addition to exploring the various methods of estimation, Giangreco
gives evidence that Truman based his
decision to avoid invasion on conservative, not inflated, casualty estimates.
In his fifth chapter, “Not the Recipe for
Victory,” Giangreco documents U.S. and
Japanese reallocations of troops among
various areas of operation. Despite Allied attempts to deceive the enemy with
misleading communications campaigns,
Japanese military leaders correctly
anticipated the time and location for
the planned initial Allied invasion of
Japan’s home islands: October 1945
in Kyushu, southern Japan. Accordingly, the Japanese transferred thirteen
divisions to Kyushu before the end of
the war in August, whereas General
Douglas MacArthur and U.S. planners
expected only six to ten Japanese
divisions. MacArthur anticipated
outnumbering Japanese troops by a
comfortable margin, but the thirteen
divisions transferred made the probable
ratio closer to 1 : 1. Giangreco emphasizes that, since “planned superiority”
was no longer likely, Truman’s assertion
that five hundred thousand lives would
be lost probably was too conservative.
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One of the most significant chapters in
the book is chapter 6, “The Decision,”
referring to Truman’s decision to drop
the bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
Giangreco traces factors from the summer of 1944 to August 1945 that affected
the decision, including the casualty
surge from the earlier ratio of more than
4.5 Japanese casualties to every U.S. casualty to a more even ratio of 2 : 1 or even
1.2 : 1 in recent campaigns, such as Iwo
Jima. This surge was one of Truman’s
considerations when he requested that
the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) provide
a projection of casualties that would
result from an invasion of Kyushu.
The aforementioned new chapters 11
and 17 contribute facts and research
regarding Soviet entry and participation. Giangreco provides evidence
that MacArthur and other military
advisers supported Soviet entry into
the war against Japan soon after Pearl
Harbor. Accordingly, the author reasons
that Truman did not drop the bombs
to minimize Soviet participation;
contrary to such a narrative, U.S.-Soviet
cooperation in defeating Japan was an
extension of Lend-Lease arrangements
and planning. Although Giangreco
argues that it always had been the intent
of the JCS to incorporate the Soviets
into U.S. war-termination plans in the
Pacific, his research aligns in at least
one instance with revisionists who
argue that Truman wanted to minimize
Soviet participation as much as possible:
while MacArthur always argued for
Soviet entry as the best plan, other JCS
advisers, such as Admiral Ernest J. King,
told Truman that the United States
could defeat Japan without Stalin’s help.
Contemplation of the locations, participants, and numbers involved in this
story can be daunting, but a dedicated
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reader gains a nuanced mental picture
of the moving parts on both sides of
the conflict. Scholars and researchers
who desire in-depth information will
benefit from Giangreco’s research,
and the appendices and bibliography
include numerous primary sources that
have received little or no attention in
past traditionalist-versus-revisionist
debates. This work is a must-read for
those interested in U.S. and Japanese
military and political historiography and
strategy in the final year of World War
II and the critical factors contributing
to war termination in the Pacific.
GINA GRANADOS PALMER

Progressives in Navy Blue: Maritime Strategy,
American Empire, and the Transformation of
U.S. Naval Identity, 1873–1898, by Scott Mobley.
Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2018. 432
pages. $34.95.

Judging Scott Mobley’s Progressives in
Navy Blue by its cover, it might seem
a bit esoteric. The parallels with the
modern U.S. Navy, however, quickly
become apparent in this well-written
and -researched history of the transition
of our Navy from sail to steam and from
constabulary force to national fleet. This
is Mobley’s first book, but in a thirtyyear career as a nuclear-trained surface
warfare officer, including command of
two ships, he lived the same “warriorengineer” dichotomy that was central to
the late-nineteenth-century American
naval culture around which this book
revolves. The U.S. Navy between the
Civil and Spanish-American Wars
engenders limited historical discourse
owing to the lack of naval combat, but
Mobley asserts that the progressive
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currents that the naval officer corps
debated during this period marked a
pivotal shift in ideas on naval professionalism and strategic thinking.
The Gilded Age Navy, in relation to
its time, was not an anachronistic
organization wedded to outdated ideas,
as it often is portrayed. Indeed, in many
ways, the Navy of the 1870s and 1880s
preceded the national Progressive
movement. Even as the Navy addressed
the massive challenges involved in
incorporating emerging technology
into an organization steeped in tradition, the service simultaneously had
to deal with the emergence of national
strategic thought. The idea that America
should maintain a navy for war during
peacetime ran counter to a century
of tradition. Mobley asserts that this
change in strategic focus drove the
cultural shift in the Navy officer corps.
In this he challenges previous scholars
“who attribute the Navy’s revival to
a mix of commercial expansionism,
hegemonic aspirations, and imperial ambition” (p. 12). Progressives in Navy Blue
adds to the scholarship by considering
the “influence of strategic ideas, beliefs,
values, and practices upon the Navy’s
professional culture and identity” (p. 14).
With the marked exception of the Civil
War, within the service’s first century
“decades of overseas service, policing,
and promoting America’s maritime
empire fundamentally shaped the U.S.
Navy as a constabulary force led by
mariner-warriors” (p. 37). The post–
Civil War American navy emphasized
single-ship operations, with limited to
no opportunity for multiship training.
Naval officers and civilian leaders
saw no need to dedicate resources to
homeland defense, believing that the
frigate-and-coastal-fort system in place
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since the Navy’s inception still sufficed.
But by 1880 the focus had shifted
from imperial constabulary duties
to national defense as “the essential
foundation of naval policy” (p. 143).
While most historians tie the renaissance of the U.S. Navy to the nation’s
imperialist expansion around the
turn of the twentieth century, Mobley
asserts that the birth of the modern
American navy predated this imperialist
surge—perhaps even facilitating it.
Navy progressives were divided in
their approach to advancing the Navy.
One branch focused on harnessing
technology, while the other advocated
the study of strategy. As an ardent voice
for technology, Lieutenant Bradley A.
Fiske advocated for developing ships
with the latest technology, to stand up
to the more advanced European navies.
At the opposite end of the progressive
movement, Rear Admiral Stephen B.
Luce founded the Naval War College
in 1884 to ensure that the officer corps
studied not only emerging technology
but also the art and science of war. These
two branches of progressivism “clashed
between 1887 and 1897 in a series of
bureaucratic and cultural struggles, with
the Naval War College their primary
battleground” (p. 207). Despite their
differences, however, “the two cultures
complemented each other in many
ways. . . . Indeed, many officers readily
embraced both perspectives” (p. 207).
Using Harold L. Wilensky’s professionalization model, Mobley tracks how
the U.S. naval officer corps established
its professional credentials. The final
step involved the establishment of
the U.S. Naval Institute and the Naval
War College as forums for debating
ideas. Prior to the 1873 founding of
the Naval Institute, no forum existed
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for professional discussion within the
naval service. The institute was open to
all officers; the founders hoped that the
inclusion of many voices would advance
the profession as a whole. Mobley
claims that—contrary to historiography
regarding this era holding that naval
education existed only at the intellectual fringes—“the early Naval War
College mirrored the progressive trends
shaping new graduate schools and social
science disciplines in the United States
during the Gilded Age” (pp. 182–83).
Many of the lessons Mobley identifies
can inform today’s warrior-engineer
debate. As the information age matures
and the robotics age emerges, America’s
navy faces new technological and strategic challenges. Those who trust technology to dominate future warfare and
those who argue for the continued need
to study the science of war continue to
clash, just as they did over a century ago.
Lieutenant William Bainbridge-Hoff ’s
observation rings as validly today as
when he uttered it in 1886: “[W]ellconstructed strategy must consider
technology, just as technology should be
informed by strategy” (p. 207). For this
reason, those desiring to advance the
naval profession should read this book.
JAMES P. MCGRATH III

Seablindness: How Political Neglect Is Choking
American Seapower and What to Do about It, by
Seth Cropsey. New York: Encounter Books, 2017.
408 pages. $27.99.

In Seablindness, Seth Cropsey delivers a
comprehensive examination of sea power and makes a compelling argument for
the modernization and recapitalization
of the U.S. Navy. To do so he analyzes
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the future security environment, the
projected use and requirements of the
Navy, and the current state of readiness
within the sea services. Seablindness
serves as a cautionary reminder to U.S.
leadership and the American people
regarding the mandate of sea power for
maritime states. Cropsey provides short
historical examples of the actions and
decisions that led to the diminution
of the power and influence of earlier
powerful maritime states and the international and domestic consequences.
These analogies provoke reflection on
the current state of U.S. sea power.
Cropsey defines seablindness as a mindset under which great maritime powers
“forget, neglect,” or are “distracted”
from the oceanic foundation of their
commerce and security. It manifests its
effects in national security policy and
defense resource-allocation decisions
that incrementally weaken the ability of
the state to employ sea power, including
its navy, in the promotion, protection,
and defense of state interests. These
policy and budget actions rarely are
intended to diminish the capability or
effectiveness of maritime forces; rather,
the degradation is more an unintended
consequence of seemingly unrelated
policy actions or political objectives.
The author develops the urgency to
make national security decisions and
take action to remedy seablindness
through a methodical and logical analysis of current and future maritime strategies, missions, operating concepts, and
forces. This book is more than an argument for a larger naval force structure; it
represents as well an opportunity for the
reader to reflect on sea power and the
employment of a navy, so as to form an
answer to the question: “What does the
nation need and want its navy to do?”
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The author presents five core strategic
missions of the U.S. Navy. The service’s
first priority is to use the nuclear triad
to deter nuclear war. Second, the Navy
must be able to conduct sustained
and complex maritime warfare from
the sea. The third priority is to deter
and respond immediately to regional
conflicts and challenges. Fourth, the
Navy needs to conduct global surveillance through forward deployment,
and to respond to crises. Lastly, the
Navy provides extended coastal defense
that keeps potential adversaries at
greater distances from the United States.
This list of core missions reflects the
orthodoxy of American sea power,
captures the enduring elements of the
missions of the U.S. Navy, and is a clear
expression of the purpose of the service.
The book presents a comprehensive
assessment of the conditions that have
affected matériel and personnel readiness within the naval force structure
over the last two decades. Cropsey’s
examination of sea power evaluates
the complex interrelationships among
force structure, strategy, operational
employment, and readiness. He explains
in detail the cascading effects on the
Navy and Marine Corps, and on the
men and women who serve therein,
from reductions in force structure,
prolonged deployments, deferred or
truncated maintenance periods, and
expedited predeployment training.
Using descriptive regional security
scenarios, Cropsey presents plausible
future situations and describes how
and why potential adversaries such as
China, Russia, and Iran would take
actions in their regions in pursuit of
their own national interests, thereby
threatening U.S. partner states, regional
stability, and U.S. national interests.
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The author uses these scenarios to
demonstrate how a U.S. maritime
response to regional aggression could
be constrained or limited by diminished
Navy and Marine Corps force structures
and postures. Thus, these scenarios
examine the potential vulnerabilities
that have resulted from seablindness.
Cropsey recommends that the Trump
administration conduct a comprehensive
assessment of American sea power to determine the “goals, size, and character”
of the U.S. Navy. In two chapters entitled
“Rebuilding American Seapower” and
“Naval Rearmament,” Cropsey’s analysis
frames the naval force structure alternatives facing the Trump administration,
Congress, and naval force planners. The
author evaluates President Trump’s 2016
350-ship campaign goal by comparing
it with the Navy’s 2017 thirty-year
shipbuilding plan of 308 ships and
the 2015 Congressional Budget Office
assessment of Navy shipbuilding.
Cropsey makes recommendations for
changes in force posture, naval operating
concepts, and force structure programming. He determines that the United
States has the industrial capability and
resources to build a 350-ship Navy—if
the Trump administration effectively
advocates for sea power, and if Congress
establishes sea power as a priority.
Seablindness delivers a candid and
uniquely comprehensive examination
of the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps
by first assessing the past and current
uses of American sea power and
analyzing force-structure requirements, then considering the future
security environment, naval missions
in general, and particular employment options for the U.S. Navy.
SEAN SULLIVAN

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol71/iss4/1

Autumn2018Review.indb 152

Neglected Skies: The Demise of British Naval
Power in the Far East, 1922–42, by Angus Britts.
Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2017. 253
pages. $34.95.

Although the author describes his
work as a “reconsideration” of the April
1942 clash between the British Eastern
Fleet and the Imperial Japanese Navy’s
Kido Butai (1st Mobile Force), this is
probably something of a stretch. Britts’s
main conclusion—that the neglect
of naval aviation during the interwar
years resulted in a Royal Navy that was
uncompetitive when matched against
the combat-seasoned and well-drilled
multicarrier task force fielded by
Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo—is
hardly earth-shattering. Nor indeed
are his explanations for this lapse:
the obsolescence of both platforms
and thinking in the Royal Navy; and
the almost criminal squandering of
a comprehensive early lead in naval
aviation, a degradation brought about by
parochial infighting within Whitehall,
set against the chronic underfunding
of the navy in particular. To my mind,
to be considered a true reconsideration
a work would have to offer significant
new perspectives, new evidence, or a
novel interpretation of an established set
of events. Unfortunately, and notwithstanding a few fanciful counterfactuals,
Britts does none of these things.
For a start, while the author in his
second and third chapters conducts a
thorough scrutiny of the policy-making
rationale employed and the pitfalls of
that approach, he does not back it up
with a detailed analysis of the detrimental impact the “dual control” system
had on comprehensive development of
naval aviation as a warfare discipline.
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The excessive compartmentalization
and “stovepiping” always were destined
to create difficulties, but in an era when
the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force
were fighting one another for their very
existences, the necessary motivation to
come together was lacking altogether. As
a result, the research and development
necessary to produce aircraft optimized
for warfare at sea never achieved
sufficient priority within a Royal Air
Force primarily dedicated to offensive
bombardment over land. Even more
damaging, the low status of naval pilots
within the service (a point that Britts
does mention) meant that the development of the aerial tactics necessary to
use the air weapon efficiently as an element of sea warfare suffered accordingly.
Similarly, the book almost totally
overlooks the reasons why the Japanese
outclassed everyone (the U.S. Navy
included) when it came to the operation
of multiship carrier groups in 1941, even
though there has been some excellent
scholarship on this subject during the
last couple of decades, most notably
from Jonathan Parshall and Anthony
Tully in their book Shattered Sword
(Potomac Books, 2005). After all, it was
not a matter merely of the technical
competence of the Japanese A6M Zekes
and B5N Kates, as impressive as these
aircraft were. The impact of the planes
was magnified by the techniques the
Japanese had developed for operating
multiple air wings at sea and massing
their effects. Unlike other navies—whose
carriers still operated as individuals,
launching small groups of aircraft of all
disciplines in discrete packages—the
Japanese alone had mastered the art of
role-specializing decks. Carriers within
the group coordinated their launches,
such that half contributed dive-bombers
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to complement the torpedo/level bombers of the other half, thus producing a
large, coordinated force of aircraft in
each wave, while greatly simplifying the
second-strike options (with each carrier’s contribution simply being reversed).
Chapter 5 therefore could have been
enhanced greatly by references to morecontemporary scholarship in this area.
So, with no new exploration of the
operational imbalance between the two
sides, the only real “reconsideration” on
offer is the actual significance (to Great
Britain and its dominions) of Admiral
James Somerville’s decision on April 9,
1942, to preserve his fleet for another
day. While certainly humiliating, this
again was hardly the epoch-making
event that is suggested. The Royal Navy,
in company with many others, both
before and after, arguably simply was
adjusting to the changing realities of
combat experience, as compared with
prewar expectations. It had happened
earlier, during World War I and off
Norway in 1940, and it was going to
happen to the U.S. Navy off Guadalcanal
a few months later. As for the impact
that this had on the perceived vulnerabilities of Australia and India, this is
probably something that is understated
in the other Western accounts and
Britts, as an Australian, is in the right
place to redress this balance. Whether
the Japanese could have followed
through in 1942 is almost immaterial;
the perceptions were probably there.
Finally, although obviously not as
importantly, the book has its fair share
of questionable statements, exaggerations, and even spelling errors, none
of which help its credibility. Perhaps
most notable are the inaccuracies,
which include the alleged “unabated”
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construction of Japanese cruisers
throughout the 1930s (p. 107), when in
fact cruiser construction stopped after
the completion of the Takao class in
1932 and did not resume until 1937. The
“decks filled with aircraft” at Midway
(p. 156) is an assertion Parshall proved
false long ago, while the idea of the “F6F
and TBF being near twins” (p. 163)
makes no sense, given their completely
different roles and specifications. The
exaggerations—such as that Somerville’s
fleet would “not [have been] out of place
at Tsushima” (p. 16), and the reference
to “octogenarian” aircraft (p. 47), when
aviation itself was barely thirty-five
years old—are just unnecessary.
To summarize, this book probably
will disappoint serious historians and
researchers, but nevertheless it does
gather together a host of useful
thoughts about the problems of block
obsolescence and the integration of new
capabilities within a fleet in peacetime.
Given that these points may stimulate
future work or serve to educate the
amateur enthusiast, all is not lost. But
the book could have been so much more.
ANGUS ROSS

Cyber Mercenaries: The State, Hackers, and Power, by Tim Maurer. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge
Univ. Press, 2018. 266 pages. $29.99 (paperback).

The use of proxies as a part of the competition and conflict between states is
an ancient and time-tested method. Yet
from the mercenaries of the pharaoh’s
army in ancient Egypt to private military
and security companies accompanying
militaries in modern conflict, each
relationship between a state and its
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proxies is unique and is driven by a
multitude of factors. In this timely and
well-researched book, Tim Maurer
examines how modern states use cyber
proxies to pursue their geopolitical aims.
The introduction of Maurer’s book is a
deep dive into the evolution of the use
of cyber proxies by states. Unlike many
authors of popular books examining
the use of cyber operations, Maurer
feels no need to sensationalize the cyber
realm. Instead, we get a realistic and
accurate assessment of the capabilities
of cyber proxies. If there is a weakness
to his introduction, it is that he focuses
on traditional “hacking,” or denial-ofservice cyber operations. Although
this approach is quite understandable
and is representative of most scholarly
work on cyber, recent trends suggest a
greater use of algorithmic exploitation
to conduct information-operation
campaigns. These campaigns are unique
in that they do not appear to break
any laws, domestic or international.
Following the introduction, Maurer
proceeds to provide a logical, analytical
framework for categorizing cyber proxies and how states use them. This is no
small task, given the variety of roles and
relationships these groups have vis-à-vis
their respective state organizations.
Maurer organizes the various modes of
proxy use into three main categories: delegation, orchestration, and sanctioning.
Delegation is the proxy relationship in
which the state exerts the greatest degree
of control over its proxy. An example
is the relationship between the U.S.
Defense Department and a contractor
providing a cyber capability. In orchestration, the state may provide limited
logistical support or general guidance
to the proxy, but stops short of issuing
specific instructions. This relationship
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often exists when there is a common
ideology between state and proxy.
Sanctioning is a relationship whereby the
proxy is permitted to engage in malicious activities, so long as the ends align
with the goals of the state. An example
is Russian criminal organizations that
are permitted to operate as long as they
target only non-Russians with their
criminal activities and occasionally
turn their skills to patriotic purposes.
The next two sections are the strength
of Maurer’s book. He closely examines
all three proxy relationships, identifying
the strengths and weaknesses of each
type and using historical examples to
illustrate his conclusions. Maurer clearly
establishes historically the benefit of
proxies to states and explains why
states are likely to use cyber proxies as
a tool for the foreseeable future. Maurer
also does identify the standards for
international legal responsibility that
states bear for their proxies; however,
after initially identifying these standards,
he discusses them only minimally
throughout his later case studies.
National security practitioners likely
will gain the most insight from these
case studies, in which Maurer applies his
analytical framework to the use of proxies by the United States, Iran, Russia,
and China. Drawing on the most recent
events to highlight the use of cyber proxies by these states, he weaves together
the economic, social, and political realities of each state and analyzes how these
factors affect its use of proxies. Although
it is tempting to view proxy relationships as being determined solely by the
governmental actors, Maurer reveals
how proxies often are a natural outgrowth of their societies. For example,
he discusses how a combination of
excellent technical training and poor job

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2018

Autumn2018Review.indb 155

155

B O O K R E V I E WS

prospects has led to the increased use
of sanctioning as a proxy relationship in
countries of the former Soviet Union.
In conclusion, Cyber Mercenaries is both
enjoyable to read and an important
contribution to scholarship on the study
of cyber conflicts. It dispels many of the
myths and misunderstandings surrounding the use of proxies and provides an
analytical framework that can be applied
easily when following news reporting
on international conflicts in cyberspace.
It should be on the bookshelf of every
scholar and practitioner in this vital
field of national security studies.
JEFFREY BILLER

Shadow over the Atlantic: The Luftwaffe and the
U-boats, 1943–45, by Robert Forsyth. Oxford,
U.K.: Osprey, 2017. 312 pages. $30.

As the Second World War recedes ever
further into the past, more and more
works emerge that focus on historical
back pastures or operations either
overlooked or examined only lightly
until now. Shadow over the Atlantic is an
example of such works, but it is also a
welcome contribution to understanding
the vital Axis anticonvoy campaign and
the role of the Luftwaffe in waging war
at sea. Robert Forsyth is an experienced
author, with a specialty in World War
II German aircraft. He tells the story of
the attempts by the German navy and
air force to coordinate operations so
as to maneuver Admiral Karl Dönitz’s
U-boats into position to savage Allied
convoys. In doing so, Forsyth focuses
nearly exclusively on the operations of
Long-Range Reconnaissance Group
5, Atlantic (designated FAGr-5).
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Arguably, the most well-known German aircraft of the convoy war was
the Focke-Wulf 200 Condor. FAGr-5
instead flew the newer, lesser-known,
four-engine, twin-tailed Junkers (Ju)
290. Forsyth, with the passion of
the true enthusiast, goes into great
detail concerning the development and
construction of the aircraft. No significant aspect of the plane is overlooked,
from cockpit controls to armaments
to the background color of the FAGr-5
emblem. Aircraft enthusiasts will find
this detailed information of great
interest, but lay readers may find just
a bit too much emphasis on—at times
literally—the nuts and bolts of the Ju-290.
By 1943, the tide in the U-boat war
was turning against Admiral Dönitz,
Germany’s supreme submarine admiral.
His best commanders were dying, the
ratio of U-boat losses to Allied tonnage
sunk was rising, and the amount of
ocean free from Allied air surveillance
was decreasing rapidly. German air
reconnaissance was deemed essential
if there was to be any realistic hope
of bringing wolf packs into action
against the convoys, and thereby truly
hurting the Allied war effort. Had the
German navy possessed its own air arm,
it might have been easier to provide
this; instead, the Luftwaffe never was
willing to give maritime reconnaissance
anything like the support it needed.
Forsyth details how FAGr-5 went about
its duties. He describes how search
patterns were established and flown. The
nascent use of airdropped buoys to try to
track convoys and serve as navigational
beacons is examined, as are efforts to
use other emerging technologies.
For the pilots and aircrews of FAGr-5,
Atlantic reconnaissance missions were
long, demanding, and increasingly
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dangerous as Allied air coverage became
more proficient and pervasive. Missions
routinely exceeded twelve hours in duration. Weather conditions frequently were
miserable, which also increased the risk
of navigational error and mishap. Allied
escort carriers and long-range, landbased fighter-bomber patrols increased
in number, downing several of the
group’s Ju-290s and damaging others.
Forsyth tracks the losses and replacement of the group’s aircraft with great
care, to a level at which it is possible
to track individual airframes over the
period. His accounts of air-to-air combat
are analytical and detailed. Allied
reports are included to good effect.
Over the period discussed, attempts to
direct U-boats into positions to attack
convoys became less and less effective.
Forsyth explains that this was owing
in large part to the Allied ability to
intercept and decode German radio
traffic. This effort was so effective that
the British often knew when Ju-290s
were actually on patrol and when the
next aircraft would be airborne.
After the invasion of Normandy in
June 1944, things became increasingly
difficult for FAGr-5. Resistance elements began affecting the squadrons’
operations. At times, the group formed
ground-combat units and cleared local
villages of resistance fighters, taking
losses in the process. Getting supplies
and needed parts from Germany took
ever longer. Morale was low, but, as
the records Forsyth accessed make
clear, no one admitted such “defeatist”
sentiments. During the same month as
the Allied invasion, one of the group’s
more unusual missions was the rescue of
German meteorologists from Greenland.
Inevitably, FAGr-5 eventually flew its
last missions over the Atlantic. Group
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aircraft then departed for friendly
fields in Germany—leaving the ground
element to get out of France on its
own. The account of the latter’s trek
across France—in an eclectic convoy of
vehicles with cobbled-together armaments and increasingly diverse groups
of personnel who joined during the
retreat—makes for fascinating reading.
The trip was not without danger, and
several firefights erupted between group
personnel and French resistance units.
Yet for all the excellent detail that
Shadow over the Atlantic provides
concerning FAGr-5, the human element
is lacking. The planes and the operations
are the center of attention; the men of
the group are identified only rarely.
There is the occasional mention of
encouraging sports to boost morale or
how the loss of a crew was unfortunate,
but in the end the vast majority of the
men of FAGr-5 are simply ciphers.
RICHARD J. NORTON

Just War Reconsidered: Strategy, Ethics, and Theory, by Lieutenant General James M. Dubik, USA
(Ret.). Foreword by General Martin Dempsey,
USA (Ret.). Lexington: Univ. Press of Kentucky,
2016. 238 pages. $50.

Writer, lecturer, retired general officer,
and PhD, James Dubik has made a
significant contribution to military
scholarship and the practice of war
fighting with this book. He has introduced a major revision in just war
theory that undoubtedly will transform
the viewpoint of supporters and critics
on this philosophical tradition in applied
ethics. Dubik understands that his
proposed revision will not answer all
objections and naturally will be subject
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to claims of deficiencies and other
criticisms, but he rightly argues that his
revised defense of the just war tradition
advances a new perspective—one
that undeniably will alter the way in
which current and future generations
interpret the justification of war.
Demonstrating a mastery of detail
and a clarity of understanding, Dubik
persuasively employs the methodology
of historiography to support and defend
his war-waging principles, basing
them on examples from the Civil War,
World War II, the Vietnam War, and
the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. This
methodological technique, reminiscent
of Michael Walzer’s Just and Unjust
Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical
Illustrations (Basic Books, 1977), is both
convincing and engaging for those who
study history and the art of war. By
contrast with those who are academics
and stress concepts primarily and praxis
secondarily, as well as with those who
are warfighters and stress praxis primarily and concepts secondarily, Dubik is a
former Army general who experienced
the challenges of warfare, yet is now a
professor at Georgetown University. He
balances both theory and practice in Just
War Reconsidered, his magnum opus.
Although Dubik respects and acknowledges the profound contribution to just
war theory made by Walzer—as part of
a long line of philosophers and theologians, including Aristotle, Augustine,
Thomas Aquinas, and Hugo Grotius,
to name only a few—he criticizes the
customary separation of jus ad bellum
(justice in going to war) and jus in bello
(justice in waging war). Walzer presents
the usual understanding: that senior civil
leaders debate the criteria that justify
going to war, represented by jus ad bellum, and then, once a national decision
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has been reached, it is the primary
responsibility of senior military leaders
to fight the war in accordance with jus
in bello norms. Convincingly, through
historical references and extrapolations,
Dubik demonstrates that successful
wars have been won not only on the
basis of tactical excellence but also on
the strategic merit that both civil and
military leaders have provided. Dubik
insists that just war proponents have
focused exclusively on the tactical
dimension of jus in bello, thereby
omitting the strategic facet of waging
war, including the necessary public
legitimation, determination of end-state
goals, provision of logistical support,
and preparation for reconstruction.
The five principles laid out—continuous
dialogue, final decision authority,
managerial competence, war legitimacy,
and resignation—presuppose the classic
benchmarks of proportionality and
discrimination in jus in bello, but these
additional five strategic components fill
in the gap of what is tragically lacking
in the standard just war formulation.
When senior civil and military leaders
fail to optimize strategic coordination
of war via a dynamic partnership
involving intense dialogue, the costs
of war escalate in both economic and
human-casualty terms, rendering
those leaders who squandered the war
efforts morally culpable. Unforgettably,
General Dempsey in his foreword
asserts that one of the most important
and haunting lines from the entire
book consists of these few words: “The
difficulty of conditions that may mitigate
responsibility does not erase it” (p. viii).
Dubik’s critique is not a replacement
of Walzer’s ideas defending just war
but rather an addendum that augments
the value of strategic planning and
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cooperation between civil and military
leaders. On reflection, a reader might
question whether the strategic aspect
of jus in bello might not exist already,
to some extent, within jus ad bellum,
considering military advisement as
part of the moral calculation of proportionality and probability of success.
Additionally, the reader might wonder
whether the acceptable range across the
military operations continuum would be
determined best if the strategic dialogue
and robust collaboration between
civil and military leadership that Dubik
champions went on not only as part of
jus in bello but at every stage of war and
peace. For instance, the war-waging
principle of continuous dialogue also
might apply to jus ante bellum (justice
before war: strategic planning to shape
fragile states so as to prevent war),
jus ad bellum (justice in going to war:
debating all nonkinetic and military
options), and jus post bellum (justice
after war: planning for reconstruction)
to achieve jus pax (just peace).
Overall, Dubik’s strategic supplement
to the category of jus in bello is a
legacy that posterity will credit respectfully to the experience and wisdom of
a distinguished scholar and warrior.
EDWARD ERWIN

Never Call Me a Hero: A Legendary American
Dive-Bomber Pilot Remembers the Battle of Midway, by N. Jack Kleiss, with Timothy Orr and
Laura Orr. New York: William Morrow, 2017. 336
pages. $26.99.

June 4, 1942, stands out as one of the
most pivotal moments in American
naval history. The events of that day
continue to be analyzed, scrutinized, and
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debated down to the smallest details.
However, few authors can speak with
the authority of Captain Jack Kleiss,
USN (Ret.). In his memoir of his naval
service, Kleiss gives special attention
to the part he and the rest of Scouting
Squadron 6 played in the battle of
Midway. The resulting narrative is
compelling and offers a new perspective
on the battle. Most histories of the battle
try to explain the extended air battle as
a complete picture, but Kleiss eschews
this approach. It is his own story that
the reader follows through the battle,
with his personal triumphs and tragedies
sharing the stage with the overall
description of the desperate victory.
Kleiss was a 1938 Naval Academy
graduate from Kansas who joined
Scouting 6 in 1941 after his mandatory two years in the surface fleet and
flight school. His telling of his story is
authoritative throughout, owing to an
array of primary resources, including
his wartime diary, letters, logbooks, and
unit after-action reports. Although he
penned his memoir some seventy years
after Midway, the account is exceedingly detailed and surprisingly candid.
Kleiss was a lieutenant (junior grade)
at Midway and served as Scouting 6’s
second flight commander, directly
behind squadron commander Lieutenant Earl Gallaher. From that position,
Kleiss put bombs on target on Kaga
during the momentous afternoon air
strike of June 4. Later that afternoon, he
put his bombs into Hiryu to finish off
the Japanese carrier force, and he also
would get a hit on Mikuma on June 6.
For his actions throughout the battle, the
Navy awarded Kleiss the Navy Cross.
By telling the story from his perspective
in the cockpit, Kleiss avoids many of the
discussions of strategy and operations
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that dominate the historiography of the
battle. However, he specifically cites
and particularly disagrees with Walter
Lord’s Incredible Victory (Harper and
Row, 1967) as a flawed work that has
mis-steered the narrative of the battle
and perpetuates the misperception that
the remarkable victory was largely the
product of luck. “I prefer to believe we
won the battle because we knew our
stuff just a little bit better than our foes
knew theirs. If luck played any role at
all, it came in the fact that a few of us
pilots lived to fly another day, while
many others died. Luck determined who
survived, not which side won the battle”
(p. 280). Additionally, Kleiss opposes the
notion that the victory can be credited
mostly to the admirals in charge of
the action, Frank Jack Fletcher and
Raymond A. Spruance. Kleiss considers
the plans for the battle to have been
“overly elaborate” (p. 280) and deems the
pilots responsible for the victory. Kleiss
credits the tactical proficiency of the
aviators and the mental flexibility of the
squadron leaders and air group commanders with taking advantage of the
situation and delivering a sudden, lethal
strike—in spite of the admirals’ plan.
If June 4, 1942, stands out to the public,
it haunts Kleiss and colors the entire
tone of his retelling of the battle.
“As the twenty-first century dawned,
the Battle of Midway wouldn’t leave me
alone. To answer the flurry of questions
accurately, I had to relive the battle
over and over again. I had to come
face-to-face with memories I’d long
since buried. I had to recall the smell
of the salt air, the roar of the wind as it
rushed past my cockpit, the sight of red
flames coming up from the exploding
ships, and other such vivid sensations
for which words will never do justice.
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I had to summon the faces of friends
I’d lost and the sadness that tortured
me as I whiled away the aftermath
of the battle in my bunk. Today, that
day—Thursday, June 4, 1942—hovers
over my shoulder like an annoying
friend, constantly chirping in my ear,
‘I am the most important day of your
life.’ It will not leave me alone” (p. xiv).
Kleiss’s writing (in which he was
assisted by Timothy and Laura Orr
of Old Dominion University and the
Hampton Roads Naval Museum) is easy
to read even though it is laced with a
slew of technical details, along with his
vivid recollections. Anyone wishing
to get a better insight into the way in
which a scouting squadron operated in
the early part of the war should consult
this memoir as the first step. However,
the emotion carried in the pages gives
the work the weight that a secondary
source must struggle to provide. It is one

thing to understand academically the
meaning of the sacrifice of the torpedo
bombing squadrons, but it is another
to read Kleiss’s account of parting with
his best friend on the flight deck of
Enterprise, with Kleiss in tears, knowing
he will never see his friend again.
Never Call Me a Hero challenges the
narrative of Midway that is dominated
by the admirals and operational details.
Kleiss freely admits that his conclusion
is biased toward the evidence of his
own experiences. However, the book
constitutes a remarkably detailed
and comprehensive account from
one of the key actors in the events of
Midway. It stands out as an exceptionally
well-rounded military memoir that is
worthwhile for both the general reader
and the serious student of the battle.
ANDREW J. ROSCOE

OUR REVIEWERS
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cyberspace. Stockton Center faculty teach the core curriculum and electives at the Naval War College, as well as advanced international law courses around the world.
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REFLEC TIONS ON READING

Professor John E. Jackson of the Naval War College is the Program Man-

T

ager for the Chief of Naval Operations Professional Reading Program.

he Chief of Naval Operations Professional Reading Program is a professional
reading program, which differentiates it from a simple list of books intended
to be read for relaxation and entertainment. As such, the techniques a reader
should use with these books are different from those of the casual reader. Admiral John Richardson, USN, is a fan of Mortimer Adler and Charles van Doren’s
highly regarded How to Read a Book: The Classic Guide to Intelligent Reading.
In the book, the authors provide some suggestions on how a reader can get the
most out of his or her time. (Quotations are from the Touchstone Books / Simon
& Schuster edition of 1972.)
Television, radio, and all the sources of amusement and information that surround
us in our daily lives are also artificial props. They can give us the impression that our
minds are active, because we are required to react to stimuli from outside. But the
power of those external stimuli to keep us going is limited. They are like drugs. We
grow used to them, and we continuously need more and more of them. Eventually,
they have little or no effect. Then, if we lack resources within ourselves, we cease to
grow intellectually, morally, and spiritually. And when we cease to grow, we begin to
die. Reading well, which means reading actively, is thus not only a good in itself, nor
is it merely a means to advancement in our work or career. It also serves to keep our
minds alive and growing. (p. 346)

They go on to say:
A good book does reward you for trying to read it. The best books reward you most
of all. The reward, of course, is of two kinds. First, there is the improvement in your
reading skill that occurs when you successfully tackle a good, difficult work. Second—
and this in the long run is much more important—a good book can teach you about
the world and about yourself. You learn more than how to read better; you also learn
more about life. You become wiser. Not just more knowledgeable—books that provide nothing but information can produce that result. But wiser, in the sense that you
are more deeply aware of the great and enduring truths of human life. (p. 340)
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The authors advocate a technique they identify as analytical reading:
The analytical reader must ask many, and organized, questions of what he is reading.
We do want to emphasize here that analytical reading is always intensely active. On
this level of reading, the reader grasps a book—the metaphor is apt—and works at it
until the book becomes his own. Francis Bacon once remarked that “some books are
to be tasted, others to be swallowed, and some few to be chewed and digested.” Reading a book analytically is chewing and digesting it. (p. 19)

Adler and van Doren recommend that readers ask themselves four primary
questions as they read:
1.	 “What is the book about as a whole? You must try to discover the leading
theme of the book, and how the author develops this theme in an orderly
way by subdividing it into its essential subordinate themes or topics.”
2.	 “What is being said in detail, and how? You must try to discover the main
ideas, assertions, and arguments that constitute the author’s particular
message.”
3.	 “Is the book true, in whole or part? When you understand a book,
however, you are obligated, if you are reading seriously, to make up your
own mind. Knowing the author’s mind is not enough.”
4.	 “What of it? If the book has given you information, you must ask about
its significance. Why does the author think it is important to know these
things? Is it important to you to know them? And if the book has not only
informed you, but also enlightened you, it is necessary to seek further
enlightenment by asking what else follows, what is further implied or
suggested” (pp. 46–47).
The authors go to the heart of what I believe it means to be an informed sailor
when they note the following: “We must be more than a nation of functional
literates. We must become a nation of truly competent readers, recognizing all
that the word competent implies. Nothing less will satisfy the needs of the world
that is coming” (p. 31).

JOHN E. JACKSON

(This article is adapted from Reflections on Reading, Naval War College Review
67, no. 1 [Winter 2014].)
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